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A bstract
This thesis aims to show that usually neglected compositional changes of the labour force over the last 
30 years (more young workers, more women, more workers with low attachment to  the labour market, 
less experienced workers, more educated workers), can explain important stylized facts.
First, about unemployment: the countries with high female unemployment are also countries with 
high young unemployment (the correlation across OECD countries between the two rates is positive and 
quite high at about 0.84). This can be explained by a shift towards more competition among young 
/  women in a secondary labour market due to increased labour supply of the two groups. About 4 
points of total unemployment are associated with observed changes in labour supply, if endogeneity of 
participation variables with respect to unemployment is properly accounted for. Second, about wage 
inequality: the most important trend in wage inequality in the US is the rising return to experience, 
or equivalently the deterioration of the relative position of younger workers. The second fact can be 
explained by a historical change in the skill composition of the labour force - workers though more 
educated are yet less experienced. This substitution of skills can also explain a significant part of the 
unexplained rise in the return to education, depending on the substitutability between education and 
experience in human capital: more inexperienced workers in the labour force generate a relative scarcity 
of human capital that increases the demand for education.
In the theoretical part of the thesis, two trends of the OECD labour markets are explored within 
matching models. First, it is shown that more short-term employment can be explained by higher active 
population growth and lower productivity growth. Second, stronger urban unemployment gradients 
and higher aggregate unemployment can be shown to reinforce each other when location choices within 
agglomerations are endogenous.
Thesis Supervisor: Christopher A. Pissarides
Title: Professor, Department of Economics, London School of Economics
2
Modifications to the PhD dissertation 
“Changes in the Composition of Labour Supply.
Implications for Wages and Unemployment” 
by Etienne Wasmer
p21, second paragraph: “twice the” , instead of “twofold” 
p27, last line: replace “attack” by “address”
p28, last paragraph: “The matching function even allows us to” instead of “The matching 
function allows us to even”
p29, last paragraph: “monotonically” instead of “monotonously” 
p30, first paragraph: “arises” instead of “come back”
p46, first paragraph: “has become much less common” instead of “has become very less 
frequent”
p54, first paragraph: “continuously increasing” instead of “continuously augmenting”
p60, appendix C: “in the last sentence” instead of “in the above equation”
p63, third line: “substantial” instead o f “substantive”
p63, first paragraph: “wage rigidity should not persist for that a long time”
p65, first paragraph: “...participation from being conclusive” instead of “participation to be
conclusive
p66, second paragraph: replace “more than 25 years old workers” by “adult workers” 
p66, second paragraph: replace “who are more unemployed” by “who have higher 
unemployment rates”
p75, last line: replace “be thought without” by “be usefully analysed without incorporating” 
p 89, third line: replace “we are safe of the criticism” by “the problem is not serious” 
p91, last paragraph: “over the period 1970-1995, changes in the level of labour supply reflect 
its compositional changes”
p 100, first column first table: “683 (3.3%)” instead of “(3.3%)”
p i 10. second paragraph: “advanced” instead of “imposed” and “inequality-increasing” instead 
o f  “dispersing”
p i l l ,  first line: “and” instead of “whereas”
p 131, “Figure 3-9: Comparison of the price of skills and the quantities supplied (in efficiency  
units)”
p i 69, second paragraph: “appearance” instead of “apparition”
■\
3
13
13
16
20
20
21
21
21
23
24
26
26
27
27
28
2-
29
30
30
30
31
Contents
0.1 Introduction: why an interest in labour s u p p ly ? ............................................................  13
0.1.1 Motivation, objections and an sw ers ..................................................................... 13
0.1.2 Some selected stylised facts about unemployment and wage inequality . . 10
0,2 Labour Supply with Homogenous w o rk e rs ...................................................................... 20
0.2.1 Level of the labour fo rc e ......................................................................................... 20
0.2.2 Growth rate of the labour f o rc e ............................................................................ 21
0.3 Labour Supply with Heterogeneous w o rk e rs ..................................................................  21
0.3.1 The simplest compositional e ffe c t........................................................................  21
0.3.2 Com petition among g r o u p s ..................................................................................  23
0.3.3 Are the groups appropriately d e f in e d ? ..............................................................  24
0.4 Organisation of the t h e s i s ...................................................................................................  26
0.4.1 Turnover (chapter 1 ) ................................................................................................ 26
0.4.2 Macroeconomic impact of labour supply (chapter 2 ) ........................................ 27
0.4.3 Skills: empirics (chapter 3) ................................................................................... 27
0.4.4 Skills: a model (chapter 4 ) ......................................................................................  28
0.4.5 Com petition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Du­
alism (chapter 5 ) .......................................................................................................  28
0.4.6 Equilibrium Urban Unemployment (chapter 6) ..............................................  20
0.5 More on participation d e c is io n s .......................................................................................... 30
0.5.1 Endogeneity of participation with macroeconomic d a t a ..................................... 30
0.5.2 Endogeneity of participation with microeconomic d a t a .................................  30
0.6 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................  31
3
1 Trends in worker flows on th e  labour m arket and som e consequences for 
unem ploym ent: France 1968-93
1.1 In tro d u c tio n .................................................................................................................................
1.2 Transform ation of the da ta  ...................................................................................................
1.2.1 The da ta  .......................................................................................................................
1.2.2 Correction for the multiple transitions...................................................................
1.3 Decomposition in trends and c y c le s .....................................................................................
1.3.1 Trends in the transform ed d a t a ..............................................................................
1.3.2 C y c le s ..............................................................................................................................
1.4 The rise in the fraction of job movers going; to  unem ploym ent.....................................
1.4.1 Men and women.............................................................................................................
1.4.2 Demography ................................................................................................................
1.5 Ergodic D istribution of Unemployment Under Different A ssum ptions......................
1.6 A comparison with the UK......................................................................................................
1.7 Secondary workers effects in P r a n c e ? ..................................................................................
1.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................
2 C an Labour Supply Explain th e  R ise in U nem ploym ent and Inter-G roup  
W age Inequality in th e  OECD?
2.1 Some f a c t s .....................................................................................................................................
2.1.1 Cross-country correlations of unemployment by g r o u p ..................................
2.1.2 Unemployment by gender and a g e .......................................................................
2.1.3 Size and composition of labour supply and of female labour supply . . .
2.1.4 W a g e s ..............................................................................................................................
2.1.5 S u m m a r y .......................................................................................................................
2.2 A m o d e l ........................................................................................................................................
2.2.1 Labour supply .............................................................................................................
2.2.2 Elasticity of com plem entarity and cross-elasticity of dem and for labour .
2.2.3 Labour d e m a n d .............................................................................................................
2.2.4 Endogeneity of participation ..................................................................................
2.2.5 S im u la tio n s ...................................................................................................................
33
33
36
36
36
38
38
41
45
46
47
49
52
53
56
62
65
65
66
67
72
75
75
75
76
78
80
82
4
2.2.6 Conclusion of the m o d e l .................................................................................................82
2.3 The empirical s t r a te g y ................................................................................................................ 83
2.4 Cross-sectional analysis................................................................................................................. 84
2.4.1 F irst cross-sectional analysis: the centralization of wage-bargaining . . . .  85
2.4.2 Second cross-sectional analysis: the Jackm an, Layard and Nickell’s s truc­
tu ra l approach.....................................................................................................................89
2.5 Time-Series E v idence ....................................................................................................................90
2.5.1 Co-integration .................................................................................................................. 92
2.5.2 C a u s a l i ty ...........................................................................  93
2.5.3 V A R ...................................................................................................................................... 93
2.5.4 C o n c lu sio n s .........................................................................................................................94
2.6 Concluding comments and future r e s e a rc h ........................................................................... 96
3 T h e labour m arket consequences o f dem ographic trends: France and U SA  
1964-94 109
3.1 h it re d u c tio n ..................................................................................................................  109
3.2 Changes in labour supply and relative wages ...................................................................113
3.2.1 USA 1964-91 .................................................................................................................  114
3.2.2 France 1970-93 ..............................................................................................................  115
3.3 Education vs E x p erien ce ............................................................................................................119
3.3.1 D e c o m p o s itio n ................................................................................................................ 119
3.3.2 Potential P ro b le m s ..........................................................................................................120
3.3.3 U S A .....................................................................................................................................121
3.3.4 F r a n c e ................................................................................................................................. 125
3.4 Implications for the labour dem and shift hypothesis ..................................................... 130
3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 133
3.6 Appendix: Description of the d a ta s e ts ....................................................................................... 134
3.6.1 US CPS: 1964-1991   134
3.6.2 French surveys Formation et Qualifications Frofessionelles: 1970, 1977, 1985, 1993136
4 Labour Supply D ynam ics, U nem ploym ent and E ducation  138
4.1 In tro d u c tio n .................................................................................................................................. 138
4.2 N o ta t io n s ...................................................................................................................................... 140
4.2.1 Production tec h n o lo g y ................................................................................................... 140
4.2.2 W o rk e rs .............................................................................................................................. 141
4.2.3 E x p e r ie n c e ....................................................................................................................... 141
4.2.4 U n e m p lo y m e n t.................................................................................................................142
4.2.5 Endogenous p a r t ic ip a t io n ............................................................................................ 143
4.3 Model W ithout E d u c a tio n ..........................................................................................................143
4.3.1 Labour supply .................................................................................................................144
4.3.2 The perfectly flexible e c o n o m y .................................................................................. 144
4.3.3 A perfectly rigid e c o n o m y ............................................................................................ 145
4.3.4 Interm ediate flexibility: the wage curve ................................................................. 140
4.3.5 C o n c lu s io n s ........................................................................................................................151
4.4 E d u c a tio n .......................................................................................................................................151
4.4.1 Supply of education in steady-state  e q u il ib r ia .......................................................152
4.4.2 Demand for E d u c a tio n ................................................................................................... 153
4.4.3 The rigid e c o n o m y ..........................................................................................................154
4.5 Empirical E v id en ce ......................................................................................................................154
4.5.1 Labour supply composition of the labour f o r c e .....................................................156
4.5.2 Real e x p e rien ce .................................................................................................................156
4.5.3 Tim ing of the  changes in the composition of the labour f o r c e .......................... 160
4.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 161
5 C om petition  for Jobs in a Growing E conom y and th e  Em ergence o f D ualism  165
5.1 In tro d u c tio n ...................................................................................................................................165
5.1.1 Dualism and the emergence of d u a lis m .....................................................................165
5.1.2 More tem porary contracts: need for flexibility or o ther f a c to r s ? .....................166
5.1.3 A job-search model with growth ............................................................................... 169
5.2 The m o d e l.......................................................................................................................................171
5.2.1 F i r m s .................................................................................................................................. 171
6
5.2.2 Search and m a tc h in g ...................................................................................................... 172
5.2.3 Profit M a x im iz a tio n ...................................................................................................... 174
5.2.4 W orkers’ M aximization ................................................................................................175
5.2.5 Wage b a rg a in in g ............................................................................................................. 176
5.3 S o lu t io n ........................................................................................................................................... 17S
5.3.1 The system of e q u a tio n s ................................................................................................178
5.3.2 Endogenous emergence of job d u a l i s m .....................................................................178
5.3.3 Aggregate E ffec ts ............................................................................................................. 181
5.3.4 The shift of the Beveridge C u r v e ...............................................................................184
5.4 Labour force g r o w t h ....................................................................................................................184
5.5 S im u la tio n s .....................................................................................................................................186
5.6 Empirical E v id en ce ....................................................................................................................... 191
5.6.1 The rise in turnover between Employment and Unemployment in France . 191
5.6.2 Test of the m o d e l............................................................................................................. 192
5.7 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................194
6 Equilibrium  Urban U nem ploym ent 201
6.1 In tro d u c tio n .................................................................................................................................... 201
6.2 The model and general n o t a t io n s ............................................................................................205
6.3 Equilibrium  urban co n fig u ra tio n s ............................................................................................207
6.4 The labour m arket equilibrium with exogenous w a g e ........................................................212
6.4.1 Free-entry condition and labour d e m a n d ................................................................. 213
6.4.2 S teady-state labour m arket e q u i l ib r iu m .................................................................215
6.5 Wage b a r g a in in g .......................................................................................................................... 218
6.5.1 S teady-state labour m arket e q u i l ib r iu m .................................................................220
6.5.2 Existence and uniqueness of urban e q u il ib r iu m ................................................... 221
6.6 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................222
7
List o f F igures
0-1 Trend in unemployment in France ..................................................................................... 15
0-2 Unemployment rate  by g e n d e r............................................................................................... 17
0-3 Returns to Experience and Quantities of Experience Supplied. Com parison be­
tween France and the USA ................................................................................................... 19
1-1 Transition Rates From Employment, F ra n c e .................................................................... 39
1-2 Transition Rates From Unemployment, France.................................................................. 40
1-3 Transition Rates From Inactivity, France............................................................................ 41
1-4 Predicted Transition Rates in 1968 with Cycl -- 80.9% (left) Cycl =  87.3% (mid­
dle) Cyel =  74.5% ( r i g h t ) ...................................................................................................... 44
1-5 Predicted Transition Rates in 1992 with Cycl =  80.9% (left) Cycl — 87.3% (mid­
dle) Cycl =  74.5%) ( r i g h t ) ...................................................................................................... 44
1-6 Transition Rates From Employment, male workers, France........................................... 46
1-7 Transition Rates From Employment, female workers, France....................................... 47
1-8 Transition Rates From Employment, 25-49 year male workers, France..................... 48
1-9 Transition Rates From Employment, 25-49 year female workers, France.................. 48
1-10 Comparison of different sim ulated unemployment rates, France.................................. 51
1-11 Transition Rates, U K ................................................................................................................. 52
1-12 Comparison of different sim ulated unemployment rates, U K ........................................ 53
1-13 Female Labor Force, France. Thousands of workers........................................................
1-14 Evolution of real wages, France.............................................................................................. 55
1-15 Comparison of different cycle indicators, France............................................................... 57
1-16 Income and Price E f f e c t ......................................................................................................... 60
8
2-1 Unemployment R ate by G e n d e r ................................................................................................ 67
2-2 Unemployment by Gender, Adult W o rk e rs ............................................................................68
2-3 Employment Rates by ('lender (Men Left, Women Right) Europe, USA, Scandi­
navia, Japan  .................................................................................................................................. 69
2-4 Participation by G e n d e r ..............................................................................................................70
2-5 (lender Composition of the labour f o r c e ............................................................................... 71
2-6 Relative Wage A djustm ent the USA and F ra n ce ..................................................................74
2-7 Participation (PART) and Unemployment Rates (U) Deseasonalized, Logarithm s 91
2-8 Impulse Response of a VAR estim ated with 2 lags. Solid hue: participation  ; 
dashed line: u n e m p lo y m e n t....................................................................................................... 95
3-1 Gender Composition of the Labour Force, O E C D .............................................................I l l
3-2 Age Composition of the Labour Force, O E C D ................................................................... 112
3-3 USA: Changes in Labour Supply and Relative W ag es ......................................................116
3-4 France. Labour Supply and Relative W a g e s .......................................................................118
3-5 USA. Skill Composition of the Labour Force (Education, Experience) ....................124
3-6 USA. Skill Composition of the Labour Force (Education, Experience, Interaction
T e r m ) ..............................................................................................................................................126
3-7 France. Skill Composition of the Employed Population (Education, Experience) . 128
3-8 France. Skill Composition of the  Employed Population (Education, Experience,
Interaction T e rm ) ..........................................................................................................................129
3-9 Comparison of the price of skills and the efficient quantities supplied, USA and 
F r a n c e ..............................................................................................................................................131
4-1 Equilibrium  of the ratio of marginal productivities of skilled and unskilled workers 146
4-2 Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with high dem and for the unskilled . . . 146
4-3 Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with interm ediate dem and for the u n ­
skilled ..............................................................................................................................................147
4-4 Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with low dem and for the miskilled . . .1 4 7
4-5 Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with endogenous participation and high
dem and for the m isk illed ............................................................................................................ 147
9
4-6 Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with endogenous participation and  low
dem and for the unskilled  ..................................................................................................... 148
4-7 Dynamics of employment, wage curve with endogenous p a r t ic ip a t io n .......................150
4-8 S teady-state dem and and supply of e d u c a t io n ................................................................... 155
4-9 Tim ing of the changes in the composition of the labour force. Source FQ P and
chapter 3  161
4-10 Dynamics of A djustm ent of Education W ith different Speeds of A djustm ent . . . 163
5-1 Inflows into Unemployment per year, by c a u se ................................................................... 167
5-2 M atching technology with two types of j o b s ...................................................................... 173
5-3 Correspondence between the share of secondary jobs and the share of secondary
jobs ..................................................................................................................................................181
5-4 Wage Setting and Labour M arket T ig h tn e s s ...................................................................... 182
5-5 The Beveridge Curve and the (u,v) e q u il ib r iu m ............................................................... 184
5-6 France: transition  employment-unemployment and em ploym ent-inactivity for
m e n ..................................................................................................................................................192
5-7 France: transition  employment-unemployment and em ploym ent-inactivity for
w o m e n .............................................................................................................................................. 193
5-8 Regression Analysis in a Cross-Section of 15 OECD c o u n tr ie s .................................... 194
6-1 U rban Equilibrium  1 ( U E ) ........................................................................................................ 230
6-2 U rban Equilibrium  2 ( E U ) ........................................................................................................ 231
6-3 Labour Demand and Exogeneous Wage ............................................................................. 231
6-4 Labor M arket Equilibrium  .....................................................................................................232
6-5 Labor Dem and and Endogenous Wage S e ttin g ...................................................................232
10
List o f Tables
3.1 USA, OLS regression of A L /L  on w across 40 c e l l s ..........................................................115
3.2 USA, Correlation of A L  on w  across 40 cells, and contribution of different groups 117
3.3 France, OLS regression of A L /L  on w across 32 c e l l s ...................................................... 117
3.4 Framce, Correlation of A L  on w across 32 cells, and contribution of different
g r o u p s ..............................................................................................................................................117
3.5 USA, GLS of In (hourly wage) of male workers on poten tial exp. and sq., 5
education dummies and two race d u m m ie s ..........................................................................122
3.6 USA, GLS of In (hourly wage) of female workers on potential exp. and sq., 5
education dummies and two race d u m m ie s ..........................................................................122
3.7 USA, decomposition of wages on education (SD in parentheses) ...............................122
3.8 USA, decomposition of wages on experience (SD in parentheses) ...............................123
3.9 USA, decomposition of wages on experience and education with gender discrim ­
ination (SD in p a re n th e s e s ) ..................................................................................................... 125
3.10 France, GLS of In (hourly wage) of male workers on potential exp. and sq., 4 
education d u m m ie s ...................................................................................................................... 126
3.11 France, GLS of In (hourly wage) of female workers on potential exp. and sq., 4 
education d u m m ie s ...................................................................................................................... 127
3.12 France, decomposition of wages on education (SD in parentheses) ........................... 127
3.13 France, decomposition of wages on experience (SD in parentheses) ........................... 128
3.14 France, decomposition of wages on experience and education w ith gender dis­
crim ination (SD in p a re n th ese s) .............................................................................................. 130
3.15 USA, im pact of the change in experience on the re tu rn  to e d u c a t io n ........................133
11
3.16 USA, sample statistics (source C P S ) ...................................................................................136
3.17 France, sample statisitcs (source INSEE-FQ P) .............................................................. 137
4.1 Share of women in the labour force, source: O E C D ........................................................156
4.2 Share of 25-34 y.o. in the labour force, source ILO (1990 figure =  projection . . . 156
4.3 France 1992, cell averages, men in the labour f o r c e ........................................................... 157
4.4 France 1992, cell averages, women in the labour fo rc e .........................................................158
4.5 France 1992, variable: Log Hourly W a g e ...............................................................................159
4.6 France 1992, variable: Log Hourly W a g e ...............................................................................159
4.7 France 1992, Com paraison Experience /  E d u c a tio n ........................................................160
4.8 France 1992, estim ated interaction term s between education and experience . . . 160
A cknow ledgm ents: I w ish to  w arm ly thank m y supervisor Chris P issarides for 
his a tten tion  during th ese  three years, and th ose w ho helped at som e stage o f the  
thesis by their com m ents or criticism s, notably  D aniel C ohen, G illes D uranton, 
R ichard Freem an, R ichard Jackm an, Francis K ram arz, A lan M anning, and Gilles 
Saint-Paul, and m ore generally all who gave a part o f their tim e to  discuss the ideas 
contained in th is d issertation . I greatly  appreciated to  work in D elta  in Paris, the  
C enter for Econom ic Perform ance at th e LSE, and IN SE E -C rest in Paris. A special 
thank  to  Lucy M atth ew  and A dam  Lubanski for th e extraordinary IT  service o f  
th e CEP. Financial support from th e  C EP is greatly  acknowledged.
12
0 .1  In tr o d u c t io n :  w h y  a n  in te r e s t  in  la b o u r  su p p ly ?
This thesis is about the role of labour supply in the rise in unem ploym ent in the  OECD countries, 
and  in the rise of wage inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries. It argues th a t some stylised 
facts about female and youth unemployment and about the changes in relative wages have 
no (convincing) explanation and th a t looking at labour supply properly focusing 011 all its 
components (age, education, experience, gender) significantly improves our understanding of 
these stylized facts. The changes in labour supply are first a change in the  level and in the 
growth rate  of the labour force due to  an increase in population and second a change in the 
com position of the labour force. M acroeconomists have usually considered th a t changes in the 
level of labour force are neutral in their effect on the equilibrium  unemployment rate  in the 
long run, though a change in the growth rate has some effects th a t are perceived as weak. The 
compositional changes have not been seriously addressed so far, or have not been approached in 
all their varied dimensions. The first section presents the m otivation of the thesis, summarizes 
some stylized facts addressed in the thesis and the mechanisms th a t explain them . The next 
sections (sections 2 and 3) explain why the thesis will be restricted  to the study of compositional 
changes. Section 4 describes the organization of the thesis. Section 5 discusses the problems 
linked to the endogeneity of participation, which come back in the different chapters and section 
6 concludes in suggesting directions for future research.
0 .1 .1  M o tiv a tio n , o b je c t io n s  a n d  an sw ers
This first section is devoted to the m otivation of the thesis. The main reason for the interest 
in labour supply is the lack of existing work 011 the question. In the most influential works on 
the subject, the Chelwood Gate conferences I and II, edited in Bean et al (1987) and Dreze 
and Bean (1990), and in Layard et al. (1991), Bean (1994), Snower and de la Dehesa (1997), 
the  possible im pact of labour supply is not addressed or not central. The lack of work per .se 
is a  justification for the study. The reasons for the absence of serious analysis on the question 
are numerous. Some are serious, some other not so. For instance, there are some good reasons 
to  tliink th a t unemployment is not connected to the level of labour supply. In the very long 
run, unemployment is not trended, whereas the size of active population is. This is why the
focus of the thesis will rather be on the composition of the labour force. It happens th a t in 
the  past decades, the increase in the level of the labour force (at least in countries like the US, 
the UK, France) is associated with changes in its composition. In all the OECD countries, the 
size of cohorts of new entrants into the labour m arket increased, especially in the 70’s, with the 
post-w ar demographic shock. In the United States, the peak in the size of cohorts occurred in 
1977. The share of women on the labour m arket has drastically increased, 011 an average from 
30% to 45% of the labour force in less than 30 years. This is an enormous change, which has 
not been addressed with a macroeconomic perspective.
However, in many works, the question of labour supply is dismissed in three lines. In the 
case of France for instance (see M alinvaud 1986, Lam bert and al. 1990), a question of tim ing is 
often involved: there is a positive inflexion in the growth of female labour force in the end 60’s, 
more precisely in 1967, whereas the rise in unemployment occurred mainly after 1974. This 
is however a too simple view of the problem: I would like to argue th a t, in order to  properly 
consider the links between unemployment and labour supply, there is the need to disentangle 
the  cyclical component from the trend  of unemployment. The figure 0-1 displays the residuals 
of a simple OLS estim ate of yearly French unemployment on the index of capacity utilization. 
It appears more clearly tha t, once the cyclical dem and factors, approxim ated by the cycle 
indicator are removed, the trend  in higher unemployment does not s ta rt in 1974, bu t rather 
earlier since the m id 60’s. Moreover, between 1967 and 1968, the residual goes up  faster than  
its trend. This can be related to  the analysis of the chapter 2: using quarterly  data , it is found 
th a t a co-integration relationship exists between participation and unemployment in France, 
w ith a positive coefficient.
A nother commonly made objection to  an im portant role of labour supply is th a t in the US, 
despite their rising share in the labour force, women’s wages have caught up m en’s wages, which 
seems to indicate the dominance of labour dem and ra ther than  labour supply side phenomenons. 
To answer this objection, I will argue th a t the average ’’quality” of participating  women has 
strongly increased: the  relative rise in their wages is in fact a m anifestation of a compositional 
effect ra ther than  of a dem and side effect. Moreover, most of the studies (Mincer 1985, Layard 
et al. 1980) show th a t the historical progression of real wages cannot explain much of the rising 
female participation. This supports the view th a t rising participation is supply driven.
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Residual of a  regression of French unemploym ent 
on an index of capacity utilization
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Figure 0-1: Trend in unemployment in France
In Layard (1997, p344), a strong positive correlation between the growth of the labour force 
and the growth of employment is shown across the OECD countries. Tliis kind of analysis 
is helpful in showing that the number of jobs is not an exogenous given constant as in the 
simplest Keynesian models and that there are obviously positive comovements of labour force 
and employment. However, these graphs don’t deal with possible endogeneity issues: the labour 
force obviously depends on the economic conditions, relative wages and employment prospects, 
as shown in Gregg and Wadsworth (1995). The causality in Layard’s scatter diagrams is an 
open question. This question of causality is thus addressed to in chapter 2.
In r 1 T " : : there are neglected facts about labour supply tha t can be usefully reminded. 
For instance, in Germany, 7 ' J! _is of the labour force are very strong: in Entorf et al.
(1990), the graph 7.2. p 243 tells us that between 1974 and 1976, the labour force was reduced 
by 800 000 workers (mostly foreigners), which should explain at least in the short run part of 
the decline in unemployment after the 1974 peak. This simple fact is not commented upon in 
the text, however. The VAR and co-integration analysis undertaken in the chapter 2 of the 
thesis give a statistical interpretation: in Germany, causality runs from unemployment to labour 
supply after a few quarters and the long run relation between participation and unemployment 
implies a negative coefficient. Another interesting feature concerns the supply of hours of 
worked by women: in some countries the share of women working part-tim e (the UK, 50%; the
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Netherlands, 63%; Switzerland 54%; Sweden 44%) is much higher than  in others (Spain 15%; 
France 26%; Italy  11%) and so com parative studies of labour m arket performance should be 
able to  integrate this fact. There are m any aspects of female labour supply (cyclicality, hours 
supplied, opportunity  cost i.e. incentives of participation) th a t could frequently be used, in 
order to  more accurately compare the countries.
0 .1 .2  S o m e s e le c te d  s ty lis e d  fa c ts  a b o u t u n em p lo y m en t a n d  w a g e  in eq u a lity
How can the supply trends be considered? The starting  point of this work is a simple observa­
tion: since the second oil shock in 1979, unemployment in Europe has been perm anently  higher 
than  in the US, bu t both  rates are actually quite similar when only adult men are considered. 
In contrast, when adult female and young (less than  25) workers are considered, the  difference 
between the two sides of A tlantic becomes extremely im portant. See the figure 0-2 for the 
gender differences1, and Blancliflower (1996) for the youth labour m arkets. If one wishes to 
explain European unemployment, these facts of inter-group unemployment disparities caimot 
be neglected. To some extent, European unemployment is specific to female and youth. At 
the national level, the stylized facts can be summarized as follows: in a cross-section of OECD 
countries, the correlation coefficient between unemployment rates of adult women and young 
workers is 0.84 over the 80-94 period, while it is 0.69 between adult men and adult women and 
0.56 between men and young (chapter 2). Unemployment rates of each category, female and 
young, should be explained jointly.
T he claim of the thesis is th a t a key to understanding these facts is labour supply. The 
intuition can be described starting  from the micro-econometric literature  on production func­
tions. Different production factors enter in production w ith different elasticity of substitution. 
There is a fair degree of convergence of these studies (G rant et Hamermesh 1982, Berger 1983, 
Topel 1994^: adult men and adult women are com plem entary factors, young and adult men 
are com plem entary factors, young and adult women are substitu te  factors, as well as women 
and low-skills men. For instance, an increase in the labour supply of one of these groups has a 
negative effect on equilibrium wages of the q-substitutes group. Of course the im pact of the size
^ U l l :  unemployment rate in Europe excluding Greece, EU5 (Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium ), Sea 
Scandinavian countries. See figure figures 1 and 2 in chapter 2 for more details on this graph.
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Figure 0-2: Unemployment rate by gender
of the cohorts of young was studied in the previous literature. It was shown that this affected 
the relative position of young with respect to older workers in the US: bigger cohorts have lower 
wages, lower growth of wages (see Welch 1979). These negative effects of the labour supply were 
also considered in other OECD countries by Bloom, Freeman and Korenman (1987). They lead 
to  unemployment and lower wages for young workers. The originality of the thesis is to consider 
explicitly the substitutability between young and women. When this is done, a natural cause 
of deterioration of the relative position of female and young workers on the labour markets lieh 
in the evolution of labour supply described below: more young and more women. A part of this 
change should have generated either unemployment or inter-group wage inequality. These last 
two points, the compositional change in labour supply and the substitutability between young 
and women in production, have not been addressed to in the macroeconomic literature so far. 
The mechanism highlighted in the thesis (chapter 2) is basically the following one. Consider 
a dual labour market. In segments of this labour market, groups that are substitutes are as­
sumed to  be working in the same segment. As in Doeringer and Piore (1971), the prim ary jobs 
require stable workers (like men and educated women) and the secondary jobs can be filled by
high turnover workers (young, low educated women). The change in the com position of the 
labour force can be viewed as a relative increase in the workers of the secondary segment, at 
least in some stage of the last decades, and even a saturation  of this segm ent2. In chapter 2, 
estim ates of unemployment in cross-section of countries show th a t differences in participation 
alone explain about 4 percent of to tal unemployment, 3 percent of male unemployment and 6 
percent of female unemployment after institutional factors have been controlled for.
A nother stylised fact quite relevant here, concerns wage inequality which has strongly in­
creased since the 70’s, especially in the  US and in o ther ”flexible” economies like the UK. A 
key fact th a t the thesis addresses is the most im portan t trend  in the rise in the retu rn  to 
skills described by Juhn, M urphy and Pierce (1993): a rise in the retu rn  to  experience of male 
workers, by 70% between 1963 and 1988. In other words, there has been a strong decline in 
the relative wages of young workers. The literature is ra ther silent on this aspect: there b. 
little evidence th a t biased technological progress like intense com puterization can easily explain 
the worsening relative position of younger workers. Similarly, the im pact of com petition with 
developing countries through international trade should be more im portan t in sectors intensive 
in younger workers to  explain anything, what has not been shown so far. It is also im portan t 
to notice th a t the size of the cohorts of new entrants in the labour m arket is not able to explain 
the trend, since this size peaked in 1977 and then declined. The last p a rt of the  rise in the 
re tu rn  to  experience, since the mid 70’s, has no convincing explanation, as acknowledged by 
K atz and M urphy (1992, p75). There is a missing piece in the puzzle th a t the  thesis proposes to 
solve. This is the second mechanism. After having shown th a t women have lower employment 
experience and lower re tu rn  to true employment experience, I argue th a t the rising share of 
young and women in the labour force can be in terpreted  as a cumulative increase in  the share 
o f ’’low experience” workers. Tliis can easily explain the rising retu rn  to experience of men 
described by Juhn, M urphy and Pierce, as illustrated  in figure 0-3 (source: chapter 3). This 
decrease in the share of experienced workers decrease the aggregate quantity  of skills which 
is supplied. This relative scarcity of skills (a mix of experience and education) can explain 
the rising dem and for education, just by substitu tab ility  between education and  experience.
2 By saturation it is meant that the wage necessary to insure full employment is so low that there is either 
high unem ploym ent in this segm ent or people are overwhelmingly leaving the labour force.
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Comparison between the return to experience and the quantities supplied 
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Figure 0-3: Returns to Experience and Quantities of Experience Supplied. Comparison between 
France and the USA
From my calculations, a significant part (say 10 to 25%, depending on the assumption about 
the elasticity of substitution between experience and education in human capital formation) of 
the unexplained rise in the college premium can be explained by the inflows of inexperienced 
workers.
One may be tem pted to underestim ate the importance of the inter-group increase in in­
equality, arguing tha t the rise in wage inequality, to the extent of O r.:t 60%, is due to the rise 
in inequality within narrowly defined groups of education, age and gender a t least in the US. 
My answer is that over the last decades, the change in inter-group inequality is quantitatively 
more im portant than usually thought. An accurate reading of Juhn, Murphy and Fierce- (1993
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table 4, p  430) reveals that 60% for the within-group component is the figure for the whole 
period 1963-88. However, it is worth emphasizing th a t the first part of this period faced only a 
slight change in the dispersion of wages. The share of the rise in wage inequality explained by 
the within-group component is actually about 40% during the quite interesting period of the 
strong rise in inequality, i.e. since the late 70 s. The change in inequality due to the change 
in observed prices is always more im portant than the change due to the unobserved prices and 
quantities. It follows that the inter-group inequality is more relevant than usually a ttribu ted  
to in the explanation of rising wage inequality.
0.2  L a b o u r  S u p p ly  w ith  H o m o g e n o u s  w ork ers  
0.2 .1  L evel o f  th e  lab ou r force
The impact of the level of the labour force on equilibrium unemployment is usually considered 
as null in the long rim. There are both empirical evidence and strong theoretical arguments 
in support of this. From the empirical point of view, it can be observed than  in all countries 
an increase in the size of the labour force due to population growth in the very long run, say 
two centuries, is not associated w#* an increase in the unemployment rate (defined as the ratio 
of the number of unemployed to the labour force) is associated. For this view, see Layard et al.
(1991). It follows that any regression of unemployment rates on the level of labour force will 
provide statistically insignificant coefficients if the sample size has sufficiently long time series 
dimension. In the long run, the observed correlation between labour supply and unemployment 
rates will be a very small number. On the theoretical side, in both  market clearing models 
and models with imperfect wage adjustm ent (wage setting models, or WS models hereafter), a 
change in the level of labour supply only implies short run effects on wages or on equilibrium 
unemployment. For instance, in a WS model, if an increase in the labour force raises the number 
of unemployed, this leads to a decrease in wage pressure, and a decrease in real wages. Whenever 
labour is cheaper, capital is going to be more profitable and after capital stock adjustm ent, the 
equilibrium level of wages and of unemployment will be the same as before the change in the 
labour force. If there are effects of the changes in the level of the labour force on unemployment 
and wages, these effects are likely to be only short run effects. This is illustrated in Nickell
(1989) in a wage-setting price-setting framework (W S-PS). Since these effects are well known, 
the thesis will not revert to  these issues.
0 .2 .2  G ro w th  ra te  o f  th e  la b ou r force
In contrast, there is no reason for compositional changes of the labour force to  be neutral on 
equilibrium unemployment. The first of the compositional changes is a change in the  growth 
rate of the labour force. If the growth rate of the labour force increases, this can be the result 
of either larger flows of workers from inactivity to activity, or smaller flows from activity to 
inactivity. Assume, for instance, th a t the inflows from inactivity to activity are the  young new 
entrants and th a t they are previously unemployed. It follows th a t an increase in the  growth 
rate of the  labour force is associated with more young workers and with higher unemployment, 
even if the workers can be considered as ex-ante identical. This case was made for instance 
in Pissarides (1990, chapter 2). However, it is generally considered th a t the m agnitude of a 
change in the growth rate of the labour force on unemployment is weak and can be neglected. 
Simulations of Pissarides model for instance (not reported here, bu t with the values of the 
param eters in the simulations described in the chapter 5) suggest th a t a 1% increase in the 
growth rate  of the labour force (which is large, about twofold in average growth rate) has a 
very small im pact on equilibrium unemployment, of +0.15%. Since it was anticipated  th a t no 
im portan t effect would come from the change in the growth rate  of the labour force, this aspect 
was also skipped in the thesis.
0 .3  L a b o u r  S u p p ly  w i t h  H e te r o g e n e o u s  w o r k e rs  
0 .3 .1  T h e  s im p lest  co m p o s it io n a l effect
There are other compositional changes th a t one can introduce in models of equilibrium  unem ­
ployment. However, in contrast to the former ones, one needs to go beyond the representative 
agents framework: one can no longer consider ex-ante identical workers. Assume, for instance, 
th a t there are N  classes of agents indexed by i, each of them  being a fraction a t of the labour 
force. Each of these class of agents has a different ”natural unem ploym ent rate” Ui. This 
concept of natural unemployment rate  could be generated in many different models. In static:
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W S-PS models, differences in the Ui would come from differences in the labour dem and or from 
the outside options of the agents. In flow models incorporating hiring rates determ ination and 
separation rates (exit rates from employment), differences between the U{ would, in addition, 
come from differences in the separation rates. At this stage, it is not necessary to choose just 
one type of model of natural rate  of unemployment to make the following points. The average 
unemployment rate  of the labour force is given by the weighted average of the rates of each 
group,
u =  ^2ai.Ui (0 . 1)
and any change over tim e in the average unemployment ra te  can be decomposed into the sum 
of a compositional change and a change in the unemployment rate  within each group:
Aw =  Ao-t.Wi +  ^ 2  a i ' ^ Ui (^2)
where A is a difference operator between two dates. This formula can be applied to  the rise in 
unemployment in some OECD countries over the 1970-95 period. It reveals th a t much, if not all, 
of the rise in unemployment can be a ttribu ted  to the rise in the group-specific unemployment 
rates uf. in each groups of age, gender and education, the unemployment ra te  has been increasing 
sometimes in huge proportion. See the following tables:
USA3 1964 1970 1977 1985 1991
u (%) 4.6 3.6 6.2 5.8 5.4
USA 1964-70 1970-77 1977-85 1985-91 1964-91
cti.Aui -1.2 +3.0 +0.3 +0.2 +2.3
J2 Attt.u* +0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -1.5
France 1970 1977 1985 1993
u (%) 2.5 4.8 10.9 11.8
3The groups are defined according to the gender, 4 experience categories and 4 education categories (resp. 5 
for the USA), i.e. 32 groups for France, 40 groups for the USA.
France 1970-77 1977-85 1985-93 1970-93
+2.1 +5.9 +  1.6 +9.6
•4-0.2 +0.2 -0.7 -0.3
Does this necessarily imply th a t the compositional changes of the labour force have 110 
im pact on the average unemployment rate? The answer is no. Two argum ents are outlined in 
the next two sub-sections. The first relies 011 the fact th a t the relative size of some groups has 
an impact 011 the relative dem and for all the groups. For instance, when the share of adult 
women in the labour force increases, given their significant substitu tab ility  w ith the young 
workers, the relative position of young workers is affected. The above decomposition does not 
preclude any im pact of the composition of the labour force on unemployment: it may well be 
th a t the increase An* , in for instance young unemployment, is caused by the supply of some 
other group. This argum ent is the core of chapters 2 and 3.
The second argm nent relies on the fact th a t the above analysis based 011 the decomposition 
of equation (2) is valid only as long as there are 110 changes in the structure  of the population 
■within groups, in other words as long as the division of the labour force into arb itrary  groups 
is valid. Unobserved heterogeneity for instance could have changed within groups.
0 .3 .2  C o m p e tit io n  a m o n g  grou p s
The first argum ent is the following. Coming back to the equation (0.1), it can be sta ted  th a t the 
group-specific unemployment rates tq are affected not only by their share in the labour force, 
but also by the share of some of the others. To simplify the presentation of the argum ent, let us 
consider a full-employment model in which wages are fully flexible, and consider how these wages 
respond to  the share of the different groups. Any transposition to the study of unemployment 
would come from relative wage rigidity, as developed in chapters 2 and 3. Consider a m ulti­
factor production function with constant return  to scale, Y  =  F { X\ ,  X2,  . . . , Xn). Consider the 
case where the X{ are labour inputs only. The constant re tu rn  to  scale assum ption implies th a t 
the m arginal product of a category j  of workers is a function of the ratios X \ / X j ) ..., X n/ X j ,  
or a function of the share a t of group i in to ta l labour inputs. It follows th a t
Wj = ...ai, ...an)
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if the wage equals the marginal product. It is well known th a t the impact of an increase in 
the share of one group on the wage of another group will depend on the partial cross-derivative 
in the production function. When the Hicks elasticities of complementarity are negative (i.e. 
when the cross-derivative of the production function are negative), the groups are said to be 
q-substitute whereas they are term ed q-complement when the converse is true.
In the empirical literature of the early 80’s, it was often found th a t some low wage groups 
are q-substitutes. This is the case of young workers, low-skilled women, low skilled men, and 
even medium and high skilled women (see Grant and Hamermesh 1982, Berger 1983). It follows 
that a change in the composition of the labour force that would jointly increase the fraction of 
young workers and of women would adversely affect the bottom  end of the wage distribution. 
The picture is however not as clear as it could be: in particular, other labour supply changes 
have taken place over the last twenty years, like the strong improvement of educational levels. 
Nevertheless, it is surprising that usual explanations of the rising wage inequality and of the 
rise in unemployment have neglected the substitutability between groups of the labour force. 
In particular, men and women are often considered as working 011 separate islands, which 
is not necessarily the case. An exception is Topel (1994) who investigates the elasticities of 
substitution between various demographic groups and concludes that ‘"there is no
evidence that different regional evolution o f wages are demand-driven; the whole story is on the 
supply side. “
0 .3 .3  A re th e  groups ap p rop ria tely  defined?
Equation (2) is helpful only when the groups considered faced no change in the composition of 
their population. However, since da ta  limitations are often very strong, missing variables could 
make the division in the different groups inappropriate. Two simple examples can illustrate 
this point. Consider first the group of young men with a given education level, say 12 years 
of schooling: the equivalent of a US. high school degree. In 1964 in the US, these workers 
were in fairly high quantiles of the education distribution in the labour force. In 1991, these 
workers were in much lower quantiles of the distribution of education. In 1964, 50% of the 
population had strictly less than 12 years of education in the USA, in 1991 this fraction was 
only 22%). If one believes that education serves as sorting individuals (sorting is either signalling
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and screening, for the distinction see the survey by A. Weiss 1995) as well as it provides hum an 
capital to workers, certainly part of the decline of the relative position of the  low education 
groups comes from the fact th a t when most of population has a higher education level, those 
who rem ain at lower education level are less a ttractive to  employers.
A nother example which will be very im portant in some of the chapters of the thesis, is the 
group of women of interm ediate age, say 30-45 years old. Over time, their a ttachm ent to the 
labour m arket is very likely to have increased. If in addition, it is believed th a t employers 
expectations about the  a ttachm ent of a given female worker to  the labour force is crucial in 
explaining reciprocal investment in hum an capital, like training, then this can explain why 
the relative position of this group has been improving over time. Again, this is a supply side 
effect, ra ther than  a dem and side effect. A similar argum ent can be advanced about the use of 
potential experience (i.e. a proxy for real experience, equal to age minus education) as a way 
to define the different groups of the labour force. In the same group of women, the difference 
between potential experience and real experience is likely to  have declined over tim e and, if real 
experience is an important, determ inant of wages or unemployment, there should be no surprise 
in observing an improvement in the position of the group, due to  a supply effect.
In other words, in these two examples, there is a problem  of unobserved heterogeneity. 
In the first example, the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated to  the determ inants of the 
groups i, and may bias the conclusion on the im pact of compositional changes. In the second 
case, tliis heterogeneity is changing over tim e and there is a hidden or unobserved supply 
change. This argum ent can be used in m any situation where usual indicators lead to seemingly 
unambiguous conclusion. For instance, Katz and M urphy (1992) provide a necessary condition 
for the  existence of labour dem and shifts: if the inner product across cells of changes in relative 
employment and relative wages is positive, necessarily there is a dem and shift. However, this 
holds only when the decomposition of the groups is appropriate. There is a lack of empirical 
work on th a t point and the thesis does not fill this gap, but this is certainly a direction for 
future research.
0 .4  O r g a n is a t io n  o f  t h e  th e s is
We s ta rt from the observation th a t the increase in labour supply in all OECD countries in the 
last th irty  years leads to specific; change in the composition of the labour force, an increase in 
the. share of young workers and of female workers. It will be useful to determ ine w hat rele\ant 
characteristics of these workers differ from th a t of the average labour force. The first of these 
characteristics is about attachm ent to the labour force or to  the average turnover rate: the young 
and some adult women are perceived by employers as less stable in their job as com pared to 
men, because their outside options (out of activity) are greater than  th a t of adult men. C hapter 
1 investigates the differences in the turnover rates among different groups and over time, in 
France. Building on the empirical results of chapter 1 , the second chapter proposes a model 
of the consequences of the  compositional changes and how they may affect the macroeconomic 
variables. This is tested  on OECD macroeconomic data. A second characteristic wliich differs 
among the different categories of workers is th a t female and yomiger workers have generally 
lower wages than  the average. However, these lower wages are the  smn of two opposite effects of 
skills: on average, the recent cohorts of yoiuig workers and of active women are more educated, 
bu t they are less experienced than  men. C hapter 3 investigates these trends with the m icro-data 
of French and US labour force surveys. This chapter deals w ith possible wage d isc rim in a te s  
problems. The dynam ic implications of these trends are explored in the model of chapter 4.
0 .4 .1  T u rn over (ch a p ter  1)
In the first chapter, the 6  rates of transition  among employment, unemployment and inactivity 
in the French labour m arket are decomposed into trends and cycles. C ontrary to o ther countries 
like the UK, almost all rates have a significant trend  between 1968 and 1993. A striking result, 
is th a t a growing fraction of the workers leaving employment choose unemployment ra ther than 
inactivity (20% in 1968, up to  60% in 1993). This evolution is shown to be a result of women’s 
rising participation and their stronger attachm ent to the  labour m arket. The consequences 
are im portan t changes in the ergodic distribution of workers in the three states, which can 
be associated with a rise in imemployment by about 4% of the labour force in the 80’s. A 
comparison with the UK suggests th a t this evolution is specific to  France: in the UK, the trend
is rather a withdrawal from activity (see Gregg and W adsworth 1995).
0 .4 .2  M a cr o eco n o m ic  im p a ct o f  lab ou r su p p ly  (ch a p ter  2)
The second chapter investigates the consequences of labour supply changes on the labour m ar­
kets in the OECD countries during the last decades. It is argued th a t changes in supply cannot 
be thought of as homogenous: these changes involve more young and more adult female workers, 
th a t are complements to skilled men and substitutes for low-wage groups (young, unskilled). 
Logically, these labour supply trends since the 50’s increased com petition between female work­
ers, young workers and low skilled workers in some segments of the labour force. Using the 
result of chapter 1 , where it appears th a t men have much lower em ploym ent-inactivity transi­
tions rates than  women, bu t the difference is narrowing over time, I introduce a model of dual 
labour m arket, where the prim ary segment is the segment of low turnover workers, the secondary 
segment is the segment of high turnover workers. The model provides testable predictions of 
the links between unemployment and participation indicators.
An empirical strategy to  test these links is undertaken. Disaggregation by gentler is nec­
essary and gives positive relation between female participation growth and unemployment. 
Endogeneity of participation levels w ith respect to  imemployment is trea ted  in two ways, by 
instrum ental variables’ estim ations and with vectorial au to regression  techniques. Clausal rela­
tions between participation and unemployment cannot be rejected.
0 .4 .3  Skills: em p ir ics  (ch a p ter  3 )
M acroeconoinic d a ta  are no longer sufficient to conclude whether or not labour supply has 
adverse effects on the labour m arket. An approach using microeconomic d a ta  is necessary and 
can address connex issues. Specifically, since the thesis is to some extent on the debate of rise 
in inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries, therefore taking into account the  educational levels of 
workers is unavoidable. The rise in inequality in the US is explained for instance by Julm, 
M urphy and Pierce (1993) or Katz et M urphy (1992) as a result of structu ral changes in the 
labour dem and toward more skilled workers. In this chapter, French da ta  from INSEE (Enquete 
Actifs Financiers 1992, Formation et Qualification Professionnelle 1970, 77, 85 et 93) and the 
US d a ta  from the March Current Population Survey (1964, 70, 77, 85, 91) are used to a ttack
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the question of labour supply changes.
Using French and US data , the paper assesses the substitu tion  in the composition of skills 
of the labour supply: low education /  high experience workers have been replaced by low 
experience /  high education workers. In aggregate, these changes can have a positive or a 
negative im pact to the skill level of the active population. Using French and US data, the 
paper establishes the substitu tion  in the composition of skills of the labour supply. In France 
covariations of price and supply of skills are consistent w ith pure labour supply stories. In the 
US, changes in labour dem and seem im portant, even if labour supply changes could lead to the 
same predictions depending on the substituability  between experience and education.
0 .4 .4  Skills: a  m o d e l (ch a p ter  4 )
In the earlier chapters (2 and 3), it was shown th a t an increase in female participation can have 
a negative im pact on the prospects for young workers. Since unemployment for young workers 
can prevent them  from accum ulating hum an capital (employment experience), the supply trends 
can generate adverse dynam ic effects, and can lead to m ultiple equilibria. In addition, more 
education can be an endogenous response of the labour force to  these shocks. A model with 
explicit dynamics of labour supply by skill and age is constructed, to disentangle the effects of 
labour supply trends and the rising dem and for skill. The model predicts th a t supply can have 
the same effects as demand, provided th a t supply changes are associated to  more inexperienced 
workers in the economy.
0 .4 .5  C o m p e tit io n  for J o b s  in  a  G row in g  E co n o m y  a n d  th e  E m erg en ce  o f  
D u a lism  (ch a p ter  5)
In the two last chapters, we present two extensions of m atching models. An interesting charac­
teristic of m atching models is th a t they are equilibrium unemployment models. This equilibrium 
comes from a stochastic rationing process, the allocation of resources (job seekers and jobs) is 
not instantaneous, bu t is time-consuming. The m atching function allows us to even endogeneise 
this tim e dimension. This kind of model is therefore extremely useful to  complement the em­
pirical analysis of the  previous chapters. They are applied to the analysis of two trends of the 
OECD labour m arkets, the (re-)emergence of dualism  and peripherisation /ghetto isation  of the
unemployed.
Pushing the logic: of the thesis to the extreme, chapter 5 aims to  provide a theoretical 
explanation of the rising share of short-term  employment in Europe with (partly) supply trends 
in using a m atching model with growth. In the model, higher population growth increases the 
share of tem porary jobs and unemployment. In addition, we find th a t a slowdown in growth 
of labour productivity  leads to the emergence of tem porary  (i.e. short-term ) jobs and explains 
their increasing share in to ta l employment. Lower growth rates also shift the “Beveridge curve“ 
to the right and weaken the bargaining position of workers. These effects generate a relation 
between growth and unemployment, which can be negative when the adverse effect of growth 
on wage setting  dom inates its positive effect on labour demand. Finally, the often blam ed firing 
costs are found to be neutral when there is no floor on wages.
0 .4 .6  E q u ilib r iu m  U rb a n  U n e m p lo y m en t (ch a p ter  6)
In this paper w ritten jointly with Yves Zenou (CORE and Hermes, Paris II), we focus on an 
original aspect of labour supply, the location of workers. The model is about search equilib­
rium unemployment when a spatial dimension is introduced. By assum ing th a t workers’ search 
efficiency decreases with the distance to the employment-centre located a t the city-centre, two 
urban equilibrium  configurations emerge: either the unemployed reside at the  vicinity of the 
employment-centre or locate at the outskirts of the city. The la tte r case happens when the sur­
plus of the  employed and labour m arket tightness are low. W hen the wage is exogenously set, 
we show th a t the first u rban  equilibrium  is be tte r because aggregate m atching is more efficient 
and the unemployment level is lower. Unemployment does not depend m onotonously on the 
exogenous wage. If the wage is endogenously determ ined through bargaining, some externali­
ties linked to distance arise in wage determ ination: unemployment differences between urban 
configurations can be reduced. In conclusion, the model shows th a t introducing endogenous 
location choice in search equilibrium  leads to  the am plification of the effect of small aggregate 
changes on unemployment.
0 .5  M o r e  o n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  d e c is io n s
This section summarizes some of the problems faced with the endogeneity of participation deci­
sion. No chapter specifically addresses this question, bu t since it comes back in three chapters, 
the introduction of the thesis is the opportunity  for explaining how they were considered.
0 .5 .1  E n d o g e n e ity  o f  p a r tic ip a tio n  w ith  m a cro e co n o m ic  d a ta
C ontrary to microeconomists, macroecononiists like to think of labour supply as exogenous, or 
weakly affected by wages. Indeed, in the  case of rising female participation for instance, it has 
been argued th a t the secular rise in real wages has little explanatory power for rising female 
participation, given the m easured elasticity to  real wages. This is partly  because there are price 
effect and an income effect th a t may compensate each other, and partly  because wage growth 
affects bo th  the wage of potential participants and the other incomes of the family. The la tte r 
fact should decrease participation probability. Aggregate elasticity of participation with respect 
to  aggregate wages tends to  be very small.
In contrast, participation may react more to unemployment. One of the findings in chapter 
2  is th a t participation rates in cross-section of countries depends quite strongly on unemploy­
ment rates and th a t instrum ental variable estim ators are necessary to  estim ate unemployment 
equations.
0 .5 .2  E n d o g e n e ity  o f  p a r tic ip a tio n  w ith  m icr o eco n o m ic  d a ta
Since the thesis also investigates the links between labour supply and unemployment using 
m icro-data, a question arises about the necessity to control for endogenous choices of partici­
pation in running wage or employment equations. The Heckman procedure is easy to apply: 
an equation for participation is estim ated, the residual is used to calculate the m ean of the 
residual of the wage equation conditional on participation, wliich leads to  unbiased estim ators 
of the wage earning retu rn  to  skills.
This procedure is however not always useful in our context. Wage equations are estim ated 
to investigate the employability /  productivity  of workers, conditional on the fact th a t they 
effectively participate. In o ther words, what wage equations estim ated w ith a simple OLS/GLS
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estim ator provide is the return  to  skill of those who are actively looking for a job. This is 
exactly what the thesis is interested in. A Heckman estim ator would in contrast provide the 
unconditional retu rn  to  skills, for all participants and non-participants, and the coefficient could 
not, stricto sen.su, be used to derive the same welfare implications. Crudely, I do not care about 
non-participants, i.e. those who are not looking for a job nor employed.
There is, however, a justification for the use of the Heckman procedure, which relies on a 
specific view about the structural model of participation. The logic: is as follows. Workers, 
employed and non-employed, have, different reservation values. They receive wage offers, tha t 
they accept or reject by com paring these against the reservation value. Therefore, when one 
observes the wage distribution, one actually only considers the accepted wage offers, while the 
d istribution of the employability of workers (assumed to be relevant to the  welfare analysis) 
would more accurately be m easured by the d istribution of all wage offers. For this reason, 
chapter 3 provides bo th  types of estim ates, w ithout alteration of the conclusions.
0 .6  C o n c lu s io n
A m ajor conclusion emerging from the thesis is tha t the supply effects were h itherto  wrongly 
neglected. They help explain some trends of the rise in wage inequality and they also help 
predict cross-country or tim e series unemployment. It was however a very ambitious task  to 
consider the macroeconomic: problem of unemployment under the perspective of the changes in 
participation, usually considered as a microeconomic; field. So far I can say th a t more work can 
be clone on the subject . I suggest the following directions.
First, a rough description of the da ta  lead me to consider th a t during the 60’s-70’s, the labour 
m arkets faced a substitu tion  in their skill composition, from high experience /  low educated 
workers to  low experience /  high education workers. There may be differences across countries 
in the am plitude of the substitu tion, which may be helpful to investigate. More precisely, some 
countries which are cited for their good macroeconomic performances may have bounded their 
labour supply to low levels, by developing various disincentives to female full-tim e work. One 
disincentive is for instance lack of enough nurseries, another is a schooling system  in which 
children have too m any hours free. Both situations make female participation much more
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difficult.
Second, the low experience groups are those which are less a ttached  to  the labour market. In 
an insider/outsider type of approach, it may be interesting to address the political economy of 
this situation. Is it possible to consider th a t unions care more about, say male employment than 
female and youth employment? Some of these issues were investigated by Pissarides (1989).
Third, there is a lack of theory about participation decisions when there is unemployment. 
I sometimes uses the sta tic  expected wage (employment rate  times the received wage) as the 
determ inant of participation, bu t a more dynamic: approach would certainly be required. A 
basis for this could be the work by B urdett and al. (1984).
C hapter 1
Trends in worker flows on th e  labour  
m arket and som e consequences for 
unem ploym ent: France 1968-93
A bstract: The 6 rates of transition among employment, unemployment and inactivity in the French 
labour market are decomposed into trends and cycles. Contrary to other countries like the UK, 
almost all rates have a significant trend between 1968 and 1993. A striking result is that a growing 
fraction of the workers leaving employment choose unemployment rather than inactivity. This 
evolution is shown to be an outcome women’s rising participation and their stronger attache c k 
to the labour market. Its consequences are important changes in the ergodic distribution of workers 
in the three states, which can be associated with a rise in unemployment by about 4% of the labour 
force during the 80’s.
1 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
Since the 1960’s, unemployment across OECD countries has increased, depending on the coun­
tries, twofold to  tenfold. Inequality in wage earning in the US and other Anglo-Saxon economies 
has risen, as also the share of tem porary contracts in Europe, which can be seen as another 
type of inequality among workers. Common view on these evolutions is th a t, as firms face an 
increasing international com petition and operate in a high technology environm ent, the rela­
tive position of unskilled workers lias deteriorated (Katz and  M urphy 1992, Julm , M urphy and 
Pierce 1993). Institu tional factors may have further transla ted  these changes in labour dem and 
into a rise in unemployment in Europe, as a counterpart of the US inequalities (Krugm an 1994, 
Bertola and Icliino 1995).
We argue here th a t in addition to technological changes and international trade, labour 
supply evolutions may also have some im portant explanatory power, and illustrate  this point 
using French data: labour supply has been increasing in a non-neutral way in France, with more 
women and more educated workers1. These facts concerning labour stocks are well known. 
We try  to  provide additional explanation of labour supply changes by exam ining accurately 
the flows, or the numbers of workers moving among the three different sta tes (employment, 
unemployment and inactivity). The m erits associated with the flow’ approach are elaborated 
by Blanchard and Diamond (1990a) and Layard et al. (1991). Firstly, as they point out tha t 
the flows are much more cyclical than  the stocks, helping to  capture the  im pact of the business 
cycle fluctuations on labour m arkets far better. Secondly, much of the secular rise in European 
unemployment is accounted for by a decrease in the exit rate  from unem ploym ent ra ther than  
an increase in the inflows into unemployment (Bean 1993 or Layard et al. 1991). This leads one 
to emphasize the possible depreciation of the skill level of the  labour force during unemployment 
as in Pissarides (1992).
Two recent papers study the flows of workers in the French labour m arket. One by Cohen 
and Lefranc (1994), th a t establishes a relationship between technological growth and some of 
the transition  rates: the rise in the exit rate  from employment is well explained by the slowdown 
in productivity  grow th2. In the other paper, Y. L’Horty (1994) uses relevant d a ta  to compute 
contribution of each transition  ra te  to the rise in unemployment. One of his conclusions is 
th a t even a two-states representation, i.e. Employment-Unemployment is broadly sufficient to 
explain the rise in unemployment. We argue here th a t this is not so obvious in the 80’s and th a t
1 See Aceinoglu (1996) for the effect, of a rise of skilled labour supply leading to a change in demand for skilled 
overshooting the supply and generating inequality.
2 In France, the exit rate from employment also increases because of the rising share of temporary contracts 
in total employment: there are more short duration jobs with higher turnover. However, Cohen and Lefranc’s 
conclusion holds when one considers the rise in temporary contracts in total em ploym ent as the outcom e of 
a transition to low prod uctiv ity  growth rates. This is argued in the chapter of the thesis: high growth rate 
implies higher future profits. In a matching framework, it is im portant for firms to retain workers with long-term  
contracts, whereas the contrary holds in low growth regimes.
the interaction between activity and inactivity rather explains a fairly substantial fraction of 
unemployment changes. O ur first result is th a t the destination of workers leaving employment 
is more frequently unemployment rather than  inactivity. Consequently, our second result is 
th a t a higher turnover through unemployment has an adverse effect on unem ploym ent stock 
itself, by a mechanical effect.
The chapter investigates the flows of workers between the three m utually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive states employment, unemployment and inactivity, in France between 
1968 and 1993. In section 2, we use da ta  from the labour force survey (Enquete Emploi) and 
com puting the fraction of workers in a given sta te  who were in another s ta te  one year before, 
we build up a yearly transition  m atrix, defining implicitly a M arkovian model of the labour 
m arket transitions. This m atrix is then transform ed to  have an estim ate of the transition 
probabilities. In section 3, we decompose the tim e series of the six transition  probabilities 
into trends and cycles. We find th a t all rates have statistically  significant cyclical components. 
Some of the rates have unexpected cyclical signs, implying increased labour force participation 
during downturns (income effect dom inating price effect). All rates are also found to exhibit 
strong trends. This differs from the result of Gregg and W adsworth (1995) for the UK, where 
almost all the variations of the transition  rates are cyclical ones.
Section 4 covers one of the most im portant trends: workers - in fact women - leaving 
activity are less and less likely to indicate inactivity and rather more and more likely to declare 
themselves as unemployed in the labour force surveys. We show th a t labour force composition 
such as changes in the size of cohorts of retiring workers cannot account for it, and  instead it is 
really a change in individual’s (females) labour supply which is clearly implied. This is one of 
the numerous dimensions of increased female participation and their stronger a ttachm ent to the 
labour m arkets. In section 5, we define the ergodic d istribution (the lim it of the  stocks given 
the actual transition  rates) and the associated concept of the stationary  ra te  of unemployment 
(like in L’Horty 1994). The changes in behaviour of labour force participants described in 
section 3 is associated wrtka 4% increase in stationary  unemployment rate. In section 6 , we 
undertake a brief comparison with the flows in the UK, to emphasize as to how the trend 
described above is specific to France. In section 7 we suggest th a t secondary workers effects 
are a good factor for explaining the trend  of more workers choosing unem ploym ent rather than
inactivity. We then conclude th a t first, the changes in the transition  rates are closely linked 
to the changes in participation characteristics and second, it is reasonable to  conclude th a t the 
level of unemployment is dependent on labour supply, through these transition  rates.
1 .2  T r a n s fo r m a tio n  o f  t h e  d a ta
1 .2 .1  T h e  d a ta
The French labour force survey, “Enquetes Em ploi“, is com puted every year by the French ad­
m inistration (INSEE), and aggregate d a ta  are available since 1968 in “ INSEE Series Longues” . 
Individuals in the sample are asked their labour force status: employed or unemployed accord­
ing to  ILO ’s definition or not in the labour force. They are also asked their s ta tus a year before. 
If we represent the transitions of the labour m arket as a M arkovian process of all identical in­
dividuals, we can use the inform ation in the Enquetes Emploi to estim ate the  instantaneous 
transition  probabilities, or alternatively the m onthly transition  probabilities3. However, d a ta  
require some prior rectification. For instance, the fraction of people having moved from un­
employment to  employment in one year, calculated from the surveys as the num ber of movers 
from one sta te  to  the o ther divided by the unemployment stock the previous year, is not a 
proper measure of the transition  probability. Since there are, among the movers, people having 
moved more than  once, such a mechanical calculation is not appropriate. This is especially true 
when the annual rates are large, like the exit rate  from unemployment, in France being about 
50% a year. We have thus to  correct for multiple transitions within a year (hereafter intra-year 
transitions).
1 .2 .2  C o rrec tio n  for th e  m u ltip le  tra n s it io n s .
We correct the d a ta  in the following way. Let Q(dt) be the Markov transition  m atrix  associated 
to  the states E, U and N (Employment, Unemployment and Not in labour force respectively), 
during the period t  and t +  dt. In our case,
3Of course, the dependence of transitions rates of individuals to their past history is quite strong. Then, a 
Markovian process (in which the transition probabilities depend only on current state) may be insufficient. This 
is however enough for this description of the trends of the French labour market and w hat we want to highlight.
Q{dt) =
(  1 — ue — ue ue ue  ^
eu 1 — eu — nu  nu {dt)
y en u n  1 — en — u n  J
where x y  denotes the transition  rate  from sta te  X to Y during tim e dt. For a vector of the
stocks X { t)  =  {E, U, N )( t)  representing the number of persons in each sta te  a t tim e t, we have
therefore: X ( t  + dt) = Q{dt) .X{t) . Assuming a constant transition  m atrix  Q, clearly Q{2) is
given by Q (l)  * Q (l). From the Enquetes Emploi, we build the  yearly m atrix P  =  Q(dt =  12
months) and P  is equal to the m onthly transition m atrix to  the power 12. Thus, dividing the
non-diagonal coefficients of P  by twelve would provide a more appropriate  m onthly Markovian
m atrix, because of the m ultiple transitions (intra-year). T he proper m onthly transition  m atrix
is the unique real 12th root of the yearly transition m atrix. One could question the uniqueness
of this 12th root in the set of real 3x3 matrices. In fact, the uniqueness comes from the fact th a t
each year, all the m atrices are found to be diagonalizable and to have three positive eigenvalues,
one equal to 1 and rest two strictly between 0 and l 4. We thus assume th a t the Markovian
m atrix (expressed in m onths) is not far from the instantaneous transition  m atrix  expressed
in month: the error term  being of the order of the difference between (1 — A) and —log{A),
where A are the eigenvalues of the transition  matrices. In the yearly case, the error could reach
50%, fortunately partially  compensated. For the m onthly rates, the error is around 4% for
the exit rates from unemployment, and by less than  0.5%; for the o ther transition  rates. We
then com pute5 for each year the 1 2 th  root of the yearly transition  m atrix , for men, women
and all workers: this is the m atrix of the m onthly transitions rates, provided th a t there are no
intra-m onthly m ultiple transitions, which we assume hereafter.
4See also Fougeres aud Kainionka (1992) for a formal exposition of the transition m atrices and of tlieir 
properties.
5 W ith M athem atiea for W indows.
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1 .3  D e c o m p o s it io n  in  tr e n d s  a n d  c y c le s
1 .3 .1  T ren d s in  th e  tra n sfo rm ed  d a ta  
N um ber o f workers in transition
Having estim ated the m onthly transitions probabilities, we can calculate the m onthly Hows of 
workers year by year ( X Y  is the num ber of movers between sta tes X  and Y).  The following 
table displays the yearly growth rates for the period of study, plus additional statistics on the 
stocks. These growth rates are very large, either positively or negatively, wliich means tha t 
the tim e trends of these flows are persistent, and significant. The flows between E  and N  have 
clearly decreased over the period, the flows between N  and U have risen, the flows between U 
and E  have a clear upward trend. This reveals deep changes in the French labour m arket, th a t 
we analyse in details while considering the transition rates, in the next sub-sections.
Table 1.1. A verage yearly grow th rates, 1968-92
Series Growth rate  (%) Series Growth ra te  (%)
E U +7.22 Entry in E 0.58
U E +5.25 Entry in U 6.47
E N
hCoi Entry in N -0.75
N E -1.95 Employment E +0.45
U N +5.83 Unemployment U +6.90
N U +4.91 Unemployment ra te  u + 6 . 0 1
Exit from E +  1 . 6 6 Labour Force IJ +  E +0.80
Exit from U +5.38 15-64 years old E  +  U +  TV +0.82
Exit from N -0.44
Transition rates
The transition  rates are defined by x y  — X Y / X :  for example, eu — E U  I E , en  = E N / E  and 
exit-e = eu  +  en. They are displayed in figures 1-1 to 1-3.
Monthly transition rates : exit from employment
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Figure 1- 1 : Transition Rates From Employment, France
F ro m  e m p lo y m e n t Considering the outflows from employment, a a priori unexpected result 
is that the separation rate (on the figure 1-1  exit-e = s-e = en  +  eu) has not been really 
increasing over the period, compared to the rise in French unemployment. This last point is 
nevertheless the result of two different evolutions: a fall in en and a rise in eu. This is where 
this paper differs from Y. L’Horty’s: he finds that 6.4 points of the rise in unemployment are 
explained (in an accounting sense) by the changes in the rate Employment-Unemployment, and 
attributes this change to more job destruction. Here we don’t intend to imply job destruction in 
the explanation of rising eu rate, since the exit rate from employment is more or less constant. 
Consistently, we prefer to focus on the propensity to remain on the labour market after a job 
separation. We see tha t this propensity is larger than what it was twenty years back. This may 
be due to a change of arbitrage between unemployment and inactivity, or the composition of 
people exiting from employment, voluntarily or otherwise, which could be different from earlier 
period. This is investigated in details in section 4.
F ro m  u n e m p lo y m e n t From figure 1-2, it appears that the probability of unemployed persons 
to leave this state has been strongly decreasing over the period. As the un  rate has only slight-y 
decreased, the higher decrease in the accession rate from unemployment ue is the main cause oi
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Monthly transition rates : exit from unemployment
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Figure 1-2: Transition Rates From Unemployment, France.
the decrease in the exit rate from unemployment i.e. ue + un. The decrease occurred mainly in 
the 70\s, and not in the 80’s. One im portant implication of this is that the theory of persistence 
of unemployment due to a loss of skill of the unemployed or of ranking by employers of the 
unemployed according to duration, a t least at a first glance, does not fit well far with the French 
labour market: the decrease in the exit rates from unemployment should arise when long term  
unemployment rates increase, which was the case in the 80’s. O ther explanations of the French 
evolutions are still to be provided.
F ro m  in a c t iv i ty  in to  th e  la b o u r  fo rce The outflows from inactivity are shown in figure 1- 
3 . The fraction of inactive people coming on the labour m arket has not strongly decreased. The 
accession to  employment from inactivity is in decline, bu t less than the accession to employment 
from unemployment. The nu  rate has increased over the period, bu t to have decreased during 
the boom in 1988-89, when more directly found a job.
r’The definitions of the three states have, changed hi 1974 and 1982. Before 1974, the working age population 
was defined as persons aged more than 15. After 1974, people more than 65 (retired) are removed from our 
sample. After 1982, people older than 60 are also removed, because of the. change in legal age of retirement. 
However, this is not a big problem, as it does not. concern workers moving between the three states, but only the
stayers.
40
Monthly transition rates : exit from inactivity
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Figure 1-3: Transition Rates From Inactivity, France.
1 .3 .2  C ycles
Apart from the trends, the flows and the transition rates have a clear cyclical behaviour, as also 
remarked in many recent works'. It is interesting to separate trends and cycles, to avoid any 
confusion between transitory recessions and long run evolutions of the labour market. We want 
to focus on the latter. In 1 ’T ' , the cyclical component is strong in the flows and contains
some interesting information on the determinants of labour supply. Moreover, this section is 
motivated by the difference with the UK: in Gregg and W adsworth (1995), it appears clearly 
tha t all variations of the rates of transition for this country rates are cyclical ones, except the 
rate u n  which is upwards trending.
A way to separate the trends and the cycles is to use the Hodrick-Prescott filter. This filter 
removes the high frequency < merit and the result can be interpreted as a long run trend, 
while the residuals can be term ed as the cyclical component. Another way to  proceed, though 
somewhat less sophisticated yet sufficient, is to run the following regressions in annual time 
series:
1 See for these six flows, Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Burda and W yplosz (1993), for the job-to job flows, 
see Hartog and Van Ophem (1994) and Burgess (1994); for job flows, see Leonard (1987), Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1990) and for a more theoretical approach Mortensen and F’issarides (1994).
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x y  =  C  4 - a.trend  +  tt (reg 1)
x y  =  C  +  a.trend  +  b.Cycl 4- t t  (reg 2)
x y  =  C  +  a.trend  +  b \ .C yd \  +  b 2 . Cycl 2 +  t.t (reg 3)
tt  being an error term  with mean E{tt)  =  0, E ( t t , t t - i )  — 0 (Hypothesis Ho), and Cycl a 
cycle indicator. This give us a decomposition of the series into transitory  cyclical changes, and 
long term  evolutions which are the main focus after this section. For the cycle indicator, we 
take either the capacity utilization rate  in m anufacturing and an index of ou tpu t gap (gross 
domestic product filtered by Hodrick-Prescott filter, param eter value A =  1600), w ithout huge 
differences. We report here the results with the capacity utilization rate, the other results are 
in appendix B, bu t are qualitatively identical. We allow for two different coefficients b\ from 
1968 to  1981, and 62  from 1982 to  1993, by defining Cycl\ =  Cycl  if t < 1982 and 0 if t  >  1982. 
C ycl '2 is defined as 1 — C ycl2 (reg 3)8. The results are the following:
Table 1.2. D ependent variable: rate xy.
Rate eu ue en ne* un nu*
C  (regl) 0.0038(2.4) -0.054(-2.0) 0.0035(2.5) 0.2e-4(0.01) -0.003(-0.3) 0.43e-2(2.7)
a (regl) 0 .0 0 2 (2 1 .0 ) -0.0021 (-15) -0 . 0 0 1  (-13) -1.4e-3(-ll) -0.0005 (-10) 0.3e-4(2.3)
a .A T(%)  (regl) 40.44 -5.35 -0.24 -0.35 -1.30 40.07
b (reg2 ) -0.36(-1.9) 16.5(4.99) 0.21(1.23) 0.87(4.08) 3.12(2.68) -0.34 (-1.59)
&i(reg3) -0.40(-2.1) 16.7(4.89) 0.22(1.24) 0.85(3.25_ 3.05(2.55) -0.24(4).96)
b2 (reg3) -0.45 (-2.3) 16.8(4.76) 0.22(1.24) 0.84(2.96) 2.95(2.39) -0.22 (-0.79)
R 2 0.97 0.92 0.89 0.82 0.81 0.89
DW 1.83 1.13 1.91 0.99 2.53 0 . 6 8
In brackets: t-Student. ft.AT(%) is the variation of the monthly rate x y  over the period without 
the cyclical component. The sign * means that a dummy variable is added to the independent variables
8The choice of the year of the dummy variable is not done according to some efficiency criterion, but because 
of the missing point in 1981 and its median position in the sample.
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to take into account the change of definition of inactivity.
Table 1.3. D ependent variable: rate xy.
Rate en  +  eu =  s-e u n  +  ue = s ju
C  (regl) 0.007(2.98) -0.057(-1.8)
a (regl) 0.00007(6.1) -0.0026(-16)
a .A T(% )  (regl) + 0 . 2 0 -6.50
b (reg2 ) -0.15(-0.5) 19.6(4.98)
&i (reg3) -0.18(-0.6) 19.7(4.84)
b2 (reg3) -0.22(-0.7) 19.8(4.68)
R 2 0.62 0.94
DW 2.30 1 . 1 0
In brackets: t-Student. a. AT(% ) is the absolute variation of the monthly rate x y  over the period.
The sign and size of the trends appear in rows 2 and 3, the signs of the cyclicality in rows 
4 to 6 , and the R 2 and Durbin-W atson statistics in the last two rows9. The findings are also 
sum m arized in figure 1-4 and 1-5, displaying the transition  rates a t the beginning and the end 
of the period (1968 and 1992), when the cycle indicator is taken a t its average, or the average 
plus (or minus) two times its standard  deviation (upturns or downturns).
The rates are sim ulated from regression 3, with cycl\ and cycl2 as regressors. The table 1.4 
offers another sum m ary of the results. The flows ue, eu  and ne  have expected behaviour: eu is 
countercyclical, being bigger in recession, whereas ue  is procyclical, like ne. I t is easier to find a 
job in expansion, from either unemployment and inactivity and there are more job separations 
towards unemployment in downturns.
Table 1.4. C yclical behaviour o f different ra tes .10:
9 Standard test reject the null Ho  of no autocorrelation of the residuals. However, given m issing data in 1981, 
A R (1 ) procedure cannot lie performed efficiently. Since the purpose here is mainly descriptive, we have not 
improved the estim ation. In addition F-tests on the equality of 61 and generally do not reject the null.
10(+ )  means a high level of significativity, (-) a low level.
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Figure 1-4: Predicted Transition Rates in 1968 with Cycl =  80.9% (left) Cycl =  87.3% (middle) 
Cycl =  74.5% (right)
3.14
4.89 3.89
2. 2*
4.72
4..59 .4.46
10.2,
6.30
.5.044.28
Figure 1-5: Predicted Transition Rates in 1992 with Cycl =  80.9% (left) Cycl =  87.3%) (middle) 
Cycl =  74.5% (right)
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The behaviour of the three other rates is paradoxical: en  and u n  are procyclical, nu  is 
countercyclical. Thus, in recessions, more people come to the labour m arkets and fewer leave 
the labour m arket to return  to inactivity. This can be explained by secondary or added workers 
effects (see Appendix C for a short theoretical framework): in period of recession, households 
are more likely to loose the prim ary income and to  com pensate with additional workers going 
to the labour m arket. This added worker effect should prim arily concern women. To test 
this, we undertake the same analysis with male and female transition  rates. The tables are 
reported  in appendix B. The main finding is sum m arized here: the exit rate  from employment 
is countercyclical for men, as expected bu t is procyclical for women. This is due to the fact tha t 
the  transition  rate  from employment to  inactivity is a-cyclical for men, bu t strongly procyclical 
for women. This is a result th a t we interpret in section 7 as a renewal of added workers effect 
in France due to high unemployment.
1 .4  T h e  r is e  in  t h e  fr a c t io n  o f  jo b  m o v e r s  g o in g  t o  u n e m p lo y ­
m e n t .
As pointed out in Bean (1993), the exit rate  of unemployment has decreased and it is one of the 
m ost im portant'cause^of French rise of unemployment. However, this decrease occurred mainly 
in the 70’s whereas the probability to  find a job has roughly rem ainrd  constant in the  80’s. T. :s 
decrease cannot explain why unemployment almost doubled during these years. The separation 
rate  (transition  from employment) is almost constant, which is also a well-known feature (see 
Layard et al., 1991). W hat is less known and th a t we show here is th a t the destination of workers 
leaving a job has m arkedly changed. We in terpret this in section 7 as a consequence of the fact 
th a t during the same period, the arbitrage between unemployment and inactivity has largely 
changed since the end of 60’s. In France, workers leaving a job decide to  search for another job. 
In 1968, eu /s ,  the fraction of job movers going to unemployment instead of inactivity, was only
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Figure 1-6 : Transition Rates From Employment, male workers, France.
13%. By 1992, it jum ped up to 59%. For workers leaving a job, it has become very less frequent 
to return to inactivity, and rather more frequent to  register in unemployment agencies. This 
section is devoted to this trend.
1.4.1 M en  and  w om en .
To go further, it will be useful to consider disaggregated da ta  by gender. The separation rate 
of men (eu  +  en, figure 1-6 ) has increased since 1968. This is only due to the transitions to 
unemployment (eu) th a t have been multiplied by a factor of 5. This rise has not occurred 
slowly, on the contrary each recession was followed by a seemingly perm anent increase of the 
separation rate, in 1973, 79, and 82. But the en  rate is roughly constant and male workers 
flows cannot account for the aggregate decrease of the transition Employment-Inactivity.
By contrast, for women this separation rate eu +  en  has slightly decreased (figure 1-7), even 
if it remains higher than the corresponding rate for men. The disaggregation in the destinations 
reveals that again this is essentially due to an inverse shift of both  transitions rates eu and en. 
The eu rate of women has increased by a factor of 5 (like for men) whereas the en  rate in 1992 
is 40%) only of its 1968 value.
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Figure 1-7: Transition Rates From Employment, female workers, France.
It follows tha t the fact observed and described above, the change in the arbitrage between 
activity and inactivity is mainly a change in women's participation to the labour market. From 
these two graphics, it also appears that women have progressively got jobs with longer tenures, 
compared to those of men: the average duration of a job, in steady-state being the inverse of 
the separation rate. Two explanations are possible: the quality of the  jobs proposed is better; 
and alternatively, the willingness of women to stay on the labour market, i.e. their attachment 
to the labour force has increased for different reasons on which we come back in section 7.
Finally, the yearly transitions11 of the 25-49 years old (so without retirem ents) for men 
and women confirm the view that there is a shift in the arbitrage between unemployment and 
inactivity and that this is due to women only (see figures 1 - 8  and 1-9).
1 .4 .2  D e m o g r a p h y
We could object tha t these changes are due to changes in the size of cohorts of workers as the 
number of retiring workers could have decreased over the period. The test of this hypothesis is 
provided in the following table.
11 These latter transitions rates are not corrected for intra-vear transitions, because all the six rates disaggre­
gated by age were not available, so the 1 2 th root of the transition matrices couldn’t be computed.
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Figure 1-8 : Transition Rates From Employment, 25-49 year male workers, France.
W omen (25-49 yo) transition  rates : from  em ploym ent
0,09
0,08
0,07
0,06
0,06
0,04
0,03
0,02
0,01
8 S S 3  il  Jl S y  3  3  g 2  S S E S S ?  g  S g  2  13
Figure 1-9: Transition Rates From Employment, 25-49 year female workers, France.
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T able 1.5. C oh ort s izes in  d ifferent years in France.
Age category 1968 1975 1982 1990
65 years 503 361 501 645 611 361* 590 594*
(65-69 years) /  5 456 579 477 542 441 027* 578 414*
18 years 864 732 843 538 879 676 894176
(15-19 years) /  5 853 008 846 473 872 150 866178
The symbol * in a column means that the corresponding column reports individuals of 60 years old 
in the first row and 60-64 years old in the second row, to take into account the change in the retirement 
age in 1982, from 65 to 60 years old. Numbers taken the first day of the year.
As there is no downward trend  in the num ber of retiring people (this num ber even increased 
between 1968 and 1990), the hypothesis th a t a fall in the size of cohorts can explain the trend 
is rejected.
1 .5  E r g o d ic  D is t r ib u t io n  o f  U n e m p lo y m e n t  U n d e r  D if fe r e n t  A s ­
s u m p t io n s .
(liven th a t in France, the flows between activity and inactivity have significant cyclical and 
secular variations, a three states representation of the labour m arket is necessary. We now 
study here how the transition  rates between the three states have an im pact on the long run
d istribution of the workers in each of these three states and define the concept of ergodic:
distribution.
D e f in it io n  1 . The ergodic distribution of the Markovian system is the limit o f  the stocks 
when the transition rates are held constant.
Denoting by E, U and N  the stocks of workers, we have the following dynamic: equations, 
equal to 0  for the ergodic distribution:
dlJ / d t  — E .eu  +  N .n u  — U.(ut: +  un) =  0 (1 . 1 )
d E /d t  = N .ne  +  IJ.ue — E.(eu  +  en) = 0  (1.2)
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d N /  dt, = E .cn  +  IJ.un — N .(ne  +  nu) =  0 (1-3)
so we can also define, like in L’Horty (1994) a stationary  rate  of unemployment when E, N 
and U are constant, which is the rate  of unemployment corresponding to the ergodic. d istribution 
of workers in the three states.
D e f in it io n  2. The ergodic rate o f unemployment is given by:
* eu.ne  +  eu.Jiu +  en .nu .
u  = -------------------------------------------------------------------  (1.4)
eu.ne  +  eu.nu  +  en.nu  +  ue.ne  4 - ue.nu  +  ne .un
The speed of convergence to  this stationary rate  is difficult to write explicitly12. It should 
also be rem arked th a t u* has no real in terpretation bu t is the lim it to which u  converges if all the 
transition  rates remain constant. Now if we suppose th a t in each year the workers losing a job 
have the same preferences th a t they had in the 1960’s, i.e. if en  =  81/100 .s and eu =  19/100.s
as in 1968, where s =  eu +  en  we can build a second stationary  rate  u**, defined by:
** 0.19.s.ne +  0.19.s.rm-f O.Sl.s.nu , .
(1.5)
0 .19.s. ne  +  0.19s. me +  0.81.s. rm +  ue.ne  +  ue.nu  +  ne.un
The figure 1-10 represents the actual rate  of unemployment (solid line), u* and u**lA.
There are two observations to be made.
•  If the rise of u  is smooth, the rise of u* arises more suddenly and unevenly. The. slowness of 
the rise of u  is often seen as a hysteresis effect, bu t an in terpreta tion  in term s of structural 
changes affecting the transition  rates is possible.
•  The hypothesis made on e u /s  and e n /s  has a large im pact on the. sta tionary  rate  of 
unemployment, especially after 1981. In fact, 4 points of the unemployment rate  of the 
ergodic: distribution of workers can be linked to  the change of preferences. In other words, 
unemployment at the end of 1960’s could have been more im portant, if preferences had
12 It depends on the. eigenvalues of the matrix A defined by X t + 1 =  A .X t where. X t is the vector 
There are three eigenvalues: 0 and the two negative solutions of the equation X 2 +  (eu +  en +  nu +  ne +  un +  
ue)X  +  {eu(un +  ne +  nu) +  en(ue +  un +  nu) +  ue(ne +  nu) + un.ne)} =  0
K Note the homogeneity of degree 0 in the flows from inactivity insuring that u* and it** are not affected by 
the break on the inactive population in 1975 .
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Figure 1-10: Comparison of different simulated unemployment rates, France, 
been the same as in the 1980’s14.
One could object that keeping constant the proportion of two of the six transitions rates at 
its 1968 value would affect the other rates. This weakens the interpretation of u**. However, 
the effect of this assumption on the other rates is ambiguous, as is their impact on the ergodic 
unem ploym ent15.
Another way to quantify the consequence of the change in the exit rates from employment is 
to evaluate the gross flow E N  in level if it had grown since 1968 only a t the demographic rate. 
In 1968, each month, 105 852 workers were moving from employment to inactivity. In 1992, it 
should represent 128 771 persons, instead of the actual value: 64 292 persons. The monthly 
difference is then 64 479 monthly, or 773 748 yearly who now transit through unemployment. 
W ith an average duration of unemployment of 1.3 years, it means 1, 005, 872 unemployed 
people, or again 4.0% of the labour force. Independent of the m ethod used to estimate the
14 More detailed studies can be found in Cohen and Lefranc (1994) for the respective contributions of demog­
raphy, hiring and firing rates, and in L’Horty (1994) for the analysis of contribution of each of the six rates.
Assuming cu/cn(t) =  cu/cii(68) means that we have each year less active people than in reality: therefore, 
labour supply should decrease, equilibrium wage should increase, therefore hirings ue +  ne should decrease and 
resultantly u*m is underestimated. But, if more people are exiting from activity, the average search intensity with 
respect to reality should increase, therefore we and ne should increase, and u** would be overestimated.
Yearly Transition Rate in the Uh 
(not corrected for infra-year transil
Figure 1- 1 1 : Transition Rates, UK.
effect of the shift in preferences observed in the data, it clearly represents a significant fraction 
of unemployment.
1 .6  A  c o m p a r iso n  w ith  th e  U K .
Before discussing the reasons for the main trend  in French data, it is interesting to compare the 
transition rates with Gregg and W adsworth’s data. As stated  before, it can be seen in figure 
1 - 1 1  that there are almost no trends in the British transition rates, and most of the variations 
are only cyclical ones, hi 1975, the share of workers leaving employment to unemployment was 
55% of total job movers (EU + E N )  and in 1993 it was only 50.3%. In figure 1-1‘2, we repeat 
the exercise of last section: for this we compute the stationary rate of unemployment u* and 
we compare it with the actual rate u  (from OECD data), and with the stationary rate u** 
simulated with eu f(eu  -f- en) and en /(eu  +  en) at their levels of 1975.
The comparison with France is quite clear: the hypothesis made on u** has no im pact in 
the UK as compared with u*. The difference between the actual and stationary rates can be 
seen, as in France, as a transition to the stationary state, and yields no additional information 
here.
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Figure 1-12: Comparison of different simulated unemployment rates, UK.
1 .7  S e c o n d a r y  w ork ers e ffe c ts  in  F ran ce?
It is difficult to conclude without offering a few explanations for the shift in the destination 
of women leaving jobs in France. We propose five mechanisms and then show evidence that 
secondary workers’ effects are plausible in the 80’s in France.
• First, a change in attitudes with respect to  the labour market: women have become more 
than a only a “ reservoir ” of labour. They are more attached to the labour markets, 
whatever the cyclical fluctuations of the economy16.
• Second, a rise of real wages w, which is an incentive to undertake job search.
• Third, a rise of unemployment compensation z =  a.w, either by a rise of w  and of a, also 
by an increase of the coverage.
• Fourth, informational reasons, if one believes that finding a job from inactivity is more 
difficult, and th a t the intermediary role of employment agencies has become necessary.
16 For instance, the rise in the divorce rates is certainly linked with the propensity of women to work, as a 
cause but perhaps also as a consequence.
• Fifth, secondary worker effects, affecting; poor households: as noted in Dolado et al. 
(1996), the prim ary cause of poverty in Europe is unem ploym ent, and in a world where 
unemployment has strongly risen, the risk for prim ary workers to become unemployed has 
been continuously augmenting. This can explain why secondary workers prefer to  stay in 
the labour force.
Only a study with m icro-data would allow to disentangle, the different explanations. How­
ever, we are going to argue th a t the  last explanation, secondary workers’ effects is very likely. 
It already received some support in section 3.2, where the cyclicality of some of the transition  
rates (en, un , nu) could be explained by added workers’ effects.
Indeed, in the 80’s, French unemployment has been constantly a t very high level. Fur­
therm ore, this level has certainly been perceived by agents as perm anent in the medium run, 
while this was not necessarily the case in the  mid 70’s. The view of a change in the percep­
tion of unemployment was developed in Cohen (1988). He argues th a t the shift towards more 
conservatism  in the late 70’s-early 80’s is due to the progressive understanding of the nature 
of unemployment, resulting from perm anent supply shocks, and not from transitory  dem and 
factors. It is possible to transpose this analysis to the participation decisions of households: 
they expect a long period of high structural unem ploym ent in the 80’s, ra ther th an  a tem porary 
fluctuation, and higher participation of women is acting as an insurance in case of unemploy­
m ent of the o ther family members. See also in the figure 1 - 6  how the separation rate  of men has 
increased over the period, leading to more uncertain ty  in household’s incomes. O ther elements 
in favour of this explanation can be found in figures 1-13 and 1-14:
The num ber of women in the labour force has constantly  increased a t a ra te  of 2.5% a year 
(figure 1-13), much faster than  the growth of population (0.8%)). This is well explained by the 
rise of real wages during the first part of the period (figure 1-14). After 1980, the  deceleration 
in the. rise of real wages should have lead to  an inflexion in the trend  in participation, which 
is not the case in figure 1-13. Moreover, it appears th a t the female labour force participation 
has a different behaviour in the late 80’s th an  in the. 70’s: the 1974’s recession is followed by 
an inflexion (a decrease, if we. remove the. trend, solid line in figure 1-13) in labour force of 
women. On the contrary, women’s active population declines a t the beginning of the economic 
expansion, in 1987. Furtherm ore, it is under the secular trend  during this entire, period. At the
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Figure 1-14: Evolution of real wages, France.
beginning of the large recession of the early 90’s, it increases, and only declines in 1993. We have 
here many signs th a t labour force participation of women has become less procyclical in the 
80’s. This is consistent w ith a renewal of secondary effects due to high levels of unemployment.
In the UK, by contrast the indicators of the labour m arket are much less trended. The 
figm'es 1-11 and 1-12 have more cyclical variations than  trends. It can be argued th a t the 
perception of a rising and long-lasting unemployment is stronger in France than  in the UK. 
This would explain the difference in the behaviour of workers leaving unem ploym ent in the two 
countries.
1 .8  C o n c lu s io n
This worker flows analysis aims to show that in the 80’s in France, the decline in the exit rate 
from unemployment is not sufficient to explain the rise in unemployment. A nother relevant 
aspect th a t must not be forgotten is th a t due to a stronger labour force a ttachm ent of women, 
arbitrage between unemployment and inactivity has changed. This single fact account for more 
th an  4 points of unemployment in the ergodic distribution of all workers between the different 
states of the labour force. W ith  a different perspective, unem ploym ent in France in the 60’s 
could have been partly  hidden, because women losing or leaving jobs were very likely to  return  
to  inactivity, which is no longer the case now. A possible explanation for this evolution is th a t 
secondary workers’ effects are more im portan t in the context of high unemployment equilibrium, 
and may be a t least partly  responsible for this shift in preferences between unem ploym ent and 
inactivity.
The central idea underlying this paper is th a t labour supply changes (shocks, trends and 
composition) are non-neutral on the labour markets, especially on unemployment rates. There­
fore the consequences of increasing labour force participation should be investigated in other 
OECD countries, since this is for sure one of the strongest common change affecting the labour 
markets.
• A ppendix  A: sources o f data
Figures 1-1 to 1-3 and 1-6 to 1-9: INSEE, enquetes Emploi, annual survey, after the transformation 
described in section 2. Figures 1-4, 1-5 and 1-10: author’s calculations. Table 5: INSEE I)6mographie,
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Figure 1-15: Comparison of different cycle indicators, France.
various years. Figures 1-11 and 1-12 British LFS, provided by I. Wadsworth. Figure 1-13: OECD 
Labour Force Statistics. Figure 1-14: OECI) National Data, variable WRSE. Figure 1-15: Direction de 
la Prevision, Ministere des Finances et OECD National Accounts.
• A p p e n d ix  B
Tuc  is an index of utilization of capacity in industry (source OECD) and is the cycle indicator used 
in the text and called C y d . gap is the high frequency component of (IDF* filtered by the Hodrick- 
Prescott filter. The following tables provide the results of the regression analysis of the text with the 
cycle indicator gap (see regressions 1 to 3 for the notations)
Table Bl. Dependent variable: rate xy. Cycle indicator: output gap filtered by H-P filter,
Rate eu ue en ne* un nu*
bgap 1(reg2 ) -0.12(-2.33) 1.60(2.34) 0.13(2.41) 0.232(3.96) 0.50(2.13) -0.065 (-1.2)
^1 gap (reg3) -0.05 (-0.76) 1.06(1.11) 0.09(1.16) 0.189(2.34) 0 .2 1 (0 .6 6 ) 0.03(0.45)
^2gap (reg3) -0.19(-2.64) 2.19(2.19) 0.17(2.24) 0.280(3.35) 0.82(2.46) -0.17(-2.32)
In brackets: t-Student.
R ate en  +  eu = s~e u n  +  ue = s-u
bgap (reg‘2 ) 
&lgap (reg-3) 
b2gaP (reg3)
0.01(0.13) 2.11(2.73) 
0.03(0.29) -0.90(-0.43) 
-0.01 (-0.12) 2.70(1.24)
In brackets: t-Student.
The results are similar with this indicator of the cycle.
Table B2. Dependent variable: rate x y  for men only Cycle indicator: output gap filtered by H-P 
filter, A — 1600.______________________________________________________________________
R ate eu ue en $ne u n n u *
bgap (reg-2 ) -0.16(-2.36) 1.44(2.10) 0.09(1.77) 0.33(4.25) 0.59(2.85) -0.13(-1.44)
bigap (reg-3) -0.04(-0.50) 0.87(0.91) 0.07(0.98) 0.35(3.25) 0.73(2.50) 0.01(0.09)
b‘2gap (reg3) -0.28(-3.10) 2.06(2.07) 0.11(1.47) 0.30(2.75) 0.45(1.46) -0.28(-2.33)
In brackets: t-Student.
R ate en  +  eu = s~e u n  +  ue = s~u
bgap (reg2 ) 
bigap (reg-3) 
b'2gap (reg3)
-0.06(-0.70) 2.03(2.93) 
0.03(0.24) 1.60(1.64) 
-0.17(-1.27) 2.51(2.47)
In brackets: t-Student.
Table B3. Dependent variable: rate x y  for women only Cycle indicator: output gap filtered by H-P 
filter, A — 1600._______________________________________________________________________
R ate eu ue en ne* u n nu*
bgap (reg2 ) 
bigap (reg-3) 
bigap (reg3)
-0.06(-1.21)
-0.06(-0.86)
-0.06(-0.80)
1.90(2.37)
1.41(1.25)
2.43(2.07)
0.20(2.06)
0.11(0.81)
0.30(2.14)
0.19(2.87)
0 .1 1 (1 .2 2 )
0.28(3.06)
0.32(0.86)
-0.43(-0.90)
1.13(2.29)
-0.03(-0.67)
0.04(0.84)
-0.10(-1.95)
In brackets: t-Student.
R ate en  +  eu — s-e u n  +  ue = s~u
bgap (reg2 ) 
bigap (reg3) 
bigap (reg-3)
0.14(1.10) 2.22(2.18) 
0.04(0.25) 0.98(0.71) 
0.23(1.32) 3.57(2.47)
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In brackets: t-Student.
We also run the regressions 1 to 3 for men and women. The results are displayed in tallies B4 and 
B5 with the cycle indicator of the section 3, or in Tables B2 and B3 with the alternative cycle indicator. 
Consider the table B5, for women only. The eu rate is countercyclical, but not really in the beginning 
of the period (until 1981) and as much as for the total flows in the second period. This certainly reflects 
the fact that female workers have progressively got better jobs. The ue rate is procyclical, as the Tie 
rate. This is explained classically by the flexion or discouraged workers effect. The three other rates 
also have a paradoxical behaviour: en and un are procyclical, and nu is countercylical. Moreover, for 
en, the coefficient of the exogenous variable C y c l  is +0.64 to compare to +0.22 (3 times less, and not 
significant) for men. We can also remark that the aggregate (men+women) separation rate is a-cyclical 
(table 3). The cyclicality of the separation rate of men and women are of opposite signs. Men leave 
employment in recession. By contrast, the job separation rate of women is lower in downturns, due to 
the strong procyclicality of the en rate i.e. less frequent returns to inactivity.
Table B4. Dependent variable: rate xy  for men only.
R ate eu ue en Tie* un nu*
b (reg2 ) 
&i (reg3) 
b2 (reg3)
-0.40(-1.52) 
-0.41 (-1.53) 
-0.43(-1.53)
7.29(1.68)
7.08(1.59)
6.75(1.47)
0.22(1.33)
0.19(1.20)
0.14(0.83)
0.96(1.03)
0.02(0.02)
-0.24(-0.21)
2.41(2.07) -0.52(-1.26) 
2.32(1.95) -0.43 (-0.86) 
2.17(1.77) -0.41 (-0.73)
In brackets: t-Student. The sign * means that a dummy variable is added to the independent 
variables to take into account the change of definition of inactivity.
Table B5. Dependent variable: rate xy for women only.
R ate eu ue en Tie* un nu*
b (reg2 ) -0.08(-0.3) 17.84(3.78) 0.64(2.25) 0.70(2.97) 3.73(1.96) -0.11 (-0.67)
bi (reg3) -0.16(-0.90) 18.66(3.99) 0.68(2.44) 0.72(2.49) 3.94(2.04) -0.14 (-0.73)
h  (reg3) -0.28(-1.47) 19.73(4.07) 0.75(2.57) 0.73(2.30) 4.23(2.11) -0.15(-0.71)
In brackets: t-Student. The sign * means that a dummy variable is added to the independent 
variables to take into account the change of definition of inactivity.
Table B6. Dependent variable: rate xy for men only.
Income Y
w
w
Leisure
24h
Figure 1-16: Income and Price Effect
Rate en  4 - eu = s~c un  +  ue = s~u
b (reg2 ) -0.18 (-0.51) 9.70(2.00)
b i (reg-3) -0.22(-0.64) 9.40(1.90)
l>2 (reg3) -0.29(-0.81) 8.92(1.74)
Table B7. Dependent variable: rate xy for women only.
Rate C7i -T eu = s~e un  -I- ue = s-u
b (reg-2 ) 
hi (reg3) 
b‘2 (reg-3)
0.56(1.30) 21.6(3.54) 
0.52(1.19) 22.6(3.73) 
0.47(1.04) 23.96(3.82)
• A p p e n d ix  C
In a static model, from Slutsky decomposition, with //(w , Y )  the supply of hours, w  the wage, 
Y  the income: dH /dw  = d H fdW'{utility — constant) +  H .d H /d Y . The first term on the right 
handside is positive, the second one is negative.
Under the assumption that leisure is a normal good, the signs in the Slutsky equation are as written 
in the above equation. Thus, the cyclical behaviour of labour force participation can be written as the 
sum of two effects (see also the figure 1-16):
• The price-effect. During an expansion leading to a higher wage and/or a higher probability to
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find a job, i.e. a higher present-discounted value of having a job, labour force participation should 
increase. The same holds for recessions, where labour force should decrease. This is known as the 
flexion effect or discouraged workers’ effect, which leads to procyclicality of labour force. Primary 
workers’ participation is not very cyclical and generally women’s participation obeys this law 
better. On the graph, the substitution effect is represented by the path from A to B,
•  The income-effect. This is the opposite cyclical effect. A loss of wage due to adjustment during 
a recession, or due to lower probability to have a job, leads to an increase of hours supplied in 
households with more than one working age person. This is the secondary worker effect. On 
the graph, this is the path from B to C. Mincer (1962) made the following remarks: “While the 
parameters estimates predict no clear-cut cyclical patterns of labour force participation of married 
women in the aggregate, they point to differential patterns of subgroups depending on employment 
experience of husbands. In families whose heads have become unemployed, the relative decline in 
family income is much stronger than the relative decline in the “expected" wage rate of the wife. 
In such families therefore, labour force rates of wives are likely to increase in recessions. In all 
other families, incomes are relatively stable but wage-rate expectations decline somewhat. The 
likely result in these families is a slight decrease in labour force rates of wives." This phenomenon 
should be stronger in poor households or in poor countries. The studies on women labour force 
participation (Mincer 1962, 1966, Layard et al. 1980, Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986) have 
concluded that this effect, relevant in the 40’s and 50’s, has progressively vanished in the 60’s and 
the 70’s due to the rise in real wage due to the growth of technical progress in OECI) countries. 
When poverty in Europe is due mainly to long term unemployment, one cannot rule out a renewal 
of secondary worker’s effect.
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C hapter 2
C an Labour Supply E xplain  th e  R ise  
in U nem ploym ent and Inter-G roup  
W age Inequality  in th e  O EC D ?
A b s tra c t :  This paper investigates the consequences of labour supply changes in the OECI) countries
in the last decades. It is argued that changes in supply cannot be thought as homogenous: these 
changes involve more young and more adult female workers, that are complement with skilled 
men and substitute with low-wage groups (young, unskilled). These labour supply trends since 
the 50’s increased competition between women, the young workers and the low skilled workers in 
some segments of the labour force. An empirical strategy to test these hypothesis is undertaken. 
Disaggregation by gender is necessary and gives positive relations between female participation 
growth and unemployment. Endogeneity of participation levels with respect to unemployment 
is treated in two ways, by instrumental variables estimations, and with vectorial autoregression 
techniques. Causal relations between participation and unemployment cannot be rejected. The 
estimated elasticity implies that the observed changes in labour supply account for a significant 
part of the increase in unemployment.
The rise of unemployment, observed in every developed country over the past 30 years, has 
been especially strong in Europe, where it reached a level of 11.4% of active population in 1994, 
com pared to  ju st 6 . 1 % in the United States. Yet there was a time, not so long ago, when the
average unemployment rate  in Europe was only about 2%, and it was the US. economy th a t 
seemed to  be performing badly, with an unemployment rate  of 5.3% in 1960. In fact, the rise 
of unemployment in Europe was substantive after each oil shock, i.e. 1974 and 1979. Having 
observed a return  to  the pre-74 equilibrium in the US, b u t not in Europe, it was natural to 
consider the possible causes of persistence in Europe. A first type of explanation was related to 
the real wage gap. The wage setters were able to m aintain high wages after a bad  shock, without 
being cooperative enough to care about to ta l employment (Bruno and Sachs, 1985). But 15 
years after the oil shocks, this explanation has become less popular since wage rigidity should 
not . persist th a t a long period and a second type of explanation was explored, implying the 
existence of m ultiple equilibria, w ith high or low employment. For instance, a low equilibrium 
could be due to  a loss of skills of unemployed workers during the spells of unem ploym ent, making 
the labour force less a ttractive (Pissarides 1992, Layard and al. 1991). This explanation, or 
the  alternative one - a ranking by employers of the unemployed according to the tim e spent 
in unemployment (Blanchard and Diamond 1990) - seems to  fit well w ith the European case 
where the share of long-term  unemployed is extremely high com pared to  the US.
A th ird  hue of explanation, ruling out the issues of persistence in contrast to the two pre­
vious ones, came from the observation th a t wage inequality had strongly risen over the past 25 
years in the US and in UK, bu t had rem ained fairly stable in the high unem ploym ent countries, 
and th a t a common cause could explain both  phenomenon. The evolution of wage inequali­
ties was studied in Davis (1992), K atz and M urphy (1992), Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower 
(1993), Juhn, M urphy and Pierce (1993), Card, Kram arz and Lemieux (1995), Goux and Mau- 
rin (1995) am ongst others. The forces involved in the rise of inequality (mainly in the literature 
international trade, biased technical progress or institu tional changes like the decline in union­
ization), could well be the same across countries, bu t act differently according to  the wage 
setting institutions. In particular, the levels of minimum wages in Europe, associated with high 
employment payroll taxes, could make the unskilled extrem ely unattrac tive  to  employers. Any 
other institu tional factor leading to  wage rigidity in the bo ttom  of the d istribu tion  could also 
explain the differences between the US and Europe.
Here we follow the th ird  line of explanation. Since we are not convinced by theories relying 
only on technological changes affecting the dem and for labour (after all, this is always the
residual of what has not been explained), we rather focus on the changes in labour supply which, 
in contrast, have the advantage of being observed and quantified. Indeed, a m ajor change in the 
labour m arkets during the postw ar period was the massive increase of the labour force, both  
by the rise in the size of the exhorts of the baby-boom  and by higher female participation. Of 
course, a homogeneous increase of the labour force should be neutral on labour markets: over 
a period of a century, creating no trend  in unemployment: w hat happens is th a t the capital 
stock increases such th a t capital per labour is constant and m aintains real wages constant 
ceteris paribus, i.e. in absence of technological progress. This is the conventional Solowian view, 
also applied to  labour m arkets with equilibrium unemployment in Nickell (1991), or M alinvaud 
(1986), in representative agents frameworks. W hen one departs from this homogeneity of labour 
supply, allowing for generation effects as in Pissarides (1989) or in Welch (1979), labour supply 
is no longer neutral. This is the first point here: the rise in labour force of the postw ar period 
is absolutely unique in history, and involves more m arried women and in the 70’s, more young 
workers of the baby-boom  cohorts, increasing the share of unattached  and inexperienced workers 
in the labour m arkets of alm ost all OECI) countries. Then, consistently w ith the first point, the 
second point in this paper is th a t the  aggregate level of participation  is not the  proper variable 
to  explain unemployment. It is b e tte r to  consider the composition of the labour force1.
The paper is about the links between labour supply and unemployment. The study of the 
changes in the wage structu re  is explored in next chapter. In section 1 , we give 8  stylized facts 
about labour supply and unemployment by gender. In section 2, we introduce a model where the 
heterogeneity of the increase of labour supply is approxim ated with two segments of the labour 
m arket, a prim ary and a secondary segment. Wages are com petitive in the prim ary segment and 
not always com petitive in the secondary segment. Workers in the prim ary segment are thought 
as those with high experience and labour force attachm ent, while the workers in the secondary 
segments are thought as the low experienced, with higher than  average propensity to  leave the
^ h i s  explanation for the trends in labour markets is new: the role of supply factors seem s to be avoided in 
the literature, despite a seemingly strong explanatory power. For instance Katz and Murphy (1992) find that 
83% of the increased return to experience for male workers observed in the US was due to the relative supply 
component. However they attribute it to the supply of young workers, and do not control for the relative female 
labour supply, the evolution of which is comparable in the 70’s to the supply of young workers. In other papers, 
the role of supply is only m entioned, never developed (Malinvaud 1986, Murphy and Topel 1987). A notable 
exception is Topel (1994a) w ho is lead to conclude that the decrease in the relative wage of unskilled in the US 
is alm ost accounted for by increased female participation.
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labour m arket. Labour supply shocks are represented by the evolution of three param eters: 
the share of young workers in the labour force, the participation rate of adult women and the 
share of adult women in the prim ary segment of the labour force. In section 3 we derive an 
empirical strategy. We investigate the cross-country determ inants of unem ploym ent in section 
4 and the time-series evidence in section 5 and show sim ultaneity issues between participation 
and unemployment, hi section 6 , we argue to conclude th a t these sim ultaneity issues, which 
prevent simple correlations between unemployment and participation to be conclusive, are one 
of the explanations to  the lack of interest of m acroeconomists in the im pact of labour supply 
on the labour m arket. We take the risk to  re-examine this controversial question in this paper.
2 .1  S o m e  fa c ts
2 .1 .1  C ro ss-co u n try  co rre la tio n s  o f  u n em p lo y m en t b y  grou p
An interesting point not emphasized earlier is th a t the coimtries with high female unemployment 
are also countries with high youth unemployment: we report here the correlations in 1992 across 
the OECE) countries between the prime-age (more than  25) men unemployment rates, prime- 
age women unemployment rates and youth’s (less than  25) unemployment rates {Um o , Ufo 
and f/y):
r-
4 o ■■—
i
o H
L mo
Ufo
Uy
1 0.57 0.57 
1 0.78 
1
Taking the average over the 1980-94 period to get rid of the transito ry  shocks yields the 
following higher correlations:
Um o  Ufo  Uy
Umo
Ufo
Uy
1 0.69 0.56 
1 0.84 
1
The correlation coefficients between prime-age women and youth are very strong (0.78 and 
0.84), and stronger than the other correlations. At least, theories of unemployment should 
account for these correlations, for which there is no straightforw ard answer. The goal of this 
paper is to  provide an explanation and test it.
2 .1 .2  U n e m p lo y m e n t b y  g en d er  a n d  age
The tim e series evolution of unemployment also reveals interesting features. It is shown here 
th a t unemployment in Europe is different from the US in the 80’s, m ainly because of female 
unemployment. The two charts of figure 2-1 display the ra te  of unem ploym ent by gender in 
the four Scandinavian countries (SCA), in the USA, in Japan, and in 11  European countries 
(excluding Greece) . We recognize easily a regular and sm ooth p a tte rn  of European unemploy­
m ent for bo th  series, as well as the strongly cyclical p a tte rn  of American unemployment rates 
and the very low level of Japanese and Scandinavian (before 1991) rates. Its striking feature 
is th a t the  strong difference between the US and European female unemployment rates, which 
contrasts with the relatively narrow difference of the corresponding rates for males. In 1990, 
according to  our measure of the unemployment rates, the gap is about 6  points for women, and 
about 2 points for men. The same pa tte rn  remains true for five selected European countries: 
Spain, Italy, France, Belgium and Germany. The gap between the USA and Europe is still 2 
points for men, bu t is now 9 points for women. The same also remains true  for more than  25 
years old workers: we plot in figure 2-2 the unemployment rates of the 25-54 year old workers 
(or 25-59 year old workers in some countries), thus excluding the young workers, who are more 
unemployed in Europe. Unemployment rates for prime-age men are similar in Europe and in 
the USA, with more stability in Europe around a 6 % average. For this category of workers, 
there is no problem of unemployment (or no more th an  in America). Unemployment rates for 
women are much higher in Europe after 1983, with again a 5% to 7% difference com pared to 
the USA.
These results could be affected by a possible bias due to discouragement effects emphasized 
by Sorrentino (1993, 1995): discouragement could occur more in the US th an  in Europe, and 
affect women more frequently than  men. However, to  show th a t this is not the case, we plot in 
figure 2-3 the employment rates (the ratio  of employment for the 15-64 year old population).
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Figure 2-1: Unemployment Rate by (lender
Again the picture is the same, most of the cross-country differences are accounted for by women: 
the gap between Europe and the USA is 1 0  points for men, while it is about 2 0  points for wom< \  
For the five European countries, this is again more spectacular: the difference with the USA is 
8 % for men, 23% for women.
2 .1 .3  S ize  and  co m p o sitio n  o f  lab ou r su p p ly  and  o f  fem ale lab ou r su p p ly
(Jan the labour supply trends have some explanatory power? Since they are common to all 
OECD countries, this possibility needs to  be explored. A graphical view of these trends can 
be seen in figure 2-4. P A R T M  and P A R T F  are the male and female participation rates 
(Labour Force over 15-64 Population), for the USA, Japan, Scandinavian countries and Europe
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Figure 2-2: Unemployment by Gender, Adult Workers
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Figure 2-4: Participation by Gender
(EURl 1 being the twelve minus Greece, EUR5 being Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and 
Spain). It appears that over time, men are participating less (or leave activity sooner), and less 
in Europe than in the USA. Women are participating more and more in every country, with 
the same upward trend. If women are participating more in the US than in Europe, it does not 
necessarily mean tha t their share in the labour force is higher, because of lower participation 
of men in Europe. On the contrary, the evolution of the share of women in the labour force is 
very similar across countries. This can be seen in figure 2-5, which displays the ratios of female 
active population in total active population. This ratio has increased everywhere.
A look at the composition of female participation reveals two facts. First, the average 
” quality” of the participation, as measured for instance by occupations, has increased. Second,
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Figure 2-5: Gender Composition of the labour force
in the 60’s, the to ta l num ber of women in ’’low quality” jobs increased a lot. The two tables ‘2.1 
and 2.2 illustrate  these points. In the USA, the number of women in the labour force increased 
strongly, millions of them  switched from inactivity to employment. Their share in to ta l labour 
force grew from 32.5% in 1960 to 45.4% in 1991. Now if we consider the jobs 1+2 as a proxy 
for the good jobs, it appears th a t the average quality of jobs held by women improved. In 1960, 
the  share of women in these good jobs relative to their to tal participation was 17.5%, so thus 
less than  the share of these jobs in the economy (20.2%). This is one face of gender inequality 
between occupations. In 1991, all the difference had disappeared: against 29.2% of these jobs 
in the economy, 29.6% of active women are working in these jobs. But if the share of women 
in good jobs increased, the supply of labour of women in the o ther jobs also increased strongly, 
from ‘22.2 millions to 39.5 millions between 1970 and 1991, certainly increasing the com petition 
for these low skill jobs. As a comparison with all other European countries would be fastidious 
we restrict it th a t to the French case (similar results can be shown for other European countries 
like Spain, Italy  or Germany). There is an increasing participation in the labour force, bu t still 
some gender inequality, more than  in the United States. In table 2.2, it appears th a t the share 
of women in the labour force grew from 34.4% to 44.4%. It is interesting to note th a t despite a 
lower aggregate female participation rate  than  in the US, the share of women in the work force 
is the same in France as in the US, due to lower participation rates of men in France. W omen’s 
share in the good jobs increased from 13.1% to 23.8%. This evolution is close to  the increase 
in the to ta l (men+wom en) share of these jobs in the economy, from 15.8% to ‘27.0%. However, 
contrary to the USA, there is still a substantial degree of gender inequality in the occupational 
structure.
2 .1 .4  W ages
Given th a t the  ’’quality” of participating women has increased, one should observe an increase 
in their relative wages2. Figures 2-6a and 2-6b illustrate the evolution of unconditional relative 
wages between the different categories of workers in the USA between 1967 and 19883: W f / w m 
is the ratio  of female to  male median weekly earnings of US full-time workers, wy/ w 0 is the
2T his increase in realtive wages should be true before controlling for observable factors, but also after, since 
much is not measured in usual wage equations. T his is not central for the paper, and we don’t detail this further.
3Source: CPS, published data.
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ratio  of youth (less than  25) to old (more than  25). Finally, w f / w m{y) denotes the female to 
male ratio  for young workers, and wy/w 0{rn) denotes the ratio  of young to  old for male workers, 
etc... It appears clearly, as reported  in Katz and M urphy (1992) for instance, th a t the gender 
earning gap decreased, b u t only after 1977 and especially for young workers (the increasing 
relative education levels of young women). Before 1977, the relative wages appear to be rather 
constant. We also observe th a t the wages of young workers relative to older workers dropped, 
from 0.95 to 0.75 for women and from 0.75 to 0.55 for men which is an im portan t fact to be 
explained, and which has no convincing explanation after 1977, when the size of the cohorts 
of young workers decreased (see Welch 1979)4. Com petition with women could be part of the 
story.
There are few doubts th a t these changes in relative wages would have occurred dining the 
same period in Europe, if the labour m arkets’ institu tions had  been the same. If not, then 
this should generate unemployment. In Blanchfiower et al.(1993) or Davis (1992), the main 
conclusion is th a t continental Europe has experienced very little  changes in the  distribution of 
wages. The French case is perhaps an extrem e example of this wage d istribution stability  (see 
Goux and M am in 1995 or Kram arz et al. 1996). We take the m inimum  wage as a proxy for 
downwards wage rigidity. Two facts will emerge here. More and more workers are paid the 
minimum wage level and th a t minimum wage is mainly affecting women and young workers. 
F irst consider in figure 2-6c the share of wage earners paid the SMIC (French Minimum Wage, 
or Salaire Minimum Interprofessionel de Croissance, variable F R A W M S H ) ,  which is indexed 
on inflation and on a measure of the average wage in industry. There is a clear trend: more 
and more people are paid tins level, from about 2% in 1967, to  10.9% in 1990. One could thus 
argue th a t the minimum wage has been increasing too much com pared to the  other wages. 
But this explanation is not consistent with the evolution of the ratio of the average wage over 
the  minimum wage (the solid line, variable F R A W / W M I N ) :  we observe alm ost no change in 
the  last 25 years. In contrast, the trend  in workers paid the minimum wage is consistent with 
the explanation implying an increasing dispersion of the  m arginal productivity  of the  different 
categories of workers. More disaggregated da ta  by age and gender are provided in the table 
2.3. The toughness of the minimum wage is m easured by the share of employees paid this level.
41 thank Richard Freeman for making this empirical observation clear to me.
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This toughness of the minimum wage appears to be more im portan t for women and youth 
(17%) th an  for men (7%). More generally, the minimum wage affects more w hat we will call 
the secondary labour market.
2 .1 .5  S u m m a ry
The model of next section is built in order to fit the stylized facts described in this section, 
winch can be sum m arized here.
•  Fact 1 : Adult male unemployment rates are similar in Europe and in the  US.
•  Fact 2: Young and adult women unemployment rates are much higher in Europe than  in 
the US.
•  Fact 3: The cross-OECD correlation of female and young unem ploym ent rates is much 
higher than  any other correlation by demographic group.
•  Fact 4: Female participation has increased in all OECD countries, w ith some differences 
in the  levels of participation across countries.
•  Fact 5: Women have participated  in be tte r jobs/segm ents of the labour force.
•  Fact 6 : In the US, relative wages of women have rem ained stable until 1977 and  have 
increased afterwards.
•  Fact 7: In the  US, relative wages of young workers have fallen since 1969.
• Fact 8 : In continental Europe, wage distribution has rem am ed stable, bu t a t least in 
France, the share of workers paid the minimum wage has constantly increased in the last 
25 years and such workers are generally the young and women.
2 .2  A  m o d e l
2 .2 .1  L ab ou r su p p ly
A simple model w ith labour supply will easily account for these facts. The key point is tha t 
changes of labour supply cannot be thought w ithout some kind of heterogeneity. For instance,
young workers and women have (with respect to adult men), on an average less labour force 
experience5 bu t a higher turnover rate. In both  cases, the difference between men and women 
is decreasing over time. See O ’Neill (1985) and on the turnover, the  previous empirical chapter 
based on the workers flows in France. Concerning the difference between young and older 
workers, there is little evidence of d ram atic changes in turnover or experience differenc.es in the 
last decades.
For these reasons, we model the changes in the labour supply as compositional change in 
a dual labour m arket. In the prim ary segment, we have the experienced, more productive and 
stable workers, and on the other side, the inexperienced and less stable ones, as in Doeringer 
and Fiore (1971). To simplify, prime-age men (the older th an  25) are all assum ed to be in the 
prim ary segm ent6, women are assumed to  be shared between the two segments (the skilled in 
the prim ary segment, the  unskilled in the secondary segment), and the young in the secondary 
segment. See Blanchard and Diamond (1990a) for such a view of prim ary and secondary 
m arkets. In addition, it is assumed th a t there is no unemployment in the prim ary segment and 
th a t there may be some ”classical” unemployment in the secondary segment, if the marginal 
productivity  is too low in a sense detailed below7. Issues of endogeneity of participation are 
addressed to in the next sub-sections.
2 .2 .2  E la s t ic ity  o f  co m p le m e n ta r ity  a n d  c r o ss -e la s t ic ity  o f  d em a n d  for la b ou r
T he model is based on the empirical literatu re  on production functions. G rant and Hamer- 
mesh (1979, 1982) estim ated elasticity of com plem entarity from a translog production function 
between capital, old (more than  25) men, old women and youth. They found capital to be q-
,J In addition to the differences in the quantity of experience accumulated between workers, there are also subtle 
distinctions in the quality of this experience. For instance, a possible explanation for lower returns to labour 
force experience for women is that employers invest in match specific human capital only if they expect a long 
job tenure from the employee. Indeed, for women, a return to inactivity is more likely to occur. T he same is true 
for young workers, a possible interpretation being that the separation rate is higher for this category of workers 
because the quality of the match is stochastic and older workers are more likely to be in good jobs/m atclis . TLis 
higher propensity to quit is also due to higher outside options (especially for wom en), or longer time horizons 
(for young). The result is that in the wage equations, the valuation of human capital accumulated proxied by 
experience will be lower for the secondary workers.
GThere is nothing essential here in assuming that all men are in the primary jobs.
7It may be thought that the jobs held by young and women do not really have the sam e characteristics as 
those described above. For the model, the low productivity is the only essential feature that we want to highlight, 
since we do not model here the process of human capital accumulation.
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complement with all workers, men to  be q-complement with women and youth whereas women 
and youth are q-substitute. This last point has very strong; implications. At given input prices, 
it means th a t an increase in the quantity  of women in the labour force should lead to a decrease 
of the equilibrium  wage of bo th  young and women workers. The change in relative wages of 
young workers will be all the more im portant as they are substitu tes for women. Absolute 
wages in some cases can even decrease. This is all the more important than explanations im ­
plying biased technological changes always face difficulties in explaining why real wages o f male 
-workers in the first five deciles o f the wage, distribution have, declined in the US. Indeed, the 
cross wage elasticity of one group to the supply of another group is the share of this group in 
to ta l costs times the elasticity of com plem entarity if we assume constant supply of the other 
factors, see Hamermesh (1986). G rant and Hamermesh estim ated this elasticity to  be -0.15 
between young and old white women. Berger (1983), estim ating the same translog function for 
the inputs capital, females workers and male workers disaggregated into four categories (skilled 
(college) and experienced, unskilled (high school) and experienced, skilled and inexperienced 
and unskilled and inexperienced) found female workers to be q-substitutes with low-experience 
(young) male workers, slightly more with high-scliool than  with college and also q-substitu te 
though to a lesser extent w ith experienced male workers. The yomig educated workers arc 
found to  be complements with older educated workers. Finally, Topel (1994b) com pared the 
effects of increased participation of women on regional labour m arkets’ wage inequalities with 
alternative explanations like technical changes and changes in the industrial composition of 
labour demand. Estim ating a demand-factors function, he again found low-skilled women to 
be very q-substitu te to  low-skilled men. His conclusion is th a t “there is no evidence that dif­
ferent regional evolutions o f wages are demand-driven; the whole story is on the supply side. “ 
In another paper (Topel, 1994a) he even wrote th a t “i f  wom en’s participation had not changed, 
there would have been no decline in the relative 'wages o f less skilled m en .u
The following production function has these properties and those described in 2.1, in the 
simple case where the elasticity of com plem entarity are constant:
Y ( L m , L Fi , L f „  Ly )  = A.[(LmP +  L fj Y Ip +  0-(LfFi + (2.1)
where L m , L px, Lp2 and Ly are the equilibrium employmrnc levels of men, women in
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prim ary and secondary jobs and youth. The factors 9 and A  are productivity  param eters and 
p, p ’and /.i are param eters characterising the substitu tab ility  of these categories of workers. 
The elasticity of com plem entarity is 1 — p between men and  women in prim ary jobs, is 1 — p' 
between women in secondary jobs and young workers and  is 1 — /a between prim ary workers 
and secondary workers. Given our assumptions, //. is negative and p and p ’ are close to 1 . W ith 
this double GES function, it is not possible to generate a negative cross-elasticity of dem and 
between two groups. For th a t a translog production function would be needed. Here we take 
the most favourable case, where p =  1 and the elasticity of com plem entarity is equal to 0 .
2 .2 .3  L ab ou r d em a n d  
A flexib le labour m arket
We would have in equilibrium, if wages were flexible enough to equate the m arginal product at 
full employment:
m  _  f  f  L m  +  L f j V " 1 1 f  1 +  q-P 2)
•W2 0 \ L f 2 + L y )  9 \ \  + ( l — q) .p)
with p the participation ra te  of prime-age women, equal to  L f / L m  (since all men participate
and the num ber of adult of bo th  genders is the same), w ith q the share of women willing to
work in prim ary jobs, equal to L ^ /L p ,  and A the ratio  of young to old workers, equal to
2L y / L m -  The ratio  w \/w 2 depends on the relative quantity  of prim ary and secondary workers.
It is clearly increasing in the share of young workers A, since p  — 1 < 0 .  The changes of relative
wages can be decomposed into three parts :
rf . 1^  =  - d e / e +  {i  +  ([1  _ , ( !  +  x ) \ , iP -  [ ( i  +  \ ) . v  +  p \ d q) (2.3)
Calculating the derivative, tliis is decreasing in the share of women in prim ary labour force 
q, and decreasing w ith the participation rate when q is smaller than  1/(1 -f A), otherwise 
increasing with p. So the relative evolution o f prim,ary over secondary worker’s wages may be 
the result o f a demand shift (the first term  o f the right liandside), or an increase in female 
participation that is not compensated by a sufficient increase in the quality o f jobs dq, which
is likely when participation is low, or also when the quality o f jobs is low. The average wage 
of adult women is u)f =  q/w-[ +  (1 — q).W2 and the gender earning gap is equal to  W f / w m = 
Wf / w] = q +  (1  — q ).u i\/w 2 . (Consider now the variations in the relative wages of female 
workers: d [ wf / wm] =  dq( 1 —w-i/w?) +  (1 —q)d(w]/w2 ). The first part, w ith dq > 0, is positive, 
the second, according to  (2.3), should be negative. Then, bo th  an increase in prim ary workers’ 
relative wages, and an increase in women average wages would be observed if the positive term  
associated with dp in (2.3) dominates. This rise of female relative wages will be stronger when 
q is close to 1 , and smaller when q is close to  0 .
W ith  a floor on w ages indexed on prim ary wages
Now assume th a t there exists a floor on wages w which is indexed on the m arginal product 
of labour {MF*L)  of prim ary workers. This does not need to be a minimum wage: either 
unemployment benefits, non-wage incomes, the value of leisure linked to  the m arginal u tility  of 
consum ption or efficiency wage can generate a floor 011 wages depending on the average wealth 
of the  economy. We assume th a t w=  7 .icq =  w 2 where 7  is an indexation rate. This assum ption 
is appealing since when the constraint is binding, the wage distribution is constant, which is 
a feature of most of the W estern European economies, see Davis (1992) or Blanchflower et 
al. (1993). Then the wages are determ ined in the following way: denoting by L the labour 
supply and by N  the  employment level, if M P L ( L )  > w then w = M P L ( L )  and N  = L and if 
M P L ( L )  < w then the level of employment is such th a t M P L ( N )  =  w. The uniqueness comes 
from the decreasing return  011 each type of labour. In the case of our production function, Wr 
have, denoting by a =  1 / ( 1  — / a )  the elasticity of substitu tion  between prim ary and secondary 
workers, the  following employment equation for secondary workers: N f 2 +  N y  — (6/ /y )CT. (Lm  +
L Fi)
Higher productivity  of secondary workers, lower indexation rate, higher substitu tability  
and  higher participation of prim ary workers, all increase the level of employment of secondary 
workers. To solve for the unemployment rates, we make the assum ption th a t young workers 
and  women in secondary jobs have the same opportunities. This is equivalent to: =  7 ^-,
79
therefore we can write the different unemployment rates: u m  =  uf1 =  0  and
u F2 = u y  = l -  (2.4)
The unemployment rate  of young workers is a decreasing function of the productivity  of 
secondary workers, increasing in the  indexation coefficient of minimum wage 7 , decreasing in 
the  share of youth in total population A, decreasing in the share of adult women in prim ary 
jobs q and increasing in the participation rate  of women p if q is lower than  1/(1 4 - A). I f  the 
share o f women in labour force rises too fast compared to their share in good jobs, they will be in 
competition with young worker's and unemployment will rise. Now we can write the other rates 
as a function of u y  only: ilf — (1 — q)-uy.  The unemployment rates of all males and females 
(adding the young workers) are: u fM = j ^ . u y  and u fF =  1 and the unemployment
rate  of old workers: u Q =  y ^ - ( l  — q)-uy
Finally, the to ta l unemployment rate  can be written:
p.(l -  q) +  2 .Au  =  —  -— .Uy (2.5)
1 + P  +  2.A  ^ '
It is easy to check th a t these unemployment rates are increasing function of p, A and (1  — q). 
Finally, there is also a link between growth rates of the labour force and unem ploym ent, through 
the share of young workers. If the cohorts of young workers are growing at ra te  n, then A the 
ratio  of young to  old workers is equal to:
At =  (1  +  n t). 02,+  n t =  1 +  n t +  A n t/2  -  A pt (2 .6 )
2  +  n t - i  1 + P t
with A the difference operator. In steady-state, this ratio  is simply equal to (1 +  rif). Observe 
th a t the active population is also growing at rate  n.
2 .2 .4  E n d o g e n e ity  o f  p a r tic ip a tio n
Endogeneity of participation is not the focal point here. On a macroeconomic perspective, 
the level of labour supply is usually considered as exogenous, a t least independent of wages. 
For instance, Layard et al. (1979) found th a t given the m icro-estimates of labour supply,
increasing wages accounted for about 30% only of the increasing female participation in the 
UK. Increasing female participation could happen due to sociological reasons, or because of 
decreasing opportunity  cost of participation. The issues are sum m arized in Mincer (1962, 1966, 
1974, 1985), Layard et al. (1979), Becker (1965) and Shultz (1981) for instance. In these views, 
it is interesting to note th a t increased participation is no longer demand-driven.
However, in the empirical sections, it will be found a ra ther strong endogeneity of partic­
ipation w ith respect to  unemployment. A likely reason is th a t those female workers who are 
indifferent between activity and inactivity are rather unskilled, therefore face rather high unem ­
ployment rates. The unemployment of these groups is much higher than  (and very correlated 
v/iH*-) the aggregate unemployment rate, which may explain why participation depends th a t much 
on aggregate unemployment. Similarly, one can also argue th a t the choice of the  occupation is 
not independent of the labour m arket conditions. We chose to  model participation as follows. 
Prime-age m en’s participation is inelastic: and in the prim ary segment. For young, it is inelastic 
and  in the secondary segment. For prime-age women, there is a random  disutility to work in 
the  prim ary segment Ai which is d istributed in the population with cum ulative distribution 
function F(.).  The disutility ojwork in the secondary segment is smaller, and to simplify, 
we assume th a t it is perfectly correlated in the population ^fkthe first disutility: S.Xi with 6  
much smaller th an  1 . W ith  these assumptions, we have two cut-off levels of disutility: u>\ and 
(1 —u f 2 ).W2 / 6  > wj for a small enough <5. Women with disutility smaller than  wi  participate in 
the  prim ary segment, women with disutility larger than  (1  — Uf2 ).w 2 / 6  do not participate, the 
rem aining participate  in the secondary segment. It follows th a t q =  F ( w\ ) / F[(l  — u f 2).u>2 /S\ 
and p = F[(l  — u f 2 )-W2 / 6 \. Since the increase of participation can be seen as supply driven, 
it will be modelled as a decrease in the average disutility of participation. Assume to simplify 
to  the extrem e th a t the disutility is uniformly distribu ted  between 0 and A >  (1 — u f 2 ).W2 / 6 . 
Then
<7 =  6 m  (2.7)
(1  -  i t f , ) : l « 2
and
p =  4 = (1  - w f 2 )-W2 (2 .8 )
O.A
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A decrease in A will increase p, b u t will leave q unchanged at constant relative wages and 
unemployment. However, when p rises, so does the ratio  bo th  in the flexible and
the non-flexible economy. This will also drive the increased quality of female participation. We 
don’t solve for the reduced-forms equations and just provide simulations.
2 .2 .5  S im u la tio n s
We report some sim ulations8 of a non-flexible economy where the changes are all driven by the 
supply factor A.
A (upper bound of disutility) 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.5 1.5 1.0
Female Participation R ate p 0.30 0.35 0.42 0.54 0.64 0.77 0.99
Female Share in Prim ary Jobs q 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.43
Total Unemployment R ate 7.3 8.3 9.7 11.3 12.3 13.5 14.9
Male Unemployment R ate 4.7 5.4 6.2 7.2 7.8 8.6 9.4
Female Unemployment Rate 10.8 12.2 13.9 16.0 17.2 18.6 20.2
Youth Unemployment R ate 14.1 16.1 18,5 21.6 23,5 25.7 28,3
Female To Male Wage 0.775 0.778 0.782 0.787 0.790 0.795 0.800
W hen A decreases from 6.0 to 1.5, female parti cipa tion rises fn )in 30% to 77% . Thei
more workers in the secondary segment, generating more unem ploym ent for secondary workers 
(equal to youth unemployment rate). The prim ary sector becomes more a ttrac tive  to  women, 
whose share q in this sector rises from 36 to 41%. Unemployment rates of all categories rise 
twofold. Due to  the compositional change of women active population, women’s relative wages 
increase during the same period.
2 .2 .6  C o n c lu s io n  o f  th e  m o d e l
•  Female and youth unemployment should be highly positively correlated (fact 3), or equiv­
alently, the difference between ’’flexible” and ” non-flexible” economies should be observed 
mainly on young and women’s unemployment (facts 1 and 2 ).
8 Parameter values: A =  0.5, p. =  —2, 6 =  0.1, 7  =  0.65, 6 =  0.2
•  In flexible economies, the  ratio  of the wages of prim ary to  the  wages of secondary workers, 
and the ratio  of the wages of old to the wages of young workers increase, all the  more th a t 
at the  beginning of the period, female participation is low and concentrated in secondary 
jobs (facts 4, 5, 7). But, the ratio of female to male workers’ wages remains stable and 
then increases (fact 6 ).
•  In less ’’flexible” economies (here, with an additional relative wage rigidity), unemploy­
m ent rate  of men, women and especially young increase, while the  wage rigidity should 
be more binding in the secondary segment (facts 2 , 8 ).
• In time-series, there is a long-run relationship between participation and unemployment. 
In cross-section of OECD countries, the relation between participation and unemployment 
involves differences across comitries in the degree of equality between gender (how far 
from 1 is the param eter q), second in the degree of downward wage rigidity preventing 
the equilibrium  in this simple framework, and third, in the participation rate  of men, such 
th a t the share of women in the labour force can be used as a be tte r explanatory variable.
•  There is a relation between the growth rate of the labour force and unemployment.
These predictions are the basis of our empirical strategy on both  time-series and cross- 
section.
2 .3  T h e  e m p ir ic a l  s t r a te g y
W hen there is a floor on wages, the  model implies a positive link between participation and 
unemployment. Some prelim inary rem arks are needed before testing  this link in cross-section 
of countries.
First, section 1.3 showed th a t despite huge differences in female participation rates between 
the US and European countries, the share of women in the labour force was very similar 
between them . This arises from lower male participation in Europe. As the floor on wages 
in the secondary sector of the  model is all the more binding when there are fewer prim ary 
workers, the  share of women in the labour force will be a be tte r conditioning variable than  the
participation  rate. Second, high female participation countries are countries with high part- 
tim e work of women, such th a t we also have to  control for part-tim e in order to analyse the 
effect of the hours supplied. We will use as explanatory variables the share of hours supplied 
by women in the labour force, w ith the formula:
^  \ L f -(1 — p a r t- t im e f / 2)
Female Share (corr) =  —-------- —------------- :------------ —  (2.9)
Lf +m -{ 1 — part-tim e f+m / 2)
where L  is the  labour force and part- t im e  represents the share of part-tim e (assum ed to be 
half-tim e) in to ta l employm ent9.
Finally, we have a problem of endogeneity of female participation: through a classical price 
effect, participation should decrease when unemployment is high. In some age-education cells 
of the  labour force, female unemployment can reach 40 to 50%, clearly affecting the arbitrage 
between activity  and inactivity, and leading to a downwards bias of the coefficient of the impact 
of participation  on unemployment. For th a t reason, in cross-section of countries, we instrm nent 
female participation with variables reflecting the social a ttitu d e  of the country towards female 
participation.
In time-series, most of the problems of endogeneity will vanish with the use of Vector Auto- 
Regression techniques. To have quarterly  da ta  to perform  causality and co-integration tests, we 
have to  give up the disaggregation by gender and study four of the OECD countries, Germany, 
France, the USA and the UK.
2 .4  C r o s s - s e c t io n a l  a n a ly s is .
The empirical strategy described above is first applied to  a cross-section of countries. Our 
approach here is to  come back to macroeconomic works of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and 
Layard et al. (1991) and to  introduce participation variables in addition to  the existing variables. 
The focus is not on the existing variables, bu t on the effect of supply factors.
9 T he correlation coefficient across OECD countries of the corrected and the non-corrected share of women in 
labour force is about 0.73, indicating that the correction matters.
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2.4 .1  F irst cross-sectional analysis: th e  cen tra lization  o f  w age-bargaining
We base our first cross-sectional analysis on the work by Calmfors and Drifiill (1988). They 
construct a rank ordering of countries according to the degree of centralization (1988, p l9 , table 
1 ), for 17 OECD countries. The rank 1 is for Austria, the most corporatist country and 17 
for Canada, the most decentralized economy. Evidence suggests th a t economic: performance is 
linked to  this rank according to an inverted U-shaped curve. The advantage of this approach is 
th a t two variables, the rank ordering and its square, proxy the 6  structu ral explanatory variables 
th a t can be found in struc tu ra l models like Layard et al. (1991) (see section 4.2). It is therefore 
possible to add new explanatory variables. The loss lies obviously in the lack of structure of the 
U-curve, however, the results will be shown to be robust and revealing the differences between 
men, women and young workers10. We extend the classification to four o ther countries: Spain, 
Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland, which were not in the initial ranking11. The unemployment 
rates, in %, are averaged over 1980-94.
The im portan t problem of sim ultaneity of participation to  unem ploym ent can be described 
in the model below:
u — C  +  f t .(Female Share) +  A.(Youth Share) +  *y.X +  eq
Female Share — C  +  ft .u +  7  .Z \  +  t 2 (2-10)
Youth Share =  C  4 - ft .uy  +  7  Z 2 +  £3 (2-11)
where X ,Z i  and  Z 2 are a set of national variables described below, u  is unemployment. Since 
ft' is likely to be negative and ft positive, then the variable representing female participation 
will be correlated with e:i and the estim ation of ft by the ordinary least square will be biased
10Since the U-curve in Corp will be very robust, in all the specifications, the appendix B (table B l)  contains 
variations on this them e with statistical tests.
11 In Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, p 52), these countries are characterized according to union coverage, 
union coordination and employer coordination. To be consistent w ith them we give the rank 11 to Portugal (be­
tween Australia and France), the rank 14 to Spain (between UK and Italy), and 17 to Ireland (between Japan and 
Switzerland). Luxembourg, as we believe, is also decentralized, and was given the rank 19, between Switzerland
and the USA. Greece is excluded because not ranked according to the degree of wage setting centralization.
downwards. To improve the estim ation, we replace (2.10) by (2.12)
Female Share =  C  +  ft1 .um  +  ft -u f  +  7  -Z\ +  e:2 (*2-12)
w ithout a large difference. A first task is to find appropriate  instrum ents for female partic­
ipation, in the following list: index of hum an developm ent corrected by gender inequality, 
index of gender empowerment, net pre-schooling enrolm ent of the 6  year old children, schooling 
expectancy of 5 year old children (Source Education a t a Glance, OECD), share of women 
in enrolm ent in tertiary  education (sources Report on Hum an Development, U nited Nations 
1996), b irth  rates, divorce rates (source UN Demographic Yearbook, 1992), fraction of women 
in national parliam ents (see table B2 in appendix). The first four instrum ents were elim inated 
by lack of significance through a recursive m ethod (rotations of the variables four by four in a re­
gression of female participation also including unem ploym ent). The regression of participation 
variables on the instrum ents is reported in table 2 .6 .
For the share of young workers, we use the projections of the 1990 figures made in 1980 by 
the In ternational Labour Office (ILO 1980), which are based on participation and demographic: 
projections, bu t not on unemployment changes. We then  take the average of the 1980 and 
1990 figures. This m ethod should remove much of the endogeneity problem  associated with 
this variable.
Tables 2-4 and 2-5 summarize the results. We first perform  the simple OLS model w ith the 
share of women in the labour force corrected by part-tim e (columns 1 and 2). The im pact of 
the share of women is not significant though slightly negative. We then show how the use of 
the instrum ents leads to  significant changes in the estim ates (columns 4 and 5) and test for the 
exogeneity and the validity of the instrm nents w ith partial-inform ation m ethods, like a 2 -stage 
least square (table 2.7). We then  go to  full-information m ethods (3SLS) which are usually seen 
as more powerful (table 2.4, columns 5 and 6 ).
After controlling for endogeneity, the coefficient of female participation  becomes significant 
a t the 10% level in most of the cases. The coefficient of about 0.5 should be in terpreted  as 
follows: everything else controlled, an increase in the share of hours supplied by women of 8 %, is 
associated in cross-country with an increase by 4% of to ta l unemployment. Tins figure of 8 % is
more or less the  increase th a t faced most of the OECD countries in since the mid-70’s. Applying 
the same m ethodology (‘2SLS and 3SLS) to  female and male unemployment rates, it is found 
th a t the elasticity is lower for men (0.43 on an average for men, 0.62 on an average for women), 
which is w hat one would have expected from the model. The im pact of the relative supply 
of young workers is also stronger for female workers, which again could be expected from the 
model. Finally, it should be observed th a t the impressive regularity of the coefficients of CORF* 
and CORF*SQ  is per se. is a justification for their use. In addition, the associated coefficients 
are more significant for women and imply a stronger curvature (see also the appendix, table B l). 
Table 2.6 shows a regression of the share of women on its instrum ents and on unemployment. 
Strictly speaking, one should use instrum ents for the unemployment variables as well, however, 
the use of CORF* and CORF*SQ  was not of a great help. The coefficients have the expected 
signs: male unemployment increases female participation, female unemployment decreases it, 
higher b irth  rates, smaller enrolm ent rates in tertiary  education and smaller divorce rates are 
associated with lower participation. The only counter-intuitive coefficient is the one of the share 
of women in parliam ent12. These regressions should be in terpreted  carefully since the choice of 
instrum ents is always difficult and arbitrary. However, usual tests of their validity do not reject 
their exogeneity. Similarly, it is not possible to reject the exogeneity of CORF*, CORF*SQ  and 
the share of less than  29 years old predicted by the ILO. See the table 2.7.
Unemployment benefits, ignored so far though certainly correlated to  the variables corp and 
corpsej, could affect jointly the level of female participation (by increasing the attractiveness 
of participation), and of unemployment (by reducing search intensity). We rim the previous 
3 stage least square estim ates in adding the replacem ent ratio  (benefits over wages) and the 
duration of the benefits (these variables are in Layard, Nickell and Jackm an 1991). In the next 
table are reported  the coefficients of the share of female hours in the  labour force in to tal, male 
and female unemployment with different specifications, w ith the replacem ent ratio  (I to IV), 
w ith or w ithout benefits duration (I-III or II-IV), with our w ithout the share of young workers 
in the labour force (I-II or III-IV). All specifications I-IV contain in addition the variables 
CORF* and CORF*SQ. It can be observed th a t the size of the  coefficients is little affected by
12 In running the sam e regression with the share of women not-correeted by part-tim e (second column in table 
4.3), it is found that the coefficent is no longer positive. M aybe the share o f women in parliaments has some 
im pact on the legislations about part-tim e which woud explain the difference.
the  introduction of benefits variables. The significance of the  coefficient is lowered for women. 
However, it can be observed th a t these variables were available for 18 countries only, such tha t 
these regressions have two less observations than  previously. On the whole, it can be concluded 
th a t unemployment benefits only m arginally change the results.
3LS Model for Unemployment, Impact of Benefits Endogenous Variables
Specifications I-IV: u u m uf
I. Young /  Replacement Ratio 0.476 0.448 0.529
(1.90) (1.96) (1.54)
II. Young /  Replacement Ratio /  Benefits Duration 0.404 0.417 0.435
(1.95) (2.57) (1.39)
III. Replacement Ratio 0.648 0.551 0.806
(1.95) (1.92) (1.76)
IV. Replacement Ratio /  Benefits Duration 0.494 0.420 0.620
(1.84) (1.97) (1.55)
(t-St in parentheses)
Given th a t the validity of instrum entations always depends on the assm nption th a t there is 
a t least one valid instrum ent, one should also provide estim ates of unem ploym ent determ inants 
only using simple OLS estim ators. The model of aggregate unemployment is again estim ated 
w ith the variables C O R F * and C O RF’S Q  and with the growth ra te  of labour force over the 
periods 1980-94: the growth rates are apparently less endogenous to  unem ploym ent th an  the 
levels. The rationale for this specification comes from the com bination of equations (2.6) and 
(2.5). From table 2.8, it appears th a t aggregate participation  growth is not explaining higher 
cross-country unemployment, since the correlation is negative. W hen a disaggregation by gender 
is introduced, things drastically change. The coefficient on the growth rate of female labour 
force is positive and significant, while the growth ra te  of male labour force becomes significant 
bu t with a negative sign. The same remains true when the growth ra te  of the young workers 
in the  labour force is added (either the 16-29 or the 16-34 years old, the la tte r  one though not 
being reported  here giving similar results). Disaggregation of unem ploym ent by genders leads 
to  similar conclusion. It is however disappointing to see th a t the effect of the growth of labour 
force of younger workers is stronger for male than for female unemployment, contrary  to the
regressions in level shown previously.
There is obviously a question of endogeneity in the regressions with the growth rates. For 
the growth ra te  of the younger workers, we are safe of the criticism, since again the figures in 
1990 are the  projection d a ta  from the ILO (1980), based on the change in the structu re  of the 
population and trends in participation, b u t not on unemployment trends. For the  growth rate 
of male workers, da ta  come from the OECD, and are actual numbers. It can be argued tha t 
this growth ra te  depends on education and retirem ent, which are certainly highly dependent 
011 unemployment. However, it is very difficult to  fold any good instrum ent for the  male labour 
force. The m ost obvious one, the growth ra te  of male working age population, was fomid to 
be almost noil-correlated in both  cross-country and time-series with the growth rate  of male 
labour force (a correlation coefficient of merely 0 . 1 2 ): it happens th a t in some countries like 
the US, bo th  growth rates are very high, whereas in most European countries, the  working age 
population is increasing fast bu t not the male labour force. Finally, the effect of endogeneity 
of female participation is certainly significant, bu t tends to bias the estim ates towards smaller 
values: therefore our estim ates underestim ate the extent to which female participation growth 
affected unem ploym ent.
To conclude, disaggregation by gender yields new results. The appropriate  variables related 
to labour supply in such a model of unemployment are compositional ones, like the share of 
women in the labour force. Endogeneity of participation to unemployment also appears clearly 
from the data . I11 addition, regressions of the average of unemployment over the period 1970-80 
were much less significant, since countries had  to be removed from the sample. Regressions of 
unemployment by age category (prime-age male, female and young workers) were not possible 
for the same reason.
2 .4 .2  S e c o n d  cro ss -se c tio n a l an a lysis: th e  .Jackm an, L ayard  a n d  N ic k e ll’s 
s tr u c tu r a l ap p roach .
In Layard et al. (1991) and in Jackm an et al. (1996), a regression of unemployment rates (short 
term  and long term ) is performed, with structural explanatory variables. As a supplem entary 
test of the model, we want to  apply the m ethodology to analyse the gender differences. The 
unemployment d a ta  are the average of 1983-88 and 1989-94, like in Jackm an et al. (1996). We
then  have a panel of 2x20 observations. Unemployment rates are in logarithm . The regressors 
are the variables defined in Layard et al. (1991): the replacem ent ratio  (unemployment benefits 
as a fraction of the wage), the duration of these benefits in years (infinite=4), active labour 
m arket spending divided by unemployment (replaced by the instrum ent: active labour market 
spending in 1987 divided by the average unemployment ra te  1977-79), union coverage (1-3), 
wage setting coordination (1-3), change in inflation, a dum m y for the second period and random  
effects. To this, we add a dummy for the existence of a minimum wage in the country and the 
growth rate  of female participation rate  over the period 1972-94, for a proxy of the accum ulation 
of inexperienced-unattached workers on the labour m arket. The results are in table 2.9.
The growth rate  of female participation rate  is significant at the 10% level for women, 
and positive and less significant for men. The possible endogeneity bias of participation and 
unemployment is not a strong problem: first the participation variable is a growth rate between 
1972 to 1994, so half of the period is lagged with respect to unemployment. Second, the 
correlation, if it exists, should be negative (the price effect) and so the coefficient is biased 
downwards, which would reinforce the interpretation of the paper. The active labour m arket 
spending per unemployed, wliich were significant in Jackm an and al. (1996) for long-term  
unemployment, are naturally  no longer significant for the average rates. Two other results come 
out: first, the negative im pact of union’s coverage is stronger for women. An in terpretation  is a 
political economy one, where insiders (men) bargain over the labour m arket regulations and do 
not care about the consequences on unemployment of the  others (women). Second, the dummy 
for minimum wage is significant, especially for female unemployment (see column 3). (liven 
th a t this qualitative variable does not fully reflect the effects of different levels of the minimum 
wage, the im pact of minimum wage could be even more significant if be tte r measured.
2 .5  T im e -S e r ie s  E v id e n c e
A nother empirical strategy to overcome endogeneity problem s is to  use time-series methods: 
co-integration, non-G ranger causality, and VARs. We want to  quantify the non-transitory effect 
of an increase in labour supply on unemployment. We use quarterly  da ta  of labour force from 
different sources (see the appendix A for a description) for France, Germany, the  USA and the
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Figure 2-7: Participation (PART) and Unemployment Rates (U) Deseasonalized, Logarithms
UK, since 1967 (1972 for the UK). The figure 2-7 plots the series in logarithm  F}A R T  and u 
(the labour force divided by the 15-64 years old population, and unemployment divided by the 
labour force respectively1 ,i). No disaggregation by gender is available for these countries with 
quarterly  da ta , and therefore we test the model in a ra ther unfavourable case. However, one 
can recall th a t over the period 1970-1995, changes in the  level of the labour supply
reflect its compositional changes, therefore the coefficients linking participation and 
unemployment should be in terpreted  as a reduced form of those implying the composition of 
the  labour force and unemployment.
13Seasonality removed by projection on quarterly intercepts.
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2.5 .1  C o-in tegration
First we investigate the existence of a co-integration relationship between unem ploym ent and 
labour force. The unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, or the significance of the 
coefficient in:
k-1
A X t  =  ( '  +  ^   ^ +  'y .Xt-k  T  tt. T  S.tvend (2.13)
5 = 1
with or w ithout a trend) on the logarithm  of U and P A R T  ) cannot reject the non-stationarity  
of participation in most of the cases. The non-stationarity of unemployment is sometimes 
rejected for the UK, b u t evidence ra ther suggests non-stationarity, especially for France (see 
table 2 .1 0 ).
The non-stationarity  of participation and unemployment implies th a t they cannot be linked 
by more th an  one c<>integration relation. We compute the ADF test of the residual of the 
regression (table 2 . 1 1 ):
Log{lJ) = C  +  a .L og(P A R T )  +  e: (2.14)
In three of the four countries, one can reject the null hypothesis th a t the series unemployment 
and participation are not eo-integrated at 5% or 10% at least in one of the specifications (table 
2.12). We also provide in table 2.13 the results of alternative tests of co-integration, known as 
the Johansen tests, using the autoregressive decomposition of X  =  (Lop(f/), Log{F}A R T )):
A;— 1
A X t =  Di.AXt-i + ir-Xt-k + e.t (2.15)
i=1
where e.t is stationary, Di the coefficients of the polynomial m atrix  of the lag operator and a 
m atrix. Then the Johansen test consists of finding the rank of the m atrix  7r which directly 
gives the order of co-integration. Here in the bivariate case, we test the null hypothesis tha t the 
highest eigenvalue of nr is equal to  0, equivalent to absence of co-integration relation. Except for 
France, the Johansen test rejects the null hypothesis of no co-integration less often than  with 
the previous two-stages procedure. However, the likelihood ratio  associated w ith the highest 
eigenvalue is often close to  the critical value of the 5% confidence level (equal to  15.4). For the 
USA, the hypothesis of a co in teg ra tion  relation is difficult to defend. More generally, it seems
th a t consistently with the model, the existence of a high m inimum  wage in France implies a 
strong relation between the two series.
(liven the  coefficients of the long-run relation between the series (reported in the table 
2.14), one can calculate the estim ated effect of the increase of labour force between 1971 and 
1991 (table 2.15). The rise of unemployment observed in these four countries is therefore well 
explained by the model: the fitted  rise (the elasticity times the rise in participation) is between 
50% and 200% of the observed value.
2 .5 .2  C a u sa lity
From G ranger (1986), reported  in Hendry (1995, p289,d), when two series are c<>integrated, 
a t least one m ust Granger-cause the other. We investigate the direction of causality and per­
form G ranger causality tests. We report the F-statistics and the confidence level of the null 
hypothesis: X does not Granger-cause Y.
In table 2.16, the non-causality from unemployment to participation is rejected for the 
USA, France and Germany (with a delay of more than  six m onths in Germany if we look at 
the significance level of the regression with two lags). The 11011-causality from participation 
to miemploym ent is rejected at good levels of confidence for France, evidence is mixed for 
Germany, and the non-causality cannot be rejected for the UK and the USA.
2 .5 .3  V A R
After the long-run relation between participation and unemployment, we explore the dynamics 
of this link. We estim ate with two lags the coefficients of a VAR model. We assume th a t the
Blanchard and Quail (1989) to  isolate the effect of the innovation of each series F A R T  and 
U 011 the bivariate system. As identification restrictions, we assume th a t the instantaneous
model is:
(2.16)
w ith B( L)  a polynomial of m atrix and L  the lag operator. The shocks are s tructural shocks 
on labour supply and on labour demand. We describe in Appendix C the methodology of
effect of an innovation of labour force on to ta l unem ploym ent is 0 .6 , a coefficient of 0.5 for 
the US having' been taken in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). The other restriction is th a t a 
dem and shock will reduce unem ploym ent by 1 unit and will increase participation  by 0.4 unit, 
the same value as in Blanchard and Diamond. We assum e also th a t the m atrix V  is diagonal
ratio  of labour force over population is about 0 . 6  and th a t we consider the series in rate  and 
not in logarithm , the 1 % innovation on participation  is also a 1 % innovation in unemployment 
in the short rim. Using this set of restrictions, £ (0 ) is then
has a perm anent effect on participation (solid line), b u t a transitory  effect on unemployment 
(dashed line), half of the  shock being absorbed after 3 years. After 8  years, the  effect of the shock 
is not statistically  different from 0. In the  UK, participation  seems much more stationary  and 
despite a  decline in participation after the rise of unem ploym ent, the  deviation in unemployment 
is still above 0.5 after 8  years. The same response is observed in Germany, bu t w ith a stronger 
decline in participation, which in tu rn  helps reduce unemployment. Finally, participation  is 
declining in France, bu t unemployment exhibits no decline after 4 years, and only a very slow 
decline after 8  years. One can also estim ate the Vector Autoregressive model in introducing 
error correction. Casual observation of the  results seems to indicate th a t the differences in the 
predictions varied very little from the VAR estim ated in level.
2 .5 .4  C o n c lu sio n s
Evidence for a long-run relation between participation  and  unemployment has been provided 
for France, and also for the UK. This is harder to  m aintain in the  US or the G erm an case. In 
Germany, participation has decreased and is quite counter-cyclical, as shown by the  Granger 
(negative) causality from unemployment to  participation.
A first in terpretation  of co-integration is th a t bo th  series are linked by a long-run relation, 
or equivalently th a t participation is not neutral for unemployment. A second in terpretation,
(the aggregate dem and shock and the labour supply shock are not correlated). Given th a t the
(2.17)
and we plot the impulse response on figure 2-8. In the USA, the innovation on labour supply
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Figure 2-8: Impulse Response of a VAR estim ated with 2 lags. Solid line: participation ; dashed 
line: unemployment
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though more controversial, is th a t the source of non-stationarity  in unemployment arises from 
labour supply shocks and not from any other shocks. One may be tem pted  to  in terp ret the 
robustness of the co-integration in France under this light: the unemployment series are found 
to  be very persistent in this country. This property is interpreted  as a hysteresis phenomenon 
generated by insiders bargaining over wages, at constant labour supply (Blanchard and Summers 
1986). Here we propose a to tally  different interpretation: the non-stationarity  of unemployment 
as coming from the labour supply. In the same vein, the significance of trends in many empirical 
macroeconomic: works (Bean 1993 for instance, who found in panel da ta  of OECD countries 
th a t the shocks on unemployment were explained as well by the world GD P fluctuations as by 
a trend) could be interpreted  as ju st proxying for the increase in labour force participation.
Finally, it m ust be accepted th a t it was not possible to mix the cross-sectional dimension 
with the time-series dimension, and to estim ate as in section 4 an equation like: U^t — Di +  
p.Uiyt - 1  +  X.Cycle +  9 .Share W o m en + t^ . It would have needed to tackle with the problem 
of endogeneity of the share of women in the labour force, and to  find yearly time-series of 
instrum ents, which was not possible. Such an analysis needs to  be carried out in another 
paper.
2 .6  C o n c lu d in g  c o m m e n ts  a n d  fu tu r e  r e se a r c h
A common and im m ediate objection to  theories implying adverse effects of rising female partic­
ipation on unemployment is th a t the female-male wage gap has decreased and so the increased 
participation of women is ra ther dem and driven. However, the model proposes a mechanism 
through winch women prefer to work in be tte r occupations because of the relative a ttrac tive­
ness of the prim ary jobs when the share of female and young workers in the labour force rises. 
It is also highly plausible th a t employers have substitu ted  men by women ih some sectors to 
get arom id muons: tins is a pure com petition story between different factors of production, 
men and women; some authors have studied the evolution of employment by gender in spe­
cific sectors like the Prin ting  and Publishing sector and the replacem ent of male typesetters by 
more productive female workers in the 70’s (see for instance Borzeix and M aruani 1988 and 
the subsequent references of the work by M aruani). Tins substitu tion  should obviously weaken
the relative position of the unskilled men. A related objection is tha t men and women work in 
different occupations, such tha t competition between them  is unlikely. Again, one can argue 
that there is, maybe a low short-run substitutability, bu t in the long-run ( 1 0  to 15 years) a 
higher substitutability. In any case, Grant and Hamermesh (1982) results on substitutability 
of production functions cannot be explained theoretically if there is no substitutability. There 
is also a theoretical answer to this point. It is sufficient to have an even narrow sector in
which men and women, or more consistently with the model of section 2 , women and young, are 
working in the same occupation, like cashier in superm arkets, to have cut in wages in all sectors 
due to increased labour supply. This is the case when there is free mobility across sectors.
A second objection is th a t a large part of the rise in inequality comes from a rise of within- 
group inequality, wliile our explanation involves inter-group inequality. We consider th a t the rise 
in inter-group inequality is well explained by the supply factor, and have to say little about the 
witliin-group component here. The model is not designed to consider that question. Anyhow, 
since 1979, according to Juhn et al.(1993), less than half (42% only) of the rise in inequality 
is due to the witliin-group component, and this share is less than  the share explained by the 
changes in observed prices, i.e. the between-group component. About the rise in inequality, 
it should finally be said tha t the analysis of this paper is able to explain very naturally the 
decline in the absolute wages of the less skilled workers. In contrast, stories implying biased 
technological changes face more problems.
In the empirical sections, we showed for a cross-section of OECD countries a positive and 
significant correlation between female participation and unemployment, after controlling for 
female part-tim e work and endogeneity of participation with respect to unemployment. There 
are also positive correlations between the share of young workers in the labour force and un­
employment, and also between the growth rates of young and female active population and 
unemployment. In time-series, a co-integration relation between unemployment and participa­
tion was found in some countries like France. Overall, the observed changes of the composition 
of the laboiu force are associated with significant increases in unemployment, about 4 to 5 
points, 3 to 4 for men, 6  to 7 for women.
The thesis of the paper is tha t the long run evolution of labour markets can be explained 
partly bu t significantly by labour supply factors. It has to be confronted to the main alternative
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explanation, the biased technological progress which lead to higher relative dem and for skilled 
workers. This is in the agenda. Anyhow, explanations implying labour dem and shifts should 
also consider the possibility th a t labour supply shocks have had  an adverse effect on labour 
markets.
• A ppendix A. D efin itions and data sources, series nam es.
Yearly Data: OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1962-82, 1970-90, 1973-93, OECD Quarterly Labour 
Force Statistics, 1994-95. Many data breaks are by less than 1%, due to random errors in labour force 
surveys. The remaining part is due to deep changes in the measurement concepts. In the OECD-CEP 
database, the series are generally chained. Here we regressed the series on their lagged values, with a 
constant, a trend and a dummy for the break (ex: break in 77, the dummy I)l=(tim e>77) was included) 
such that both the cyclical component, the trend and the average value of the series are consistent before 
and after the break. Concretely, the difference is very small with the chaining method.
Quarterly Data: USA: Employment and Earnings, UK: Employment Gazette, Germany: Amtliche 
Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik Jahreszahlen, and OECD, France: OECD 
(Civilian Employment on Payrolls and Bulletin Mensuel des Statistiques du Travail. The quarterly data 
of 15-64 years old population are interpolated from the yearly data published in the OECD Labour Force 
Statistics.
•  A ppendix B.
Corporatism variables.
To allow for the possibility of a U-shaped relationship, we construct the variable corp, which is 
directly the rank ordering of the 174-4=21 countries, and corpse] =  corp * corp its square. We then 
analyse the impact of these variables on unemployment rates by gender and their differences. The 
estimation is: X i =  0 (1 )  +  0 ( 2 ) . corp +  C(3).coi'psq +  t i .  Two statistical tests will be considered 
here. First, are the explanatory variables corp and corpsq relevant, or equivalently does the F-test, 
associated to the equality to 0 of their coefficients allow us to reject this hypothesis? Secondly, does the 
t-statistic of the coefficient of corpsq reject the hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship? We present the 
results of the tests (21 observations) in the table Bl.
All the coefficients C(3) support the U-shaped pattern (column 3), with correct levels of confidence 
(column 4). The influence of the degree of centralization, proxied for by the rank ordering, is generally
acceptable, and more for women and youth than for men. It may be observed that the coefficient of 
corps  q is twice higher for women’s unemployment and three times higher for youth’s unemployment 
than for the male rate: given that the curvature (the second derivative) of the U-shaped curve is 
expressed by 2*C(3). It indicates that women are more sensitive to the degree of centralization than 
men. The intermediate countries are the high unemployment gender gap countries. Finally, the youth 
unemployment rate, predicted by the model, is low in the corporatist economies, whereas higher in the 
decentralized economies.
Instruments
They are described in table B2
•  A ppendix C. Identification  o f th e structural shocks in th e  bivariate system .
We describe the methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989) here to Isolate the effect of the innovation 
of each series P A R T  and IJ on the bivariate system. This method was applied to the US labour market 
by Blanchard and Diamond (1989). As in Blanchard and Diamond (1989) we assume that:
= C(L) .
with T]d  a white noise innovation on demand and 7)1 a white noise innovation on labour supply, with 
E(7]d,7]1) = V  and (7(0) =  Id. Therefore, estimating X  =  D(L)£, with 0) =  Id, yields D( B) .  
£ are the reduced form innovations on unemployment and labour supply, and D ( L )  characterizes the 
reduced form relationship between the series. Given that B ( L )  XJ(L)  =  D [ L ) . B { 0), we can go back to 
what Blanchard and Diamond call the “structural e q u a t i o n F o r  that, identifications assumptions are 
required to compute B ( 0). They are described in the text
Table 2.1: United States: Female Labour Force by Occupations
1960 1970 1980 1991
1. Professional,
Technical and Related 3001 (14.2%) 4550 (16.4%) 7187 (17.3%) 10422(18.5%)
(11.7%) (15.1%) (15.4%) (16.4%)
2. Administrative and
Managerial Workers (3.3%)* 1055 (3.8%) 3070 (7.4%) 6287 (11.1%)
(8.5%) (8.4%) (10.4%) (12.4%)
1.+2. 3795 (17.5%)* 5605 (20.2%) 10257 (24.7%) 16709 (29.6%)
(20.2%) (23.5%) (25.8%) (29.2%)
3. C lerical and Related 6141 (29.2%) 10104(27.3%) 12997(31.2%) 15413 (27.3%)
(14.0%) (18.2%) (17.3%) (15.5%)
4. Sales Workers 1746 (8.3%) 2141 (7.7%) 4671 (11.2%) 7327 (13.0%)
(8.0%) (7.2%) (10.0%) (11.9%)
5. Service Workers 4572(21.8%)* 4789 (17.2%) 7452 (17.9%) 10291 (18.2%)
(11.6%) (11.4%) (12.9%) (13.9%)
6. Agriculture, animal,
husbandry and related 390(1.9%)* 225 (0.8%) 404 (1.0%) 606 (1.1%)
(6.6%) (3.2%) (2.9%) (3.0%)
7. Production and related 4006 (20.7%)* 4951 (17.8%) 5852 (14.1%) 6099 (10.8%)
(39.5%) (36.4%) (31.2%) (26.9%)
Total 20.7M 27.8M 41.6M 56.2M
Share of Women 32.5% 36.9% 42.6% 45.4%
in Labour Force
Table2.2: France: Female Labour Force by Occupations
1962 1975 1982 1990
1. Professional,
Technical and Related 717 (10.9%) 1308 (16.2%) 1600 (17.1%) 2096 (19.8%)
(11.0%) (16.0%) (17.1%) (19.8%)
2. Administrative, and
Managerial Workers 145 (2.2%) 338 (4.2%) 470 (5.0%) 524 (5.0%)
(4.7%) (7.2%) (8.2%) (7.2%)
1.+2. 862 (13.1%) 1646 (20.4%) 2070 (22.1%) 2610(23.8%)
(15.8%) (23.2%) (25.3%) (27.0%)
3. Craftmen, 736 (11.2%) 578 (7.2%) 617 (6.6%) 588 (5.6%)
Shopkeepers (10.9%) (8.1%) (7.9%) (7.7%)
4. Employees 2347 (35.7%) 3616 (44.9%) 4522 (48.3%) 5378 (50.9%)
(18.5%) (23.5%) (27.0%) (29.1%)
5. Manual Workers 1468 (22.3%) 1648 (20.4%) 1604 (17.1%) 1600(15.1%)
(39.1%) (37.4%) (33.4%) (32.1%)
6. Farmers 1169 (17.8%) 570(7.1%) 547 (5.9%) 376 (3.6%)
(15.9%) (7.8%) (6.4%) (4.3%)
Total 6.6M 8.1M 9.4M 10.6M
Share of Women 34.4% 37.1% 40.3% 44.4%
in Labour Force
Notes for tables 2.1 and 2.2 The first number is the number o f thousands of women in the workforce by occupation, the second number ls the share of women in the occupation relative to the 
total number o f women in the workforce, the third is the share of this occupation in the total workforce (male and female workers). Source: ILO Statistics relative to the total number o f 
women in the workforce, the third is the share of this occupation in the total workforce (male and female workers). Source: ILO Statistics. * : different definitions in I960: 2 Administrative, 
executive and managerial workers, 5 Service, Sport and Recreation Workers, 6. Fanners, Fishermen, Hunter, 7. Craftmen, prod-process and labourers.
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Table 2.3: Fraction of the wage earners affected by the national minimum wage, France 1990
Blue Collar
Other Salary Earners: Men
All Salary Earners:
Nb of Salary Earners (x 1000) % of "Smicards"
Men 9.5
Women 32.2
Total 15.0
3.6
Women 11.4
Total 7.3
Men 6.8
Women 17.7
Youth (-26) 17.5
Total 10.9
Source: Enquete ACEMO-SMIC, et MTEFP, in Dossiers Statistiques du Travail et de 1’Emploi, Mars 1992.
Table 2.4: OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS Models for National Unemployment
Variable: Unemployment 80-94
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS
Cte 2.51 -7.91 -2.93 -22.0 -18.0 -21.6
(0.46) (-1.03) (-1.58) (-2.00) (-1.59) (-1.96)
CORP 1.25** 1.12** 1.84** 1.17** 1,22** 1.17**
(2.60) (2.33) (2.40) (2.02) (2.25) (2.32)
CORPSQ -0.052** -0.047** -0.078** -0.054** -0.052** -0.051**
(-2.25) (-2.03) (-2.36) (-2.10) (-2.24) (-2.32)
Corrected Slut re o f Women in LF -0.012 +0.012 +0.690* 0.472* 0.578* 0.476*
(-0.08) (0.09) (1.73) (1.77) (1.88) (1.79)
Share o f Young (<29) in the LF - 0.294** - 0.216+ 0.185
(2.66) (1.41) (1.24)
R-sq 0.18 0.35 -0.21 0.09 -0.11 0.079
Adjusted R-sq 0.04 0.19 -0.44 -0.15 -0.32 -0.17
N observations 21 21 20 20 20 20
(White Heteroskedasti city-Consistent t-Statistics in parentheses,^^significant at the S % level, * significant at the 10% level, + at the 15% level,
( '(>RP = rank of ordering of centralization of wage bargaining, l=('anada, 21=Austria, CORPSQ=CORP*( ORPSQ, Corrected Shari' o f Women 
in LF means the share of hours of women in total hours, Ireland is the country for which one of the instrument is missing)
Table 2.5: OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS Models for National Unemployment by (fender
Variable
Male Unemployment 80-94 Female Unemployment 80-94
2SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 2SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS
Cte -14.1 -17.1 -14.1 -16.7 -24.3 -29.6 -24.4 -28.8
(-1.43) (-1.73) (-1.43) (-1.69) (-1.56) (-1.98) (-1.56) (-1.93)
CORP 0.94* 0.87+ 0.94* 0.872+ 1.84** 1.70** 1.84** 1.70**
(1.70) (1.67) (1.70) (1.67) (2.09) (2.15) (2.10) (1.57)
CORPSQ -0.043* -0.040* -0.043* -0.039+ -0.083** -0.077** -0.082** -0.074**
(-1.76) (-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.69) (-2.14) (-2.20) (-2.14) (-2.13)
( 'orrected Slut re o f Women in LF 0.464* 0.404+ 0.464* 0.407* 0.690* 0.561+ 0.691* 0.0563+
(1.80) (1.69) (1.80) (1.70) (1.70) (1.55) (1.70) (1.56)
Share o f Young (<29) in the LF - 0.160 - 0.141 - 0.314+ - 0.270
(1.16) (1.04) (1.51) (1.34)
R-sq -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.059 -0.09 0.1s -0.09 0.12
Adjusted R-sq -0.28 -0.18 -0.28 -0.19 -0.29 -0.10 -0.29 -0.11
N observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
(White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-Statistics in parentheses,**=significant at the S % level, * significant at the 10% level, + at the 15% level. 
C( >RP = rank of ordering of centralization of wage bargaining. 1=( 'anada, 21 =Austria, ( V)RPSQ=CORP*CORPSQ, Corrected Share o f Women 
means the share of hours of women in total hours, Ireland is the country for which one of the instrument is missing)
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Table 2.6: Choice of Instruments for Female Participation
Variable:
Share o f women in the labour force Share o f women in the labour force
corrected by part-time non-corrected by part-time
OLS OLS
('re 2.98 2.65
(3.55) (4.06)
Male Unemployment 80-94 0.515 0.606*
(1.00) (1.88)
Female Unemployment 80-94 -0.533 -0.706**
(-1.38) (-2.51)
Birth Rate -1.794** -1.08
(-2.28) (-1.21)
Female Enrollment Rate 0,644* * 0.598**
in Tertiary Education (2.67) (3.15)
Divorce Rate 2.410* 1.147
(1.77) (0.71)
Share o f Seats fo r  Women -0.198 -0.030
in Parliament (-1.46) (-0.42)
R-sq 0.43 0.54
Adjusted R-sq 0.18 0.34
N observations 21 21
(White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-Statistics in parentheses,^significant at th c£  % level, * significant at the 1091) level, + at the 15% level;
Table 2.7: Validity and exogeneity tests
Specification
Total Unemployment Male Unemployment Female Unemployment
Without and with Young Share Without and with Young Share Without and with Young Share
Exogeneity o f the exogenous variables
t-S ta to fv l o n u l  -1.18 -1.04 -0.69 -0.586 -1.40 -1.25
Confidence level (25%) (50%) (49%) (56%) (17%) (22%)
Validity o f the Instruments: T-stat and confidence level
Birth Rate -0.22 -0.72 0.15 -0.20 -0.67 -1.32
(82%) (48%) (89%) (84%) (50%) (20%)
Female Enrollment Rate 0.45 0.52 0.16 0.18 0.74 0.90
in Tertiary Education (66%) (61%) (88%) (86%) (47%) (38%)
Divorce Rate -0.27 0.02 0.07 0.30 -0.63 -0.32
(79%) (98%) (94%) (77%) (54%) (75%)
Share o f Seats fo r  Women 0.54 0.49 0.59 0.52 0.42 0.09
in Parliament (59%) (65%) (56%) (61%) (68%) (0.76)
ii 1 is the residual of a regression of the endogenous variables on the exogenous variables and the instruments, v | is the residual of the 2SLS estimations. The nul of exogeueity of the 
exogenous variables is rejected if u 1 explains significantly v l . The uull of exogeneity of the instruments is rejected if they explain significantly u I
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Table 2.8: OLS for National Unemployment with the growth rates of labour force
Variable
Unemployment 80-94 Unemployment 80-94 Unemployment 804
Male Female
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Cte 4.31 2.11 2.50 2.91 3.40 0.628 0.868
0.96) (0.98) (1.08) (1.38) (-1.39) (0.25) (0.34)
CORP 1.14/** 0.60 0.37 0.42 0.14 0.91* 0.77
(2.30) (1.40) (0.76) (0.97) (0.26) (1.71) (1.36)
CORPSQ -0.044** -0.020 -0.009 -0.012+ 0.002 -0.034+ -0.028
(0.87) (0.04) (-0.41) (-0.56) (-0.10) (-1.32) (-1.19)
Growth o f Labour Force 80-94 -2.95 . . . . .
(-1.49)
Growth o f Male Labour Force 80-94 - -10.6** -9.44** -8.95** -7.51** -13.3** -12.6**
(-3.08) (-3.51) (-0.11) (-2.60) (-3.50) (-3.40)
Growth o f Female Labour Force 80-94 - 4.40** 3.93** 3.41** 2.83+ 6.12** 5.83**
(2.67) (2.39) (2.17) (1.67) (2.85) (2.89)
Growth o f Young Labour Force 80-94 - - 1.81* - 2.25* - 1.11
(<29yo) (1.93) (2.05) (0.87)
R-sq 0.24 0.52 0.61 0.39 0.52 0.55 0.56
Adjusted R-sq 0.11 0.41 0.47 0.23 0.36 0.44 0.42
N observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
(White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-Statistics in parentheses**=significant at the 5 % level. * significant at the 10% level, + at the 15% level. 
carp = rank of ordering of centralization of wage bargaining, 1 =Canada, 21=Austria, corpsq-corp*corp)
Table 2.9: Random Effects Model for N "  1 , ' ?nt
tog(u) bg(um) bg(uf)
Repl. Rate (%) 0.0037 (0.6) 0.0057 (0.8) 0.0026 (0.4)
Ben. Dur. (Yrs.) 0.081 (1.2) 0.135 (1.8) 0.012(0.2)
ALMP (%) -0.07 (0.1) -0.0045 (-0.39) -0.011 (-1.2)
1 Inion Cov. (1-3) 0.69 (3.6) 0.52 (2.3) 0.88 (4.9)
Coord. (1-3) -4.74 (-2.1) -0.54 (-2.1) -0.42 (-2.0)
A inflation (%) -0.16 (-1.9) -0.19 (-1.8) -0.11 (-1.3)
Min. Wage. (0-1) 0.40(1.8) 0.20 (0.8) 0.59 (2.9)
( irowth of female participation rate 0.54 (1.4) 0.48 (1.1) 0.56 (1.6)
Coast. 0.027 (0.04 ) 0.36 (0.54) -0.30 (-0.6)
Dummy 88-94 0.14 (1.9) 0.18 (1.9) 0.10(1.4)
Rsq 0.68 0.58 0.75
N 40 40 40
(t-St in Parenthesis'). Periods: 83-88 and 89-94. «=national unemploymerf’rate, um=male unemployment rate. w/=female unemployment rate
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Table 2.10: Unit root tests for participation rates
Log(PART) Number o f lags in the ADF regression:
Specification
Arbitrary (4) 
C+Tr Conclusion
Determined by the k-max criterion'1 
C C+Tr Conclusion
USA
UK
GER
FRA
- 0.66
-2.08
-1.43
-2.97*
-2.59
- 2.00
-0.83
-2.16
t-statistics o f y
1( 1), Tr -0.58(1) -2.29(1) I(l),Tr
1(1) -2.04(0) -0.98(0) 1(1)
1(1) -1.65(1) -0.63(1) 1(1)
1(1)___________-2.8]**(())_________ -1.44(0)________ 1(0) or 1(1)
(* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, “ the principle o f the k-max-criterion is to run the regression with an arbitrary large number o f lags, 
and to remove one lag until the last coefficient at is significant -here at the 5% level. The final number o f lags is in parentheses)
Table 2.11: Unit root tests for unemployment rates
Log(U)
Specification C
Arbitrary (4) 
C+Tr
Number o f lags in the ADF regression:
Determined by the k-max criterion° 
Conclusion C C+Tr Conclusion
t-statistics o f y
USA -2.64 -2.52 1(1) -2.28(1) -2.80(2) KD
UK -3.54** -3.63** KO) -3.01(5)* -2.50(5) KD
GER -1.76 -3.14 l(l)+Tr -1.50(3) -3.01(3) 1(1 )+Tr
FRA -1.57 -0.89 HD -1.57(1) -0.89(1) 1(1)
(* significant at 5%, * * significant at 1%)
Table 2.12: Cointegration Relation: Engle-Granger Two-Step Procedure
USA
ADFstat (without C, nor trend): t-statistics o f y for the residuals 
Number o f lags in the ADF regression 
4 lags k-max 
-2.62* -2.98(2)**
UK -2.97** -2.97(4)**
GER -2.37 -1.89(3)
FRA -2.49* -1.65(6)
(* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, the number o f lags is in parentheses in column 2, t-Stin parentheses in 
column 3,)
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Table 2.13: Johansen test on the maximal eigenvalue
H o : no cointegration
k=2 k=3 k=4
Likelihood
Ratio
Ho rejected Likelihood 
Ratio
Ho rejected Likelihood
Ratio
Ho rejected
USA 10.0 no 10.2 no 10.0 no
UK 18.8* 5% 8.85 no 13.0 no
GER 7.70 no 11.2 no 14.6 no
FRA 23.0* 5% 29.8** 1% 21.8** 1%
Critical values at 5%: 15.41,at 1%: 20.04
Table 2.14: Long-run Equilibrium Between Unemployment and Participation
Long-run Relation Between Unemployment Rate ami Participation Rate
USA Log (U) = -2.00 (13.4) + 2.18 (5.34).Log(PART) + Res, Rsq=0.22,
DW=0.07
UK Log (U) = 1.33(-1.03)+ 13.6 (-3.17).Log(PART) + Res, Rsq=0.11,
DW=0.04
GER Log(U)= -20.05(16.1) - 42.1(13.3).Log(PART) + Res, Rsq=0.66,
DW=0.08
FRA Log(U) = 7.15(-16.1) + 16.3 (-22.7).Log(PART)+Res, Rsq = 0.84, 
£)W=0.07
(t-St in parentheses)
Table 2.15: Predictions of the long-run equilibrium relation
(%, 1971-1991): Actual growth o f participation Actual growth o f
rate (%) unemployment rate (%)
Fitted growth o f unemployment 
rate (%)
USA 14.7 12.9 32
UK 4.9 103 67
GER -2.4 201 101
FRA 11.1 124 181
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Table 2.16: Granger Non-Causality Tests between Unemployment and Participation Rates
N lags
Ho: Log(PART) does not cause Log(U) 
F stat Confidence Level
Ho: Log(U) does not cause Log(PART) 
F stat Confidence Level
USA 2 1.93 15% 3.50 3.4%**
4 0.66 62% 3.03 2.2%**
UK 2 1.33 27% 0.70 50%
4 1.96 11% 1.31 27%
GER 2 1.26 29% 1.36 26%
4 3.44 1.2%** 2.89 2.7%**
FRA 2 5.18 0.7%*** 5.44 0.6%***
4 2.71 3.4%** 3.07 2.0%**
{* Ho rejected at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%)
107
Table Bl: Tests of the impact of the degree of centralization of wage setting institutions
F-test
C(2)=C(3)=0
Confidence
level
t-Stud 
C( 3)
Confidence
level
Rsquare
AU2 2.05 0.157 -1.89 0.074 0.19 21 obs
AU M2 1.28 0.303 -1.41 0.175 0.12 21 obs
AUF2 2.50 0.110 -2.17 0.044 0.22 21 obs
AUY2 2.60 0.074 -2.01 0.062 0.25 19 obs
AI)U2 0.68 0.520 -1.16 0.263 0.08 21 obs
AR112 1.085 0.359 -1.37 0.187 0.11 21 obs
AV2 = 2.06(0.69) + 1.26(2.01).corp -0.052(1.90)*corpsq 
AUM2= 2.61(0.88) + 0.96(1.55).corp -0.039(1.41)*corpsq 
AUF2= 1.04(0.28) + 1.76(2.24).corp -0.075(2.17)*corpsq 
AUY2-0.27(6.93) + 3.02(1.37).corp-0.120(2.00)*corpsq 
ADU2=-1.41(0.46) + 0.74(1.14).corp -0.034(1.16)*corpsq 
ARU2= 0.81(2.43) + 0.10(1.46).corp -0.042(1.37)*corpsq
R2=0.19
R2=0.12
R2=0.22
R2=0.25
R2=0.08
R2=0.11
(t-St in parentheses)
Table B2: Description of the variables used to instrument the unemployment equations
Country Average
unempl.
rate
Rank
of
corpo
ratism
Female
partici­
pation
rate
Share
women
labour
force
Share
women
correc
part-time
Share
women
in
part-time
Gender
empow
erment
measure
Women
in
Parlia
ments.
Women
manager
or
administ
Number 
of births
Enroll.
univer.
women
share)
Divorce
rates
School
expect.
for 
5 y.o.
(%) (rank) (rate) (%) (%) /1000p (%) /1000p (%)
Year 80-94 - 81-94 81-94 81-94 1987 1996 1996 1996 1987 1992 1987 1992
USA 7 20 0.706 0.452 0.433 0.253 0.645 10.4 42 15.7 51.2 4.7 14.2
CAN 9.8 21 0.684 0.449 0.427 0.262 0.685 18 42.2 14.4 50.1 3.08 14.7
AUS 8.1 10 0.625 0.416 0.373 0.423 0.59 13.5 43.3 15 50.7 2.48 na
NZE 6.3 9 0.452 0.361 0.332 0.357 0.685 21.2 32.3 16.7 48.9 2.63 14.1
JAP 2.5 16 0.599 0.39 0.359 0.352 0.445 6.7 8.5 11 38.9 1.25 na
IRE 15 17 0.378 0.309 0.292 0.213 0.504 12.8 17.3 16.5 44.8 na 14.4
GBR 9.9 13 0.65 0.435 0.384 0.438 0.53 7.8 33 13.6 45.1 2.89 13.4
GER 6.8 6 0.556 0.398 0.361 0.32 0.654 25.5 19.2 11.2 41.6 2.09 15.9
FRA 9.4 12 0.56 0.418 0.39 0.263 0.437 5.9 9.4 13.8 52.4 1.9 15.9
SPA 18.7 14 0.447 0.374 0.358 0.148 0.49 14.6 12 10.9 49.5 0.59 15.4
ITA 10.6 15 0.468 0.372 0.361 0.11 0.593 13 37.6 9.6 46.8 0.44 na
POR 6.2 11 0.637 0.439 0.43 0.111 0.491 8.7 36.6 12.4 53.9 0.91 na
GRE 7.1 na 0.41 0.357 0.351 0.076 0.37 6 12.1 10.6 52.2 0.6 13.7
HOL 9.8 7 0.394 0.348 0.287 0.63 0.646 28.4 15 12.7 41.6 1.89 15.8
BEL 11 8 0.537 0.423 0.388 0.285 0.58 15.4 18.8 11.9 48.3 2.1 15.5
LUX 1.4 19 0.494 0.345 0.326 0.183 0.59 20 8.6 11.4 37.1 2.08 na
DAN 8.4 4 0.771 0.343 0.315 0.373 0.718 33 20 12 48 2.87 15.6
SWE 3.5 3 0.782 0.479 0.434 0.414 0.779 40.4 38.9 12.5 51.8 2.1 14.3
NOR 3.9 2 0.71 0.455 0.274 0.476 0.786 39.4 30.9 12.9 51.8 2.08 14.7
FIN 7.4 5 0.697 0.47 0.464 0.111 0.71 33.5 26.4 12.1 49.7 2.45 15.4
ICE na na na na na 0.475 na na na 23 na 1.84 na
AUT 3.5 1 0.594 0.42 0.392 0.228 0.641 23.2 19.2 11.4 44.5 1.96 na
SVYI ___U ___ ___12___ 0 576 0 AM 0 524 0,541 n 5Q4 1fi 7 ?7R 11 7 33 4 1 93 15
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C hapter 3
T he labour m arket consequences o f  
dem ographic trends: France and  
U S A  1964-94
A b s tra c t :  This paper examines the consequences of the changes in the composition of the labour 
force in the last 30 years: in many OECI) countries, low education /  high experience workers have 
been replaced by low experience /  high education workers. In aggregate, these changes can have 
both a positive or a negative impact to the skill level of the active population. Using French and 
US data, the paper establishes the substitution in the composition of skills of the labour supply. 
In France covariations of price and supply of skills are consistent with pure labour supply stories. 
In the US, changes in labour demand seem important, even if labour supply changes could lead 
to the same predictions depending on the substituability between experience and education.
3 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
After 20 years of high unemployment in Europe, and without a very convincing explanation 
of what generated the strong increase of the 70\s - 80’s, as acknowledged in Bean (1993), a 
promising area of research has emerged in the early 90’s. Its originality is th a t trends in 
inequality in the US and in unemployment in Europe, could well be the result of the same 
forces which lead to  rising dispersion of equilibrium wages of workers, by affecting adversely the
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unskilled workers. See for instance Bertola and Iehino (1995), or K rugm an (1994). In Europe, 
labour m arket regulations may prevent the  less skilled from finding jobs. The present paper 
is sympathetic: w ith this strand  of research in general, bu t makes an a ttem p t to  challenge the 
origin of the forces at work.
Those are generally viewed as the im pact of technological progress, leading to  higher dem and 
for educated and skilled workers and international trade. Both would increase the gaps between 
the low and high skilled workers. Two influential papers, by K atz and  M urphy (1992), and Juhn, 
M urphy and Pierce (1993) have imposed the view th a t these dispersing forces in the US were 
changes in the dem and for educated and more broadly for skilled workers.
In contrast, labour supply factors were always denied any im portan t role, even if any, a role 
of reduction in disparities only: the 70’s-80’s faced an impressive increase in the share of college 
educated workers. Similarly, economists concerned by the rise in European unemployment have 
paid  little  a tten tion  to  the rise in active population: in representative agent models, relations 
between labour supply and unemployment cannot persist in the  long run, since capital stock- 
wili endogenously increase and so the productivity of labour. This is the view expressed in 
M alinvaud (1986) or Nickell (1991) for instance1.
The present paper claims th a t one should take the supply changes more seriously. In the 
70’s-80’s, the supply of educated workers increased in all OECD countries, b u t this is not the 
most preem inent change of labour supply. The most im portan t quantita tive  and fast change is 
tha t, since the 60’s, labour force has enormously increased with the massive arrival of women 
(see figure 3-1), bigger cohorts of young workers (figure 3-2a). There have also been less older 
workers (figure 3-2b). There is no reason to believe th a t this has been neutral. This is the reason 
why, instead of considering almost only education, like many authors (Nickell and Bell 1994, 
M anacorda and Petrongolo, 1996 and others), this paper considers the two other dimensions of 
labour supply (age and gender). In other words, it will make explicit the continuous substitution 
of high experience /  low education workers, by high education /  low experience workers. I argue 
th a t the implication of this substitu tion  is to  give more explanatory power to the  labour supply
1 In some models however, the size of labour force can affect equilibrium unem ploym ent, through a composition  
effect. Such is the case in 1'issarides (1990), where labour force growth, by increasing the share o f young workers 
in the sense of new entrants from inactivity to unemployment, affects the equilibrium unemployment. T his kind 
of com position effect of the labour force will be the main hue of attack of this paper.
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Figure 3-1: Gender Composition of the Labour Force, OECE)
factors, whereas less to the labour demand factors.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the relation between changes in labour supply 
and the productivity of the labour force is explored. Using French (Formation et Qualifications 
Professionelles 1970, 77, 85, 93) and US (March Current Population survey 1964, 70, 77, 85, 
91) micro datasets, we divide the labour force in 32 (resp. 40 in the US) groups of age, 
education and gender. It is shown that between 1964 and 1981 in the US, there is no positive 
correlation between the change in the size of the cells and the relative wage of these cells. 
To a lesser extent, the same is true in France between 1970 and 1985. Identifying wage with 
productivity, it means th a t the increase in the labour supply during these periods was neither 
an appreciation nor a depreciation of the labour force - in average. Section 3 goes one step 
further and decompose wages in their two main c : >nents, experience and education. In both
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countries, it is shown th a t the  rise in the labour force has implied on an average a more educated, 
bu t a less experienced labour force, until the early 1980\s. In o ther words, if the  labour force 
has become more productive along the dimension of education, it has become less productive 
along the dimension of experience. This is an assessment of the change in the skill composition 
of the labour force, which is the key point of the paper. Issues of gender discrim ination are 
then addressed, th a t do not affect the  conclusion. In section 4, I examine the implications of 
these findings for the in terpretation of relative wage changes, h i France, the wage return  to 
education decreased, the  wage retu rn  to  experience increased, changes consistent with a labour 
supply story, as found in Goux and M aurin (1995). In the l.IS, the education supplied by 
workers increased and during the same period, the retu rn  to  education increased. Changes in 
dem and for educated labour could however be overestim ated, depending on the elasticity of 
substitu tab ility  between education and experience. Section 5 answers potential objections 
and concludes.
3 .2  C h a n g e s  in  la b o u r  s u p p ly  a n d  r e la t iv e  w a g e s
This section aims to  com pare the changes in the quantities of labour and the relative wages. 
This deserves prelim inary comments. F irst of all, similar calculations were done by Katz and 
M urphy (1992) and Goux and M aurin (1995): they com pute the inner product of changes in 
relative wages and changes in relative employment. If labour dem and is constant, the inner 
product needs to be negative. This is what Goux and M aurin (1995) found in France, which is 
a necessary condition for the absence of a dem and shift in favour of the skilled workers. For 
the US, Katz and M urphy found a positive inner product over some sub-periods (those which 
include the mid-eighties).
Here, the focus is different: first, the  study is about labour supply and therefore all the active 
workers will be considered, including the unemployed. Second, the interest is about the relative 
productivity  of the workers who belong to  the dem ographic/education groups whose share in 
the labour force has changed. This productivity  can be approxim ated - certainly imperfectly - 
by their relative hourly wage. This is why this section focuses on the correlation between the 
change in labour supply and wages across cells of the labour force. The vector of changes in
labour supply by cell is denoted by A L = (Lt=k+T — Lt=k), and w is the log of the  relative 
wages of each cell, with an average over the  period as: Log(w) = Log[(wt=^ +  w t=k+r)/'^\- 
I will first estim ate a regression of A L /L o n  a constant and on w . Since the size of the 
cells are different, the OLS estim ator is weighted with the initial size of the cells. I display 
in the tables the t-statistics of the coefficient: a positive value implies a positive correlation, 
and a negative value implies a negative correlation. Second, I will calculate the correlation 
coefficient of A L  and tu which I then decompose in the sum of two correlation coefficients over 
two subperiods according to  equation (3.1):
corr(x ,y )  = £**•2/*
(£*?£*?)2\l/2
£  Xi-Vi
+  -
£  xi-yi
i^A\ / ' E ' i E  v ! \ 1/4
1 /2
E  *? E  y f
Z$r,A \ ZtzAi
i$iA\ %$-_A\
£ * ?  'Lv'i
E  A  E  y f  \ 1/4
1/2
E ^ E  v \
i^ .A-2 i^Az
i(zA‘2 i .^Az
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where A \  and A 2 are partitions of the  sample. The subsam ple A \  and A 2 will be either men 
and women, or young and older workers.
3 .2 .1  U S A  1964-91
Wages and labour force d a ta  by cells come from the M arch Current Population Survey. The 
labour force is disaggregated into 40 categories: gender, 4 potential experience categories (<  
10, 11 < exp <  20,21 <  exp <  30, >  31, where potential experience is defined by age - education 
- 5, and 5 educational categories (no diplom a or a t m ost 11 years of completed schooling, 12 
years (high school), 13 to 15 years of schooling, 16 years of schooling, and more than  17). See 
the description of the d a ta  in the appendix.
Coefficients and t-s ta t of a regression of A L on w are displayed in table 3.1. Before 1981, 
the changes in the size of the  cells do not appear to  be correlated with the mean wage of the 
cell: this means th a t the contribution of the groups to the  growing labour force in the  US is 
neutral w ith respect to the position of the workers in the wage distribution, up to 1981. In
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Table 3.1: USA, OLS regression of A L /L  on w across 40 cells
T im e  P e r io d C oeffic ien t t - S ta t
1964-1967 -0.036 -0.52
1967-1970 -0.050 -0.67
1970-1973 -0.023 -0.28
1973-1977 -0.100 -1.17
1977-1981 -0.006 -0.08
1981-1985 0.192 2.95
1985-1988 0.138 4.02
1988-1991 0.101 2.46
other words, it is difficult to argue that over that period, the rise in the labour force in the 
US is associated with a rising quality of the workers if wages fully reflect their quality. The 
impact of this assumption on the conclusions is examined in the next section. It is only after 
1981 that the coefficients appear to be positive and significant. Figure 3-3 summarizes these 
findings by plotting the changes in size of the cells with respect to the logarithm  of the relative 
wage, averaged over each the sub-periods. The seeming outliers with very low A L are the 
older workers (men and women of experience 4) with education level 1 (0-11 years of schooling). 
Since the active population has been growing enormously in the US, most of the cells are above 
the horizontal axis.
Unweighted correlation coefficients (the weighted correlation coefficients are similar) ai d 
the contribution of each group to the correlation are in table 3.2. Again, it appears that the 
correlation between the changes in the size and the mean relative wage is rather small before 
1980. The decomposition of equation (3-1) shows th a t groups contributing to decrease the 
correlation over this period are women and young workers. Young workers are defined as those 
with less than  20 years of potential experience, the older workers are the complement.
3.2 .2  F rance 1970-93
Wages and employment da ta  by cells come from the survey Formation et Qualifications Profes- 
sionnelles on French workers. The labour force is divided into 32 categories: gender, 4 potential 
experience categories (<  10,11 <  exp <  20, 21 < exp <  30, >  31, where potential experience is 
defined by age - age of end of schooling), and 4 educational categories (no diploma, education 
<  12 yrs, education =12, and education >  12). See the description of the data  in the appendix.
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USA 1964-91 
S ca tte r d iagram  of 40  cells of th e  labor force: 
log of the  m ean  w ag e  of the cell (x-axis) 
ch an g e  in the  population of th e  cell (y-axis)
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Figure 3-3: USA: Changes in Labour Supply and Relative Wages
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Table 3.2: USA, Correlation of A L on w across 40 cells, and contribution of different groups
T im e  P e r io d A ll S a m p le M e n W o m e n Y o u n g O ld
1964-1967 -0.141 +0.076 -0.333 -0.367 +0.141
1967-1970 -0.087 +0.112 -0.157 -0.236 +0.090
1970-1973 -0.062 -0.126 -0.029 -0.209 +0.319
1973-1977 -0.137 +0.013 -0.137 -0.177 +0.169
1977-1981 +0.022 +0.156 +0.073 +0.154 +0.190
1981-1985 +0.300 +0.527 +0.380 +0.524 +0.526
1985-1988 +0.319 +0.388 +0.392 +0.460 +0.179
1988-1991 +0.275 +0.271 +0.589 +0.301 +0.098
Table 3.3: France, OLS regression of A L /L  on w across 32 cells
T im e  P e r io d C o effic ien t t - S t a t
1970-1977
1977-1985
1985-1993
0.220 1.70 
0.130 0.89 
0.645 3.99
The result found with these d a ta  is th a t the coefficient of a regression of A L / L  and w 
is not strongly significant from 0 between 1977 and 1985. It is positive though only weakly 
significant between 1977 and 1985. By contrast, between 1985 and 1993, there is a strong 
positive coefficient. See the table 3.3. In table 3.4, it appears th a t the  correlation coefficient 
is slightly positive before 1985, and more strongly after. One of the m ain reason for the 
difference with the US, where the correlation was more clearly negative or close to  0, is tha t the 
contribution of bo th  women and young workers to  the to ta l correlation is positive, indicating a 
slower change in the composition of labour supply in low wage groups, as com pared to  the US.
Figure 3-4 plots the change in size of the relative groups with respect to the logarithm  of 
the relative wage. Between 1970 and 1977, no cell can be found in the  fourth quadrant (smaller 
size and high wages), and 9 cells are in the second quadrant, which means larger size and low 
wages.
One can draw the following conclusion from the decomposition of the changes in the labour
— . . . . . . . . . .  . . .
T im e  P e r io d A ll S a m p le M e n W o m e n Y o u n g O ld
1970-1977 +0.198 +0.376 +0.154 +0.114 +0.487
1977-1985 +0.154 +0.307 +0.227 +0.379 +0.212
1985-1993 +0.468 +0.534 +0.531 +0.590 +0.361
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France 1970-93 
Scatter diagram of 32 cells of the labor force: 
log of the mean wage of the cell (x-axis) 
change in the population of the cell (y-axis)
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Figure 3-4: France. Labour Supply and Relative Wages
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supply in Prance. Until 1985, despite the rise in the educational level of the workforce, the 
absolute increase in the workforce is not particularly  concentrated in high wage groups, whereas, 
as in the US, after 1985 there seems to  be an im portant upgrading of the  labour force.
3 .3  E d u c a t io n  v s  E x p e r ie n c e
3 .3 .1  D e c o m p o s it io n
Taking the relative wages as a proxy for the relative productivity  of workers, the exercise of 
last section shows th a t before 1985 in Prance, and before the early 80’s in the US, the effect of 
a rising labour supply was neutral on the average productivity  of the labour force. One would 
like to go one step further and provide a decomposition of the changes in productivity  in the 
two components of wages, education and experience. For tha t, I estim ate for each year the 
price of each skill (diploma and experience) in running a wage equation separately for men and 
women on 5 dummies for each educational level2 and on potential experience and its square.
Log(uiiT) =  C  -f OiT-Educatiorii +  f i r .Experienc&i +  ti (3.2)
=  / ( Education) +  g(Experience)  +  ti  (3.3)
Then the variable :mpr is defined as the predicted value of wages i.e. the conditional mean 
wage. Tins can be decomposed into an intercept, the experience com ponent f  and the education 
component |  . Each component can be averaged over the  whole labour force. For instance, the 
education component is: Y2 otr-Edi for the year 1970. This provides a decomposition of the
i=1970
average productivity  of the labour force in efficiency units of education and in efficiency units of 
experience. Such an exercise can be conducted at constant prices (a 64  and  f a 4 for simplicity) 
and a t current price.
2T he fourth and the fifth education level in France are the 14 years of schooling, and the more than 15 years 
of schooling respectively.
3 .3 .2  P o te n t ia l P ro b lem s  
G ender D iscrim ination
An issue th a t arises, is the extent to  which gender discrim ination may affect the conclusion. 
It may be th a t, the gender gap in wages or in the wage re tu rn  to education or experience 
only reflect some discrim ination and not their true productivity. First, in the wage equations 
described above, the gap in wages between men and women conditional to  the m easured skills 
(i.e. the difference in the intercepts) is rather im portant in the first years (in the US, 23% in 
1964, 24% in 1970), and decreases over time: 5% in 1977, 1% in 1985, 4% in 1991). If there 
is gender discrim ination, a significant p a rt of it should be captured  by the intercept, whereas 
the decomposition above only implies the wage return  of observed skills. This is a reason for 
only focusing on how discrim ination may affect the wage retu rn  of the skills: let o>m  be the 
m easured price of a given skill for men and « f  the m easured price of the skill for women. Then, 
define the return  to skill for women corrected for discrim ination by:
a/r(A) =  «m  +  (1 — A ).(o f — Ckm) (8.4)
W ith  A =  0 (no discrim ination), « f ( A )  =  ctp.  W ith A =  1 (full discrim ination), o f ( A )  =  « m .  
I will provide estim ates of the decomposition of wages in two components by taking different 
values of A.
Interaction  term s betw een  education  and experience
It might be th a t the decomposition of (3.2) of wages in education and experience is arbitrary, 
and th a t there are significant interactions between experience and education. Therefore, on;1 
should add an interaction term  in the econometric specification and estim ate change in the 
skill level of the labour force according to  a three dimensional space (education, experience 
and interaction). However, it will be shown that, in bo th  France and the USA, the size of the 
interaction term  and its changes are small com pared to  the two other dimensions. Therefore 
the conclusion of the two-dimensional decomposition will rem ain valid.
M easurem ent Error on Fem ale E xperience
It is well known th a t due to recurrent interruptions of activity, some women may have an actual 
experience which is much lower than  w hat is m easured by potential experience. Assume th a t 
real experience for women is determ ined by the following model:
FtExpi = v .P o t .E xp i  +  6i
where Oi is an random  error term  with variance cr2 and v  <  1 is a system atic error. It is known 
th a t if a > 0 there is a downwards bias to  the OLS estim ates of the elasticity of the coefficient 
on experience, by a factor where oo2 is the variance of the residual of the wage equation
for women. In addition, the coefficient is biased by a factor 1 / v .  It follows th a t the num ber of
2
efficient units of experience estim ated for an individual will be biased by the factor > but
not by the factor 1/u, since th a t system atic error cancels out in the product of the variable 
and its coefficient. To the extent th a t much of the error on experience is a system atic one, as 
seems to be the case from prelim inary work on the issue of real experience for women (using 
the survey Actifs Financiers 1992, described in chapter 4), the problem  of m easurem ent error 
is small. However, more work on the question is needed.
3 .3 .3  U S A
To provide an accurate comparison between the two countries, the wage equations described 
above will be done using the same specification on the same sample of employed workers'1. See 
the tables 3.5 and 3.6. One can observe the rising re tu rn  to  education, especially after the mid 
70’s, the rising re tu rn  to  experience for men, and the rise in the variance of the residuals.
Using those coefficients, one can decompose wages in two different components according 
to  education and experience, as in tables 3.7 and 3.8.
3T he CPS allows to estim ate not. only the wage of those who work, but also the noil-employed who worked at 
least one week during the year preceding the survey. This is veiy convenient to treat sam ple selection bias due 
to unemployment, since m ost of the unemployed workers in the US have worked during the last twelve months. 
T he regressions were done on the whole sam ple of active workers, or on the sample of employed workers, w ithout 
very significant differences. To compare w ith France, I have used the results on the sam ple of employed workers 
only.
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Table 3.5: USA, GLS of In (hourly wage) of male workers on potential exp. and sq., 5 education
Men 1964 1970 1977 1985 1991
Educ 2 0.284 0.267 0.271 0.302 0.298
Educ 3 0.439 0.361 0.374 0.402 0.459
Educ: 4 0.561 0.563 0.569 0.651 0.689
Educ 5 0.581 0.604 0.679 0.756 0.824
Exp 0.0496 0.0475 0.0581 0.0604 0.0531
Exp sci- (xlOO) -0.075 -0.076 -0.092 -0.093 -0.082
Av. return  to  exp in % (20 yrs) 3.46 3.23 3.97 4.12 3.67
Residual, cliff. 90/10 percentile 1.27 1.20 1.22 1.34 1.33
Residual, cliff. 75/25 percentile 0.60 0.58 0.61 0.67 0.67
Table 3.6: USA, GLS of In (hourly wage) of female workers on potential exp. and sq., 5
Women 1964 1970 1977 1985 1991
Educ 2 0.320 0.260 0.230 0.228 0.291
Educ: 3 0.392 0.379 0.357 0.397 0.457
Educ 4 0.544 0.590 0.536 0.590 0.722
Educ 5 0.808 0.778 0.766 0.850 0.934
Exp 0.0269 0.0233 0.024? 0.0303 0.0305
Exp sq. (xlOO) -0.043 -0.039 -0.042 -0.053 -0.051
Av. return  to  exp in % (20 yrs) 1.83 1.55 1.63 1.97 2.03
Residual, cliff. 90/10 percentile 1.49 1.32 1.23 1.32 1.32
Residual, cliff. 75/25 percentile 0.69 0.61 0.60 0.64 0.66
Table 3.7: USA, decomposition of wages on education (SD in parentheses)
All Labour Force 
Education T=1964 Current T  T=1991
Y  otT-Edi
i=1964
Y  ciT-Edi
i= 1970
Y  ocr-Edi
i= 1977
Y  OLT-Edi
i= 1985
Y  otT-Edi
^=1991
0.212 (0.21) 0.212 (0.21) 0.235 (0.25) 
0.246 (0.21) 0.228 (0.21) 0.272 (0.26) 
0.291 (0.21) 0.267 (0.21) 0.326 (0.26) 
0.334 (0.20) 0.338 (0.24) 0.379 (0.26) 
0.351 (0.20) 0.400 (0.26) 0.400 (0.26)
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Table 3.8: USA, decomposition of wages on experience (SE) in parentheses)
All Labour Force 
Experience T=1964 C urrent T  T=1991
Y  a r .E x p i
i=1964
Y  Ot-T-Ex-Vi
i=1970
Y  acr-Expi
2=1977
Y  a r -E x p i
*=1985
Y  a r -E x p i
*=1991
0.480 (0.24) 0.480 (0.24) 0.507 (0.26) 
0.451 (0.25) 0.400 (0.23) 0.478 (0.26) 
0.413 (0.25) 0.435 (0.29) 0.439 (0.26) 
0.414 (0.24) 0.477 (0.29) 0.441 (0.25) 
0.426 (0.23) 0.455 (0.24) 0.455 (0.24)
The evolution of the skill composition of the labour force is represented 011 the figure 3- 
5. At constant 1964 price of skills, it appears th a t the  average level of experience decreased 
strongly in efficiency units until 1977, and then increased slightly bu t never recovered the initial 
level. The evolution of education is exactly the opposite: it spectacularly increased over all the 
period. At current prices, experience levels decreased until 1970 b u t then  the strong rise in the 
re tu rn  to  experience com pensated for it and the efficiency level of experience strongly rose until 
1985. Education in contrast, constantly increased a t current prices. Finally, taking the price of 
skills in 1991 instead of the price of skills in 1964, does not change the picture: there is more 
education and less experience in the labour force.
One take account of the gender discrim ination 011 the  return  to skills in reestim ating the 
content of the tables 3.7 and 3.8 with various values of A as defined in (3.4). W ith  a value of A — 
1, the results can be in terpreted  in two ways. First, in assum ing th a t 100% of the difference in 
the re tu rn  to skills between gender is due to pure discrim ination, it provide the proper measure 
of the efficiency units supplied by the labour in each component education and experience. 
Second, taking A =  1 is equivalent to neutralize the changes in the gender composition of the
1
labour force and to  observe the pure effect of the change in the age structure. It can be observed 
from the table 3.9 th a t different values of A have little im pact on the m easure of education of 
the labour force: much of the effect of different A is on the measure of experience of the  labour 
force. Higher values of A tends to increase the estim ated experience (not surprisingly since men 
have higher return  to  experience). However, the decline in the level of experience of the  labour 
force still holds, even if its am plitude is reduced with high values of A. The conclusion of the 
previous subsection is not affected by the existence of discrim ination between gender.
USA: Skill Composition of the Labour Force 
in Efficiency Units of Experience (x-axts) and Education (y-axis) 
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Figure 3-5: USA. Skill (Composition of the Labour Force (Education, Experience)
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Table 3.9: USA, decomposition of wages on experience and education w ith gender discrim ination 
(SD in parentheses)___________________________________________________________________
All Labour Force T=1964
Education A =  0 A =  0.25 A =  0.5 A =  0.75 A =  1
Y  a r -E d i
*=1964
Y  a r -E d i
*=1970
Y  a r -E d i
*=1977
Y  a r -E d i
*=1985
Y  a r -E d i
*=1991
0.212 (0.21) 0.211 (0.21) 0.209 (0.23) 0.208 (0.21) 0.206 (0.21) 
0.246 (0.21) 0.244 (0.21) 0.242 (0.21) 0.240 (0.21) 0.239 (0.20) 
0.291 (0.21) 0.289 (0/21) 0.287 (0.20) 0.285 (0.20) 0.283 (0.20) 
0.334 (0.20) 0.332 (0.20) 0.329 (0.20) 0.327 (0.20) 0.324 (0.19) 
0.351 (0.20) 0.349 (0.20) 0.346 (0.19) 0.344 (0.19) 0.341 (0.19)
All Labour Force T =  1964
Experience A =  0 A =  0.25 A =  0.50 A =  0.75 A =  1
Y  a r -E xp i
*=1964
Y  a r -E xp i
*=1970
Y  a r -E xp i
*=1977
Y  a r -E xp i
*=1985
Y  a r -E xp i
*=1991
0.480 (0.24) 0.506 (0.24) 0.532 (0.23) 0.557 (0/23) 0.583 (0.24) 
0.451 (0.25) 0.478 (0.24) 0.504 (0.24) 0.530 (0.25) 0.557 (0.26) 
0.413 (0.25) 0.439 (0.24) 0.465 (0/25) 0.491 (0.25) 0.517 (0.26) 
0.414 (0.24) 0.442 (0.23) 0.471 (0.23) 0.500 (0.23) 0.529 (0.24) 
0.426 (0.23) 0.457 (0.22) 0.488 (0/22) 0.520 (0.23) 0.551 (0.24)
Finally, I represent in figure 3-6 the decomposition of the supply of skills in th ree dimensions, 
education, experience and the interaction term  (education times experience)4. It appears th a t 
the conclusion*are not strongly affected. The interaction term  is small, the supply of ’’pure” 
education increased, the supply of pure experienced decreased until 1977 and then  rem ained 
stable.
3 .3 .4  F rance
The same analysis is applied to  France. Since no race variables are available, the  specification 
only includes experience and education. One can notice in tables 3.10 and 3.11 the continuous 
decline in the coefficients of education, the rise in the re tu rn  to experience for women and to 
some extent of men, and the stability in the variance of the residuals except in the last part of 
the period, after 1985.
Using those coefficients, one can decompose wages in two different components according
4Ou the x-axis, 1,2,3,4 and 5 stand for 1964, 70, 77, 85 and 1991.
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Figure 3-6: USA. Skill Composition of the Labour Force (Education, Experience, Interaction 
Term)
Table 3.10: France, GLS of hi (hourly wage) of male workers on potential exp. and sq., 4 
education dummies
Men 1970 1977 1985 1993
Educ: 2 0.323 0.283 0.250 0.173
Educ 3 0.693 0.632 0.562 0.407
Educ 4 1.192 1.044 0.884 0.789
Exp 0.0404 0.0475 0.0425 0.047
Exp sq. (xlOO) -0.068 -0.079 -0.065 -0.074
Av. return to exp in % (20 yrs) 2.68 3.17 2.95 3.22
Residual, diff. 90/10 percentile 1.09 0.93 0.90 0.97
Residual, diff. 75/25 percentile 0.54 0.46 0.45 0.48
1 2 6
Table 3.11: France, GLS of In (hourly wage) of female workers on potential exp. and sq., 4 
education dummies__________________________________________________________
Women 1970 1977 1985 1993
Educ 2 0.306 0.274 0.235 0.176
Educ: 3 0.684 0.613 0.502 0.421
Educ: 4 0.864 0.817 0.704 0.687
Exp 0.0162 0.0244 0.0279 0.0360
Exp sq. (xlOO) -0.033 -0.046 -0.047 -0.062
Av. retu rn  to  exp in % (20 yrs) 0.96 1.52 1.85 2.36
Residual, diff. 90/10 percentile 1.04 0.86 0.87 0.95
Residual, diff. 75/25 percentile 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.44
Table 3.12: France, decomposition of wages on education (SD in parentheses)
Employed Population 
Education T=1970 C urrent T  T=1993
52 ar-E d i
*=1970
52 ar-E d i
i= 1977
52 ar-E d i  
i= 1985
52 a r-E d i
*=1991
0.266 (0.26) 0.266 (0.26) 0.157 (0.17) 
0.324 (0.29) 0.286 (0.26) 0.194 (0.20) 
0.365 (0.31) 0.284 (0.24) 0.225 (0.22) 
0.422 (0.35) 0.270 (0.25) 0.270 (0.25)
to education and experience. In tables 3.12 and 3.13 the results of the decomposition of wages 
along the two dimensions for all the employed population are displayed. It can be observed that 
a t constant 1970 prices, there is a strong increase in the supply of education and a decrease 
in the  quantity  of experience until 1985, which then remains more or less constant. Similar 
conclusion emerges when one considers the price of skills in 1993 (th ird  columns in the tables). 
At current prices, the picture is different. The supply of educated workers in efficiency units 
increases until 1985, and then decreases significantly, from a drop in the  retu rn  to  education. 
In contrast, the efficiency units of experience constantly  increase until 1993, which is mainly 
due to  the increasing retu rn  to  experience.
The evolution of the skill composition of the labour force is represented in figure 3-7. At 
constant price, this represents the inverse shift in the composition of the skills of the  labour 
force, more education and less experience.
The division between an experience and an education component in the wage determ ination 
is not driving the result: when one estim ates a richer specification including linear experience
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Table 3.13: France, decomposition of wages on experience- (SE) in parentheses)
Employed Population 
Experience T=1970 Current T T -1993
Y  ar-E xp i  
z=1970
Y  ar-E xp i
i=1977
Y  a r-E xp i
i= 1985
a r-E xp i
i=1993
0.342 (0.20) 0.342 (0.20) 0.503 (0.19) 
0.325 (0.20) 0.408 (0.21) 0.483 (0.19) 
0.320 (0.19) 0.424 (0.18) 0.480 (0.18) 
0.320 (0.19) 0.486 (0.19) 0.486 (0.19)
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Figure 3-7: France. Skill Composition of the Employed Population (Education, Experience)
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Figure 3-8: France. Skill Composition of the Employed Population (Education, Experience, 
Interaction Term)
terms by diploma level, like in:
WiT = C  + otr-Edui +  fir-Ex-Vi +  I r -E d u i  * Expi  +  e*
the same conclusions holds. The three-dimensional equivalent of figures 3-7, the pattern  of 
evolution of the efficiency units of education, experience and the interaction term  is represented 
on figure As in the US case, the interaction term  is rather small compared to the others and 
at constant price, increases over the period. The education term  increased and the experience 
term  remained constant after the strong decrease of the 70’s.
Finally, I take account of possible discrimination by taking different values of the coefficient 
A as in the US case. Again the picture is not affected by the existence of possible discrimination: 
the quantity  of education supplied increased in all the columns of table 3.14, and the quantity 
of experience supplied decreased between 1970 and 1977 in all cells and then remained more 
or less constant, except maybe in the extreme case where A =  1, where in 1993 the term
5On the x-axis, 2,3,4 and 5 stand for 1970, 77, 85 and 1993.
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Table 3.14: France, decomposition of wages on experience and education with gender discrimi-
nation (SE) in parentheses)
Employed Population T=1970
Education A =  0 A =  0.25 A =  0.5 A =  0.75 A =  1
Y  a r -E d i
i=1970
Y  a r -E d i
i=1977
Y  ar-E d i
i=1985
Y  a r -E d ii - 1993
0.266 (0.26) 
0.324 (0.29) 
0.365 (0.31) 
0.422 (0.35)
0.268 (0.26) 
0.326 (0.30) 
0.368 (0.31) 
0.426 (0.35)
0.270 (0.27) 
0.329 (0.30) 
0.372 (0.32) 
0.431 (0.37)
0.271 (0.27) 
0.331 (0.30) 
0.375 (0.32) 
0.436 (0.36)
0.273 (0.27) 
0.333 (0.31) 
0.379 (0.33) 
0.440 (0.37)
Employed Population
0t~01II
Experience A =  0 A =  0.25 A =  0.50 A =  0.75 A =  1
Y  a r -E x p i
t = 1970
Y  a r -E x p i
*=1977
Y  a r -E x p i
z=1985
Y  a r -E xp i
i=199.3
0.342 (0.20) 
0.325 (0.20) 
0.320 (0.19) 
0.320 (0.19)
0.370 (0.17) 
0.354 (0.17) 
0.351 (0.17) 
0.353 (0.17)
0.397 (0.15) 
0.384 (0.16) 
0.381 (0.15) 
0.386 (0.15)
0.426 (0.15) 
0.413 (0.15) 
0.412 (0.15) 
0.419 (0.15)
0.454 (0.15) 
0.442 (0.15) 
0.443 (0.15) 
0.452 (0.15)
Y  a r -E x p i  recover the 1970 level.
i=1993
3 .4  I m p lic a t io n s  for  t h e  la b o u r  d e m a n d  s h if t  h y p o th e s is
One can first conmient on the difference between France and the USA: the experience term  
£  a r -E x p i  is stronger in the US a t the price of 1970, bu t very close a t the price of 1993, 
th a t for all years: the degree of wage inequality between workers along this dimension (age or 
experience) is actually quite similar in the two countries. In contrast, the average re tu rn  to 
education Y a T-Ediii\s  stronger in France at the price of 1970, revealing more wage dispersion 
along the dimension of education than  in the US. In 1993 however, the picture is inverted, and 
France is more egalitarian in term s of education than  in the US. I don’t really comment any 
more on this issue, b u t this is an interesting question deserving more work.
To summarize, the p a tte rn  of the return  to education and experience and the comparison 
with the quantity  supplied is represented in the figure 3-96. It reveals th a t 3 of the 4 panels are
6 The price of education is an average of men and women of: in the US, the college premium w ith respect 
to high school, in France the Baccalaureat premium with respect ot C E P /B E P . The price of experience is the 
return to experience over the 20 first years for men. (1 =  1964, 2 = 1 9 7 0 , 3 = 1 9 7 7 , 4 = 1 9 8 5 , 5 = 1 9 9 1  or 1993)
Top: USA 
Bottom France 
Left: Education 
Right: Experience
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Figure 3-9: Comparison of the price of skills and the efficient quantities supplied, USA and 
France
consistent with pure labour supply stories. In France, there is a strong decrease in the return  
to education, while there is a increase in the return to experience. The skills th a t increased in 
quantity  have had a declining return, whereas the skills tha t decreased in quantity have had 
an increasing return. In addition, this chapter provides an explanation for the rising return to 
experience, by supply factors: the increase in the supply of inexperienced workers.
The next step is to summarize the implications of the paper in the. debate over the shift in 
the relative demand for skills. In the USA, in contrast to France, there seems to be a sti nig 
increase in both the quantity of educated workers and of the returns to education, which seems 
to imply a change in demand for education.
One can push the logic to the extreme and try to see if one can explain the unexplained 
rising return  to education by supply factors. The interpretation of the findings of the previous 
sections can be summarized as follows: there has been a decline in the quantity  of experience 
supplied by the labour force; this tends to reduce the average skill of the labour force, assuming
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education fixed. It follows a relative scarcity of the skills. The price, of the skills should increase: 
the price of experience, bu t also maybe the price of education, provided th a t education and 
experience are substitu tes for each other.
Some algebra helps to detail the intuition. Assume a production function of hum an capital 
H = F ( E , X )  where E  and X  are aggregate hum an capital linked to  education and experience. 
These quantities X  and E  are actually the sum over all employed workers of their basic: skills 
linked to their individual experience and education. Assume the X  = ^2 h x (c i ,X i )  =  X ^-Y ^b) 
the last equation implied by an assum ption of separability between education and experience 
in the production of hum an capital, and similarly E  =  X! ^ £ (cc x i) — XI The return
to one unit of experience is w x  = F x ( X ,  E), whereas the return  to one unit of education is 
w e  =  Fe ( X ,E ) .  For instance, the retu rn  to college vs high school workers is w e -^ (^ = 12)• 
Then, differentiating log('ipE) with respect to the quantities X  and E, one gets:
dwE _  Fe e  ^  F.Fe x  X .F x  d X  
w e  Fe  Fe -Fx  F  X
I11 (3.5), d E  is positive (more educated labour force), Fe e  is negative (decreasing return  to  one 
factor) and dWE  is positive (higher return  to  education). However, it does not necessarily imply 
th a t there is a trend  term  missing which represents the im pact of biased technological progress. 
It may well be th a t the elasticity of substitu tion a = e^ f* *s ne£a^ ve (the two factors are 
q-substitutes). Since the supply of experience has decreased, there is a t least one part of the 
right hand side th a t can be positive. In such a case, this reduces the size of the  trend  which is 
involved in Katz and M urphy (implied by the sign of their inner product A w .A Q  across cells, 
bu t biased upwards if the elasticity rris negative).
To fix ideas, consider th a t production associates hum an capital H  and  physical (l.mskilled) 
labour L, as follows:
Y  =  L l ~s .H 6 = L^~S.(E P + X p)s/p
where p is smaller than  1. In this OES specification, we have a -■ 6(6 — p). The higher lb? 
factor pw ith  respect to 6, the more strongly negative is a. Using the results of tables 3.5 to 
3.8, one can estim ate how much of the right hand side is explained by the decrease in the 
quantity  of experience. As a measure for I have taken the difference in the coefficients
Table 3.15: USA, im pact of the change in experience on the return  to  education
T im e  P e r io d dwp.Wr JY :( p =  64) 4 * (p  =  91) %( w ith p =  1) %( with p — —5)
1964-1977 +0.021 -0.067 -0.068 +53.2 -585.2
1977-1991 +0.093 +0.013 +0.016 -2.0 +25.6
1964-1991 +0.114 -0.055 -0.052 +7.89 -87.0
dip4 and dip'2 (ratio college /  high school). As a measure for X. Fx / F (the share of experience 
in hum an capital), I have chosen 2/3. For S, I have chosen 1/2. The results of the calibration 
are in table 3.15. The last two columns (%) represent the fraction of changes in the return  to 
education explained by the changes in experience.
There are two ways of reading table 3.15 th a t should satisfy everyone. If one believes 
th a t education and experience are strong substitutes, then one can explain a significant part 
of the  rising retu rn  to education over all the period (7.9%), m ainly because of the first sub­
period 1964-77. In the second part of the sample, there has been no decrease in the supply 
of experience, therefore experience cannot explain the rising retu rn  to  skills. However, if one 
believes th a t experience and education are strong complement (p =  —5), one cannot explain 
the rising return  to education in the first part of the period, bu t one can explain 25% of it in 
the second part of the period. This estim ates are ra ther sensitive to the values chosen for p, 
6 and X. Fx/ F.  W ith p =  0.75 instead of 1, the figures are divided by two, as is the case when 
X . F x / F  is taken to  1/3.
3 .5  C o n c lu s io n
In the paper, it is argued th a t one should explain the evolution of inequality and unemployment 
in taking account of all the labour supply changes. There has been a superposition of demo­
graphic (generational and gender) changes, and of changes in educational levels in all OECD 
labour markets.
Both for France and for the  US, it was shown th a t the supply shocks are the sum of 
two changes: more young/wom en i.e. more inexperienced workers, and more educated workers. 
Wages and labour supply d a ta  are considered together. The compositional changes of the  labour 
force are associated with ambiguous effects on workers productivity: before 1985 in France and 
before the early 80’s in the US, there has been a strong increase in the labour supply of low wage
groups, as im portant as the increase in labour supply in high wage groups. In efficiency units, 
the experience level has increased and the education level has overall increased, a t constant 
skill prices.
This paper is a basis for a new investigation about the  dem and shift hypothesis. If there is 
substitu tab ility  between education and experience, one may overestim ate the  size of the rising 
dem and for educated workers in the US between 1964 and 1977: if the labour force is less skilled 
because less experienced, rising prices of these skill, i.e. education and experience. In contrast, 
if there is a strong com plem entarity between education and experience, one may overestim ate 
the rising dem and for education over the period 1977-91. In all cases, the  share explained by 
changes in the supply of experience are big, because the relative changes in the quantity  of 
experience supplied are very im portant, especially in the US.
3 .6  Appendix: Description of the datasets
3 .6 .1  US CPS: 1964-1991 
D ata
I use the March Current Population Survey provided by the NBER on the subset of the 16-75 aged 
population. The sample weights used are the family weights (fa n iw g t ). The five education groups 
correspond to: less than 12, 12, 13-14, 15-16 and more than 17 years of schooling. As usual, experience 
is actually measured as potential experience Max (age-education-5, 0). The variable zcduc  denotes the 
number of years of schooling, and was build from the variables grdhi (highest grade attended) and 
grdcom  (Did ... finished this grade?). The weekly wage is given by the variable zw k lyw g  (average 
weekly earnings last year). It is defined as in cw a g c /zw ks ly r  where incwagc  measures the income 
from wage and salary and zw k s ly r  measures the imputed usual weeks worked last year. The variable 
z w k s ly r  is imputed on the basis of the variable w kslyr  whose modalities are 0, 1-13, 14-26, 27-39 and 
more than 39 before 1976 and continuous after 1976). The employment status is given by the variable 
zesr  which is a recode of the variables esi' and zw k s ly r  (weekly wage) over the 1964-94 period, whose 
modalities are: Not in the universe, employed working, employed not working, unemployed and not in 
the labour force. The variable f t p t  describes the full-time full-year status (more than 50 weeks last yvar, 
usually more than 35 hours per week) i.e. four occurences plus a non-worker and an invalid status. Thf
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variable h o u rs  gives the hours worked last week and the variables hrs3& and hr$35b  indicate whether 
or not the interviewed worked usually more are less than 35 hours last week. The hours worked per week 
last year are measured by h v s l y i ’, but are available since 1976 only.
Hourly wage
I describe the chosen definition of the hourly wages: after 1976, I define Ihw =  l o g ( z w k s l y r / h r s l y r ) . 
Before 1976, information is only available on full-time /  part-time, and the hours worked last week 
(bracketed, modalities 1-4, 5-14, 15-29 and 30-34). Before 1977, when the number of hours worked last 
week is consistent with the part-time /  full-time status, the imputed number of hours is the number of 
hours worked last week. When it is not, we give the conditional mean of hours worked in average given 
the part-time full-time status (45 hours for a full-time, 20 hours for a part-time). Further work is needed 
to improve the imputation method.
Top-coding
As well known, the variable in c w a g c  is top-coded at $99999 between 1964 and 1967, at $50000 between 
1968 and 1981, at $75000 between 1982 and 1984, at $99999 between 1985 and 1988 and at $199998 
between 1988B and 1994. The following table shows the number of top-coded individuals year by year 
in our sample.______________________________________
1964 1970 1977 1985 1991
Occurrence 0 46 293 247 0
The usual method is to impute the average value of those with income larger than the top-c.ode 
value assuming an exponential distribution of the log of earnings. This is equivalent to multiplying the 
top-coded earnings by a coefficient estimated from a year in which earnings are almost not top-coded. 
This value is 1.45 (see Buchinsky 1994 for instance).
Table 3.16: USA, sample statistics (source CPS)
Summary Statistics
1964 1970 1977 1985 1991
#  All Labor Force 16-75 29 321 58 131 70 531 77 157 77 114
Educ 1 0.451 0.368 0.272 0.190 0.157
Educ 2 0.335 0.378 0.394 0.402 0.393
Educ 3 0.084 0.106 0.137 0.163 0.178
Educ 4 0.086 0.097 0.126 0.157 0.177
Educ 5 0.043 0.050 0.069 0.089 0.096
Exp 24.4 22.8 20.0 19.3 19.9
(SD Exp) (14.9) (15.2) (14.8) (13.6) (12.9)
Sex (Men 0, Women 1) 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.46
Black 0.100 0.098 0.097 0.102 0.104
Other Non-White 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.028 0.034
Self Employed 0.117 0.085 0.076 0.080 0.110
#  Labor Force Except Self Employed 25 823 53 126 64 805 70 644 68 501
Full-Time 0.791 0.817 0.784 0.779 0.795
Hourly Wage 2.38 3.30 5.16 8.90 11.3
(SD Hourly Wage) (2.44) (2.70) (5.51) (8.07) (10.5)
3 .6 .2  French surveys Formation et Qualifications Professionelles: 1970, 1977, 1985, 1993
The data were provided by INS EE and by Dominique Goux. A very important work by Goux and 
Maurin was undertaken to match the definitions of the sample for different years. I report here the 
description of the data, as it appear in Goux and Maurin (1996): the survey is conducted on a sample 
of about 45000 individuals aged 20-65 until 1985, and 18000 in 1993. Diploma are pooled into 5 groups: 
No diploma, Vocational degree (CEP, CAP, BEP), Baccalaureat, DEUG and Maitrise or more, which in 
order represent: 0 year of schooling, 5 to 8 years of schooling, 12 years of schooling, 14 and more than 
15 years of schooling. The last two groups were pooled together given the small size of the sub-samples 
(experience sex). Workers declare their earnings in the year preceding the survey, the number of months 
of activity, and the part-time /  full-time status. It is only in 1993 that the number of hours worked is 
available, before the part-time are treated as half-time workers in the construction of the hourly wage
Table 3.17: France, sample statisitcs (source INSEE-FQP) 
data. Experience is built as the difference between current age and age at t he end of schooling.
1970 1977 1985 1993
#  All Labor Force 20-64 30 645 31 815 31 361 13 517
Educ 1 0.350 0.274 0.233 0.203
Educ 2 0.548 0.570 0.564 0.500
Educ 3 0.062 0.089 0.095 0.131
Educ 4 0.018 0.024 0.055 0.083
Educ 5 0.023 0.044 0.053 0.082
Exp 23.7 22.0 20.9 20.8
(SD Exp) (15.0) (14.3) (13.2) (11.8)
Sex (Men 0, Women 1) 0.384 0.409 0.440 0.451
Yearly Wage Equivalent 63 566 84 489 89 811 104 251
(SD) (47 559) (59 257) (54 368) (78 462)
C hapter 4
Labour Supply D ynam ics, 
U nem ploym ent and E ducation
A b stract: This chapter examines the dynamics of effects of labour supply trends on: the skill com­
position of the labour force, its wage inequality and on the level of unemployment. Labour supply 
trends of low experience workers easily account for stylized facts that are usually explained by a 
shift in the labour demand for skilled workers. Periods of higher labour supply growth generate 
more unemployment among young and high turnover workers, who do not accumulate enough 
human capital. This reduces the supply of skilled workers and thus the demand for the unskilled 
workers if the unskilled are complement to the skilled. This is an intertemporal multiplication of 
the supply shocks. Empirical evidence using a French survey in which workers declare their true 
employment experience is used to justify the relevance of the model, especially the trend of more 
inexperienced workers.
4 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
Economists concerned by the rise in European unemployment have paid little  a tten tion  to  the 
rise in active population. One reason of this lack of interest is th a t in representative agent 
models, relations between labour supply and unemployment cannot persist in the long run, 
since capital stock will endogenously increase, and so the productivity  of labour. This is the 
view expressed in M alinvaud (1986) or Nickell (1991) for instance. In some models however, the
size of labour force can affect equilibrium unemployment, through a composition effect. Such 
is the case in Pissarides (1990), where labour force growth, by increasing the share of young 
workers in the sense of new entran ts from inactivity to unemployment, affects equilibrium 
unemployment.
This kind of composition effect of the labour force will be the line of attack  of this paper. 
One of the most substantive change in the OECD labour m arkets since the 1960’s, is tha t 
labour force has increased with the massive arrival of women and with bigger cohorts of young 
workers. There is 110 reason to believe th a t this has been neutral. In chapter 3, it was shown 
th a t for instance workers in these two categories have fewer (efficiency) units of employment 
experience: the labour supply changes can not be thought of w ithout implying some kind of 
heterogeneity. This paper aims to explore the dynamics aspects of heterogeneous increase in 
labour supply.
Section 2 introduces the notations of a  model of labour m arkets with endogenous partic ­
ipation, unemployment and hum an capital simultaneously introduced. The key assum ption 
is th a t skilled workers are either experienced or educated ones, or in o ther words, th a t the 
unskilled workers are those w ithout experience or education. Section 3 shows tha t, when the 
only source of accum ulation of hum an capital is experience, the labour m arket variables are 
very unstable: through an intertem poral transm ission of the shocks by the skill composition 
of the  labour force, higher unemployment today leads to  lower quantity  of skilled workers the 
next period and therefore reduces the dem and for the unskilled1. It follows th a t labour sup­
ply trends of more low experience workers result in generational crowding which in a world 
w ithout education can cause many adverse effects: rise in inequality, unemployment and hys­
teresis. Endogenous participation plays a stabilizing role: when unemployment is too high, the 
unskilled leave the labour force. M ultiple equilibria are possible: a low unemployment and high 
participation coexisting with a high unemployment and low participation one. Section 4 shows 
th a t multiple equilibria vanish when workers have the possibility of acquiring hum an capital 
through education. Education is modelled as the result of an arbitrage between working young
1 T his is not the first work where this kind of intertemporal transmission of the shocks of the labour market 
is present; Pissarides (1992) and Ortega (1993) are two exam ples in a job matching framework. However, this 
paper puts the emphasis on labour supply trends as initiator of the amplification of the shocks. It also goes 
deeper into the analysis of the com position of the supply of skills.
or delaying the entrance into the labour m arket to get a higher wage rate  in the future. In the 
logic; of the. model, increased education levels of workers is the consequence of adverse labour 
supply trends, not of increased dem and for education. This prediction of the model is inves­
tiga ted  using French d a ta  (Form ation and Qualification Professionelle) in section 5. The fact 
th a t labour supply changes are changes of more inexperienced workers, is also docum ented in 
section 5 using French d a ta  from EnquSte Actifs Financiers 1992, where information on real 
experience is available. Both types of evidence support the model.
4 .2  N o t a t io n s
4 .2 .1  P r o d u c t io n  te c h n o lo g y
I assume th a t there are only two broad  types of occupations in the economy: the first one that 
can be filled by everyone and the second one th a t cannot be filled by unskilled. In this la tte r 
category, skills like education (in profession like engineers) an d /o r experience (in managerial 
occupations) are necessary. The technology associates the  skilled and the unskilled. The effi­
ciency units of employment of skilled workers (with experience or education) are denoted by 
Nj? , and the efficiency units of employment of the unskilled workers by N lt J. The production oi 
the  representative firm2 will be: Y  = F i r .N f , N lf J), where r  is a technology param eter which 
represents biased technological progress, which is often involved in the explanation for the rise 
in inequality in the US (Juhn, M urphy and Pierce 1993, K atz and M urphy 1992). Some degree 
of imperfect substitu tab ility  between experience and education will be introduced*. Capital is 
ruled out: a t fixed interest rate, the above production function is the long-run reduced form of a 
more general technology with three factors, capital, skilled and unskilled labour, as illustrated 
in appendix.
2 A similar production function w ith dynamics of skill accumulation was introduced by J. Ortega (1993) in 
a search /  matching framework. I thank G. Saint-Paul for signalling it to me. O rtega’s model has multiple 
equilibria like here. The focus of the model (persistence of unem ploym ent shocks like in Pissarides 1992), is 
different from here, where we are interested in the consequences of labour supply shocks on unemployment.
3 Experience can be an imperfect substitute, for education for informational reasons; there is a series of papers 
by Jovauovic and Nyarko (1994) who study the properties of learning through experience. Basically, experience 
is a signal extraction on som e unknown parameter, upon which a decision has to be made.
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4 .2 .2  W orkers
Cohorts of size F\ of agents enter the labour m arket a t tim e t. The growth rate  of the cohorts 
is 7it. The agents live two periods. Consistently with F. Welch (1979), who developed a model 
with workers of different age complements in the production, the workers here can move from 
the low to the high occupation. For th a t, they have to  accum ulate hum an capital. There are two 
ways to get enough hum an capital to access to the skilled occupation. The first one, classically, 
is to  spend the firsi period of one’s life in education and work only the second period. The 
second one is through employment experience in first period.
W ith  these assum ptions, workers in the  second period of their life can be in four different 
situations. They can be 1. experienced, or 2. educated. They also can be 3. inexperienced and 
uneducated. Finally, they can be 4. out of the labour force. The skilled are in category 1 and 
2, the unskilled in category 3. I will denote by Ed  the educated workers, E x  the  experienced 
ones, I  the old unskilled (inexperienced uneducated), and  Y  the young workers. Notice tha t 
w ith these simplistic assum ptions, one avoids to  have a fifth category of workers, the educated 
and experienced workers, the existence of which would somewhat obscure the intuition of the 
model about the changes in the dem and for the different skills in introducing an interaction 
term  between education and experience.
The experienced and educated workers will be allowed to have some degree of imperfect 
substitutability , detailed in section 4. In contrast and to keep the model simple, the young 
workers and the old unskilled are perfect substitu tes in the  production, N fJ =  N j  +  N j. This 
means th a t, whatever the reason for not having accum ulated experience (unemployment or 
inactivity or age), the  workers are not discrim inated nor they have suffered any hum an capital 
loss. Tins is an im portan t difference w ith previous works assum ing th a t unem ploym ent duration 
has a specific adverse im pact on workers, as in Pissarides (1992) or Layard et al. (1991).
4 .2 .3  E x p e r ie n c e
The hum an capital necessary to  access the skilled occupation through work experience, requires 
to  work. Assume for instance th a t each period is subdivided into p smaller subperiods, in winch 
a lo ttery  is done each tim e to a ttr ib u te  the jobs. The experience level to access to the skilled jobs
141
could be q < p successive spells of employment4. Then, if ct is the average employment rate  for 
the young workers, the fraction of young th a t access to skilled jobs is a function , p, q), with 
(I>1 >  0, <l>2 >  0 and <£3 <  0. W ithout loss of generality, it will be assum ed th a t <I>(et , p, q) =  e-t.
I t follows th a t periods of unemployment can prevent ex-ante homogenous workers from 
accessing to  the high occupations, therefore th a t the aggregate outcome at period t depends 
strongly on past outcomes. In some cases, there is an intertemporal multiplier effect of the 
shocks affecting the skill level of the population and leading to  m ultiplicity of equilibria. This 
key point requires only agents living two periods. More realism could be introduced in modelling 
more than  two periods, at the cost of additional complexity and  w ithout qualitative changes.
4 .2 .4  U n e m p lo y m e n t
The wage of the miskilled is not perfectly flexible, because of some downwards rigidity. These 
can be linked to  the reservation wage of the  workers, which depends on an arbitrage between 
work and non-work. The wage rigidity can also be linked to  the  existence of a wage setting 
curve linking wages and unemployment, like in the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), to  the existence of a Nash-Bargaining linked to search frictions (M ortensen 1982), the 
existence of unions setting wages given the labour dem and curve of the firms, or risk-averse 
workers buying an insurance to risk-neutral firms. These rigidities are modelled in two different 
ways, to  show th a t the results of the model don’t depend on the choice of wage determ ination. 
In the first way, the wage of the unskilled is decreasing in unemployment, like in the wage curve 
models. This is represented by a double log functional form, of the type:
log(tcf) = b-(t>. log( 1 -  ct) (4.1)
where c-t is the employment rate  of the miskilled. I11 the  second way, as in Saint-Faul (1995), 
there is a m aximum  dispersion of wage, and the ratio  of the lowest to  the average wage is a 
constant: this is a stronger type of wage rigidity. In this model with two types of workers, this is 
equivalent to  having a sociopolitical constant 7  , i.e. an indexation rate, such th a t w y  > 'y.ws-
4 See Pissarides (1994) for a model in wliich, coining from unem ploym ent, workers start in bad jobs and access 
to good jobs only from employment.
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A nice feature of this assum ption is that, when the equality is satisfied, the wage distribution 
is constant, as this is more or less the case in Europe.
Unemployment only affects unskilled: wages of the skilled are perfectly flexible and it is 
assum ed th a t the dem and for the skilled is high enough for their wage being always higher 
th an  the wage of the miskilled, such th a t they do not supply their labour force in the unskilled 
segment.
4 .2 .5  E n d o g en o u s  p a r tic ip a tio n
Participation is modelled as a s ta tic  extension of the neo-classical model of labour supply to 
unemployment. In first period of their fife, young' workers not enrolled in education all pa r­
ticipate: empirically, participation rates of female workers not enrolled in education are higher 
a t lower age and then decline with age. Some heterogeneity in the  work force is introduced, 
which allows to endogeneise the participation rate  in second period. Assume th a t workers face 
a shock on utility of leisure in the beginning of the second period. This leads to a d is tr ib u ­
tion of reservation wages wr in the population, with cum ulative density function F (.). This 
reservation wage is a pecuniary equivalent of u tility  when inactive. In second period, those 
with lower than  expected equilibrium wage will participate. This means th a t the  participation 
decision is made a t the beginning of the period, and is irreversible. The participation rate  of 
the unskilled in second period is thus p1 = F{et..wIt )b and the participation rate  of the skilled 
is ps  = F ( w f ) >  p1.
4 .3  M o d e l  W it h o u t  E d u c a t io n
The model without education is a useful benchmark, where a lot of instability arises. The only 
skilled workers are the experienced ones, whose labour supply is L f  =  L f  x ) and the unskilled 
are the  young workers and the old inexperienced workers, whose labour supply is L[r =  L}' + L{.
5T his way of modelling the effect of unemployment on particiaption is a very static one. A more dynamic 
formulation offers more realism at the cost o f more complexity. See for instance Burdett and al. (1984).
4 .3 .1  L abour supp ly
The tim e structure  of the model will provide the following dynam ic labour supply equations:
LX = Ft (4 .2)
i f*  = LU-et-i.p?x (4 .3)
where p f x is the participation ra te  of the experienced workers, and e-t is the employment rate 
of the  unskilled workers, which is common to both  young and old unskilled. Finally,
Ll = L l v {\ -  et-,).pl  (4.4)
where pi is the participation rate  of the old miskilled workers. Replacing the participation rates
with the neo-classical labour supply defined previously, the ratio  of skilled to unskilled workers
in the labour force is:
L f*  n - v F ( w ? )
(4 .5;
L f  +  L[ (1 +  fit) +  (1 — c t- i)-F (c t.w ] )
1 L ^ xand the ratio of skilled to miskilled workers in employment is simply —-TyF t t -1 L't
4 .3 .2  T h e  p e r fe c tly  f lex ib le  eco n o m y
I11 th is case, wages are equal to the m arginal productivity  of labour at full-employment, e-t — 1 
for all t.
P r o p o s i t io n  1. In a flexible economy, higher participation (a shift in the function F to the 
right) reduces inequality, larger cohort size increase it. Incre:.ased demand fo r  skilled wor'kers 
also increases inequality^.
P ro o f .
If wages are flexible, then the m axim ization of profit for the representative firm leads to 
equalize the marginal revenue of each type of labour to  wages. This first order condition plus
6 On this last point, the proof is made in the Cobb-Douglas ease only, but the property is certainly more 
general.
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the constant retu rn  to  scale property of technology imply the existence of a function g(.) linking 
the ratio  of wages to the  ratio  of employment, such th a t 1 = g ( Lt ) where g1 >  0 ,wt T-L/t
anti where r  is the relative dem and for skilled in the technology. Similarly, / r  — h (—Ly ^ L),
s T
where /?.(.) has the same property  as p(.). Therefore, w f  = r.h[g~^ ( l / r .^ f r ) ] .  Then, using (4.5) 
w ith e-t =  1 , we have:
4  =  r .a  f-----1+nt , )  (4.6)
\ r . F { r . % - > ( l / r . ^ ) l } /
The second term  of (4.6) is a decreasing function of the ratio Therefore, there is one and 
only one ratio  of wages, given by the fixed point. The left hand side of (4.6) defines a curve 
denoted by (MPL) of the ratio  of marginal product of labour of skilled to miskilled, represented 
on figure (4-1). This ratio  is decreasing in with higher wages, more skilled workers supplywt
their labour force, which reduces the ratio of m arginal products. W hen this curve is higher, 
the equilibrium ratio  is higher. W ithout ambiguity, the (MPL) curve is shifted upwards
wt
when n t  is increased. Higher participation of the skilled (higher F) shifts the curve upwards. 
The effect of r i s  ambiguous. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, g(x) — x  
and h(x) = x l ~n where a  is the share of efficient skilled labour. Then, equation (4.6) becomes 
and w ithout am biguity a higher r  shifts the (MPL) curve to  the right,
;SW  _  1 + 7 1 ,
Wt
increasing the equilibrium  ratio  ■
R e m a rk . Higher participation per se is not bad. However, if higher participation means 
more young workers, it can generate wage inequality between old and young. Similarly, if m o r e  
participation means more high turnover workers, i.e. old workers leaving the labour force in 
second period (represented by higher n t and a lower F ), then  the adverse effects (more young 
and less skilled) are added up.
4 .3 .3  A  p e r fe c tly  r ig id  eco n o m y
W hen there is wage rigidity, a lot of instability can arise. Shocks on employment of unskilled 
in period t  can be amplified next period, since some workers will be prevented from acquiring 
enough skill in period t +  1 . (liven the complementarity, the dem and for the  miskilled workers 
will be even lower, and so on.
w  s /w  u
Figure 4-1: Equilibrium of the ratio of marginal productivities of skilled and unskilled workers
e(t)
Figure 4-2: Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with high demand for the  unskilled
P ro p o s it io n  2. In an economy with relative wage rigidity, the dynamics o f employment 
is represented by one o f the 5 possible cases, displayed in the figures 4~% to 4~^- In the first 
one, there is one stable equilibrium, e-t — 1. In the second, there is one unstable equilibrium 
0 <  et < 1 and two stable, e-t = I, and e-t =  0. The third one has only ct =  0 as stable 
equilibrium. The fourth one will have one stable equilibrium 0 < et <  1 and ct =  0 as unstable 
equilibrium. The fifth one has two equilibria between 0 and 1 , the higher stable, the lower 
unstable, while 0  is also stable equilibrium.
To prove proposition 2, consider the following lenmias.
L e m m a  1 . I f  participation is constant, F  — I, then only the first three cases in figures 
to 4~4 arc possible.
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e(t-1
Figure 4-3: Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with interm ediate demand for the unskilled
e(t)
e(t-l
Figure 4-4: Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with low demand for the unskilled
e(t)
Figure 4-5: Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with endogenous participation and high 
demand for the unskilled
147
[ e< t-1 )
Figure 4-6: Dynamics of employment, rigid economy with endogenous participation and low 
demand for the unskilled
P ro o f. Assume that ^  =  7 : the constraint on wages is binding. Then, equation (4.5) gives:
„   e t- iF (w f) _________________________________________________________ .
*“ (1 + n t ) +  (1 -  r '7 ( '
where At ,7  is a constant depending only on the technology (relative dem and for the skilled and
elasticity of substitution). In a OES case, At ,7 =  {Tl )  a■, and so decreasing in the relative
dem and for skills, and also in the indexation rate. W ith F  =  1 , equation (4.7) defines an
increasing convex function et{et 1) such that et(0 ) = 0  and so the three possible situations of
figures 4-2 to 4-4. The upper limit for et is 1, in which case the wage constraint in no longer
binding. ■
The first three cases define situations in which the usual equilibrium mechanisms, flexibility 
of wages or endogeneity of participation are absent. This is why the second or the th ird  case 
happen, if the demand for low skilled workers is sufficiently low: unemployment last period 
leads to less qualified workers next period and so less demand for the unskilled given the 
complementarity between skilled and unskilled and so on. Tliis intertemporal multiplier effect 
of unemployment generates pa th  dependence and hysteresis through the skill level of the active 
population. W hat happens when there is enough flexibility of participation?
L e m m a  2. The function ct.(et-1) is still increasing, but can be concave. The curve mapping 
the function is above the curve at full participation ( F  =  1)  for low et- 1 and below fo r  high 
e -t - i.
P ro o f. First, notice that wages are independent of time: they depend on relative employment,
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itself depending- on the relative wage by the inverse relative dem and, and so depending only on 
7 . Denote ct by y, and et_i by x, and the derivatives of y  w ith respect to  x  by y', t/” etc...Then, 
'{ / [ (1  +  n) +  (1  — x )F (y .w u ) +  (1 — x);y .w (J f ( y .w u )] = F (ius ) +  y .F (y .w u ) and clearly y' >  0. 
Then, denoting A =  ( l + n )  +  (l — x  )F (y .w u ) +  (1  — x) .y .w u f  (y .wu ), this gives:
A.iy” = y '.[2 .F (y.w u ) +  2 .wu .y .f( y .w u ) -  2(1 -  x ) .w u .1/ . f ( y .w lJ) -  (1  -  x ) .(w u )2.y .f '\  (4.8)
A necessary and sufficient condition for the concavity of the curve e t(e t_ i) is y ” <  0. Since 
A  >  0, it is sufficient to  have a high enough /  or f  for having a negative y ” in (4.8). The 
economic in terpretation  of high /  or / '  a t some point :ro is tha t participation is very elastic 
to  expected wage around tliis point. Then, many workers will quickly leave the labour force 
if the  expected wage decreases too much, which will increase their m arginal product given the 
concavity of the production function. This drives the concavity of the dynam ic equation (4.7), 
th a t insures th a t 0 is not the only stable equilibrium  in figures 4-5 and 4-6. On the second part 
of the lemma, it is sufficient to write the sign of \ ijf=  l ~ y  \ t °  £et (1 + h ).u t . ( 1  — F (w h)) — a:(l — 
x ) . [ F( w e ) — F (x .w u )] which is positive for low x  and negative for x close to  1 . M 
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
4 .3 .4  In te r m e d ia te  flex ib ility : th e  w a g e  cu rve
P r o p o s i t io n  3. The dynamics o f employment is represented 071 figure (4~V- There are multiple, 
steady-state equilibria. The. stability o f the. low one is insured by flexibility o f participation. The 
stability o f the high one. is insured by the wage pressure.
P ro o f . Using (4.1) into (4.5) and a marginal product for unskilled labour condition, we have 
a dynam ic function of the type:
 _________ e t- iF (w f )
( 1  + n t) +  (1 -  et- \) .F {c t.w \J)
In the case w ith constant participation and perfect wage rigidity, the curve would be strictly 
increasing from 0  to  1 from proposition 2 . A round e-t =  1, low unemployment rates lead to  wage 
pressures, th a t take an extrem e form since wages goes to infinity when et goes to  1 . This means 
th a t the  curve et(<7 _i) has a second concavity area around 1. This is represented in figure 4-7.
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e(t)
S  Unstable Eq
Stable Eq
Unstable Eq
X  Stable Eq
e(t-l)
Unstable Eq
Figure 4-7: Dynamics of employment, wage curve with endogenous participation
The first concavity of the curve was dem onstrated in the last sub-section and arises from the 
feed-back implied by low participation at low wage. The second concavity a t high employment 
comes from wage pressure. This implies tha t there are now two interior stable equilibria, the 
two extreme intersections with the 45 degree line. The intersection between those two equilibria 
is an unstable equilibrium, as is 0  and 1 . ■
P ro p o s it io n  4. A temporary shock on nt can lead to a permanent change, o f equilibrium. 
Static adverse effects like a lower equilibrium employment, or lower participation are driven 
by: larger cohorts, higher demand for skills, larger indexation rate, excess in the participation 
o f the unskilled with respect to the skilled. Dynamic adverse, effects (the existence o f and the 
switch to a low employme nt, equilibrium) are drive n, by the irreversibility o f skill loss because o f 
unemployment, and an: reinforced by the same four factors.
P ro o f. All comes from the fact that nt, r , 7 and an increase in F(ct,w \‘) relative to F ( u f)  
tends to lower the curve linking et and e t - 1 . ■
Among these results, there are two that deserve further comments.
• Participation and unemployment rates are negatively linked, because participation dee.i-
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sions are endogenous. High unemployment levels may slowdown participation growth, as 
it is likely the case in countries with high female unemployment. This result is very close 
from what appears in chapter 2 : cross-country regressions of unem ploym ent on partici­
pation show a clear endogeneity of participation. Once participation is instrum ented, a 
negative correlation can be found between unemployment and participation.
•  Active population growth, equal to the growth ra te  of the cohorts in a steady growth, is 
positively correlated with unemployment, as also appeared in chapter 2 .
4 .3 .5  C o n c lu sio n s
In this section, the dynam ic m ultiplier effect of shocks, on the average skill of active population 
has been highlighted. It has been shown th a t the key mechanism, the persistence and  amplifi­
cation of unemployment, is not dependent on any particu lar wage setting  mechanism, and th a t 
different wage setting institutions produce the same dynamics. In this model, contrary  to most 
of the  theoretical constructions, increased labour force can have adverse effects, not only in the 
short run but also in the long rim. This is basically because, i f  there is an excess o f  low skill 
labour supply, the young are prevented from  accumulating experience and this can be amphjiea 
next period. Com petition between demographic groups, as argued in chapter 2, can reinforce 
the phenomenon, if there are other demographic groups substitu tes with the young workers. 
Here the adverse effects clearly have a dynamic nature.
4 .4  E d u c a t io n
The debate on unemployment and inequality has focused on the dem and and supply of edu­
cation, therefore this section is extended to  education. In Becker’s theory of hum an capital, 
education is an investment according to an arbitrage between the cost of education (postponed 
activity, direct cost of education) and the benefits, mainly higher productiv ity  and wages. 
T here are other positive private returns to education: unemployment probabilities or duration 
are lower for educated workers. In the European case, it is very likely th a t the fear of unemploy­
ment is a strong incentive for young workers to acquire education, given the strong differentials 
of unemployment between skill categories. A similar argum ent was given in Saint-Paul (1993).
The supply of education will be the answer to disequilibrium  situations: when wage inequal­
ity or unemployment will rise, the incentive for the young- workers to  differ their entrance on the 
labour m arket will increase. Agents can, either go to university and  work only the second period 
of their life, directly as skilled worker, or choose to work in their first period as unskilled and if 
lucky enough to acquire enough job experience, work as skilled in second period. For simplicity, 
it is assum ed th a t education is a binary choice: there are only two levels of education, 0  and 1 . 
Participation to the labour m arket is now assumed for all workers in second period. The young 
workers only a rb itra te  between education and activity. The expected life-time income of those 
w ith education is then:
7t(cd =  l) =  0 +  (4.10)
with ft a discount factor, and the expected life-time income of those w ithout education is:
I  t(cd  =  0) =  et.wl+} +  ft[ct,-wf+i +  (1 — et).€t+ iWt+i] (4-11)
Denote by st the share of a  cohort th a t get educated. The dynam ic labour supply equations 
are now:
L ? x =
L fd =  s t - i . / V i
L'i =  ( i  -  H ).Pt +  a - i . ( i  -  -  * t - i )
In (4.13), the unskilled are those w ithout education nor experience.
4 .4 .1  S u p p ly  o f  e d u c a tio n  in  s te a d y -s ta te  eq u ilib r ia
I solve the model in a steady-state, numerical simulations are offered out of steady-state  in 
appendix. There are three possible steady-state equilibria. The first equilibrium  is such th a t 
M i)  <  A(0): there are no educated workers in this economy: $t =  0. The second equilibrium  is 
such th a t I t( l)  =  It.(0 ): there is a fraction 0  <  st < 1 of workers th a t is educated, this fraction 
being determ ined by the condition above. The th ird  equilibrium  is such th a t 7t ( l)  >  h(0):
(4.12)
(4.13)
there are only educated workers in tills economy: $t =  1. The selection of the equilibrium 
depends both  on the labour market conditions and on com plem entarity between skill groups.
P r o p o s i t io n  5. In  the flexible economy, i f  skilled and unskilled are complement, then equi­
librium 3 (without unskilled) is impossible. In both the rigid and the flexible economies, i f  
experienced and educated are complement, the equilibrium 1 (without educated workers) is im ­
possible.
P ro o f . The com plem entarity insures an Lnada condition, which makes th a t in all cases, if one 
factor of production is not supplied, there is an infinite dem and for it, such th a t an equilibrium 
w ithout this factor is not possible. ■
Here the question is how the level of education endogenously evolves in response to the 
different shocks on technology and population growth. In order to have an interior solution 
such th a t It( 1 ) — I t(0 ), it will be assum ed th a t the three inputs (unskilled, experienced and 
educated workers) are complement in the production. In w hat follows, I consider only the 
steady-state  equilibrium. Assume the condition for the interior solution 7(1) =  7(0). This is a 
free-entry condition into education, or a supply curve of education:
ft.(w Ed -  e.w Ex) =  cvu/7[l +  ft ( l -  e)\ (4.14)
A more flexible representation of supply of education is represented in appendix, when lags are 
introduced in the response of workers to changes in the returns to education.
4 .4 .2  D e m a n d  for E d u c a tio n
It appears th a t the degree of substitu tab ility  between education and experience is not especially 
relevant as long as the lnada  conditions described in the previous proposition are satisfied. Then, 
I have chosen the following Cobb-Douglas production function, winch simplifies the equations:
Y  =  (A rf)1_ft~*(Arfd)ft( N f a )*
where a  is thought as a dem and shift param eter on education, and <5 as a dem and shift param eter 
on experience. M arginal product of labour conditions will provide the equation of dem and for 
education.
4.4 .3  T h e rigid  econ om y
Assume as before a relative wage rigidity, of the type: It can be rew ritten as:
~~ F ~ r b = 7-e-1(1+ n ) + (1 - £,)1 (415)
This equation states th a t the ratio  of the m arginal product of the. skilled to  the unskilled must 
be equal to  the indexation rate. It can be in terpreted  as a dem and for education condition: the 
higher the level of education, the lower their relative productivity  with respect to  the unskilled 
and so the higher the dem and for them , so the higher their employment. Replacing the wage 
constraint in the  supply condition on education now yields:
P - T ^ —  +  e-7(l + £ (1  -  <■’)) =  P (4.16)a  1 — s
which defines a negative relation between education and employment: the higher unemployment, 
the  higher the incentives for young workers to acquire education. It can be observed th a t o  an< 1 
8 have opposite effects: a rise in the dem and for education makes education more attractive, 
bu t an increase in the dem and for experience makes activity in first period more attractive, so 
education less attractive. The equilibrium can be m apped in plane (e, s) as illustrated  in figure 
4-8.
P r o p o s i t io n  6 . In  this steady-state, equilibrium, we have: >  0, ^  0, >  0,
f  < 0 and | f  0, ■§ < 0.
P ro o f . See figure 4-8. ■.
The demographic shock (increased n) explains higher unemployment for the  unskilled and 
higher education. In contrast, each of the technological param eters explains only one styl­
ized fact, whereas their effect is ambiguous for one of the two equilibrium  quantities s and 
e (represented by the symbol ^ ) .
4 .5  E m p ir ic a l  E v id e n c e
The model shows th a t labour supply trends of more inexperienced workers produce adverse 
effects 011 labour m arkets th a t can be interpreted as a shift in dem and for labour in favour of
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Figure 4-8: S teady-state dem and and supply of education
the skilled. This empirical section has two objectives. First, it is to complement chapter 3 in 
docum enting the trends in labour supply. The first subsection shows how the share of young 
and female workers evolved in the OECD during the last 30 years. The second subsection aims 
to  show th a t the average num ber of efficiency units of employment experience of these groups 
are lower than  the average.
The second objective is to show th a t one im portan t prediction of the  model is consistent 
with observed time-series evolution of the labour force. This prediction is th a t higher education 
is indirectly caused by the labour supply trends. The labour supply trends generate crowding 
out and therefore unemployment in the first period of workers’ life, preventing them  from 
accum ulating skills. Young workers have stronger incentives to  acquire education. In the th ird  
subsection, I borrow from the previous chapter to decompose the changes in labour supply in a 
high unemployment economy, France, with a historical perspective over the last 30 years: more 
inexperienced workers in the  labour force followed, as implied by the model, by an increase in 
the supply of education in the mid 1970’s.
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Table 4.1: Share of women in the labour force, source: (.)
USA Europe (12) Europe (1 1 ) France
1962 0.327 - - -
1968 0.355 - - 0.345
1975 0.391 - 0.350 0.374
1982 0.427 0.373 0.374 0.405
1992 0.451 0.401 0.410 0.440
ICE)
Table 4.2: Share of 25-34 y.o. in the labour force, source ILO (1990 figure =  projection
USA N orthern Europe Southern Europe W estern Europe
1960 0.207 0.197 0.245 0.216
1970 0.206 0.203 0.226 0.235
1980 0.274 0.239 0.260 0.260
1990 0.289 0.238 0.274 0.269
4 .5 .1  L ab ou r su p p ly  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e  la b ou r force
The tables 4.1 and 4.2 docum ent the changes in the age and gender composition of the labour 
force. It appears clearly th a t there are more women and to some extent, more young workers 
defined as the 25-34 years old 7. Europe (12) refers to the  12 members of the European Union, 
Europe ( 1 1 ) excludes Greece for which no d a ta  were available before 1977. For more details on 
the composition of the countries in table (4.2), see the figure 3.2 of chapter 3.
4 .5 .2  R e a l e x p e r ie n c e
The d a ta  of the French survey Actifs Financiers 1992 were made available by INSEE. This is 
a unique dataset in which individuals declared the num ber of years they worked in part-tim e 
and full tim e employment since the s ta rt of their working life. Daniel Verger (INSEE-CREST) 
provided me with an updated  dataset including a correction for some m isreported variables 
(spells of employment due to complicated trajectories, correction for domestic employees). The 
description of the variables and the instrum ents is reported  in appendix. The goal here is to 
show the difference between real and potential experience (potential experience is age minus 
age of end of schooling, the  usual proxy in 90% of the studies), and accordingly, to understand  
to w hat extent women can be considered as ”young” in the sense of low experienced.
7T he choice of those older than 25 was to avoid any interference with the rising enrolment in higher education.
Table 4.3: France 1992, cell averages, men in the labour force
Men R e a l E x p . P o t .  E x p . % G a p F T + 1 / 2 P T
All 20.7 yrs 22.9 yrs 0.096 20.3 yrs
exp  < 1 0 5.9 yrs 6.6 yrs 0.106 5.6 yrs
11 <  exp  <  20 14.0 yrs 15.5 yrs 0.097 13.7 yrs
21 <  exp  <  30 23.3 yrs 25.2 yrs 0.075 22.8 yrs
exp > 31 33.2 yrs 34.4 yrs 0.035 32.8 yrs
Quart ile 1 17.9 yrs 20.7 yrs 0.135 17.2 yrs
Quart ile 2 19.5 yrs 21.5 yrs 0.093 19.0 yrs
Quartile 3 22.2 yrs 23.8 yrs 0.067 21.9 yrs
Quartile 4 23.1 yrs 24.2 yrs 0.045 22.8 yrs
The tables 4.3 and 4.4 report real experience, potential experience and their relative differ­
ence (% Clap) in different cells of the active population. The first row represents the average 
(potential or real) experience of all active men (or women), the rows 2 to  5 sort individuals 
according to potential experience and the last 4 rows sort them  according to the quartile of 
hourly wage (in this case, the sample is restricted to the active employed). The th ird  column is 
the relative difference between potential and real experience. The last column reports the real 
experience corrected for non-full tim e work (=  years in full-time +  1/2 years in part-tim e). It 
appears quite clearly from the tables th a t even in 1992, the average real experience of women 
is lower than  their potential experience, by 16%. W hen com pared to men, it appears th a t the 
high skill women have actually similar experience levels as men have: the  relative gap between 
real and potential experience is 10%, close to  the m en’s average. Finally, young workers of bo th  
gender have difficulties w ith their first job: the gap is 10.6% for men, and 17% for women. These 
averages in the different cells do not only reflect the participation behaviour of the workers in 
1992, bu t the past of the workers. It appears th a t the oldest women (exp > 30) have much 
larger differences between actual and potential experience, about 2 2 %, while the corresponding 
figure is 3.5% for men. A nother point is th a t controlling for the num ber of years in part-tin i ' 1 
activities (assumed to  count as half of full-time years), the difference in experience between 
men and women and between low wage and high wage workers is even more im portant (fourth 
colum n).
Next, the goal is to  compare the return  of real experience. This will allow to get an estim ate 
of the num ber of efficiency units of experience supplied by different groups. Consider the
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Table 4.4: France 1992, cell averages, women in the labour force
Women R e a l E x p . P o t .  E x p . % G a p F T + 1 / 2 P T
All 17.8 yrs 21.4 yrs 0.168 15.9 yrs
exp  <  10 5.3 yrs 6.4 yrs 0.172 4.8 yrs
11 <  exp < 20 13.4 yrs 15.6 yrs 0.141 12.1 yrs
21 <  exp  <  30 21.9 yrs 25.3 yrs 0.134 19.9 yrs
exp > 31 29.7 yrs 37.9 yrs 0.216 26.2 yrs
Quartile 1 17.2 yrs 21.4 yrs 0.196 13.3 yrs
Quartile 2 17.2 yrs 20.5 yrs 0.161 15.5 yrs
Quartile 3 17.9 yrs 18.0 yrs 0.006 17.0 yrs
Quartile 4 20.8 yrs 23.4 yrs 0.111 19.9 yrs
following econometric model of wage determ ination.
u>i =  C  +  a .E duca tion i +  fi. E xperience i +  et
om itting the higher order term s (quadratic experience, or in table 4.8 an interaction term s) for 
simplicity - of course they are included in the regressors. The results are reported  in tables
4.5 and 4.6. It would be necessary to correct for the selection bias due to unemployment. 
However, instrum ents correlated with the probability of unemployment bu t not with wages 
will be ra ther difficult to find. Endogeneity of real experience is controlled for by instrum ental 
variables (column labelled I V ) 8.
These tables can be used to  calculate how many years of work experience are necessary to an 
unskilled (no diploma) to reach the initial wage of a worker of the highest diplom a category. The 
answer is sum m arized in the table 4.7. The last row represent the average re tu rn  to experience 
on the 2 0  first years of employment, taking account of the concavity in the re tu rn  to experience. 
Even when comparing the retu rn  to  true experience instead of potential experience, it appears
8Since the interest is about the price of skill w ith respect, to the active population (i.e. the conditional 
mean o f wages for participants to the labour force), there should be no need to control for selection bias to 
participation. This point is not commonly accepted, and som e may think of a structural model of wage offers, 
such that participants are those whose offer in the wage offers distribution is higher than their reservation wage. 
By this logic, the interesting concept to be measured is the conditional mean of wage offers given the level of 
education and of experience. Therefore, since the distribution of wage offers and of accepted wage offers do not 
coincide, selection of participation should be accounted for. The results of estim ation using sim ple estim ators o* 
Heckman two-step m ethod to correct for self-selection of women will be jointly presented in the paper (columns 
GLS or Heckman). The instruments are: (Age - Age of First Paid A ctivity) and its square, a dummy variable 
for married. In addition for women, the number of children of less than 3, 6 and 18 years old and a dummy for 
the participation of mother.
Table 4.5: France 1992, variable: Log Hourly Wage
M e n G LS IV
Experience 0.049 (0.002) 0.050 (0.002)
Exp. Sq. (xlOO) -0.078 (0.005) -0.081 (0.005)
Educ=5 0.049 (0.026) 0.050 (0.025)
Educ.=8 , Non Voc.. 0.309 (0.024) 0.307 (0.024)
Educ=12, Non Voc. 0.491 (0.032) 0.491 (0.032)
Educ=8 , Voc. 0.184 (0.020) 0.183 (0.021)
Educ=12, Voc. 0.448 (0.035) 0.447 (0.035)
Educ=14 0.654 (0.029) 0.652 (0.029)
Educ>15 0.939 (0.027) 0.938 (0.027)
R2 0.356 0.356
N olxs 3 641 3 641
Table 4.6: France 1992, variable: Log- Hourly Wage
W om en G L S IV Heckm an
Experience 0.030 (0.004) 0.031 (0.003) 0.029 (0.005)
Exp. Sq. (xlOO) -0.042 (0.010) -0.044 (0.007) -0.038 (0.011)
Educ=5 0.028 (0.060) 0.030 (0.037) 0.032 (0.058)
Educ=8 , Non Voc. 0.367 (0.048) 0.367 (0.033) 0.332 (0.046)
Educ=12, Non Voc. 0.482 (0.058) 0.481 (0.041) 0.439 (0.057)
Educ=8 , Voc. 0.216 (0.051) 0.216 (0.033) 0.182 (0.050)
Educ=12, Voc. 0.499 (0.055) 0.498 (0.049) 0.446 (0.055)
Educ=14 0.739 (0.047) 0.738 (0.036) 0.685 (0.046)
Educ>15 0.903 (0.055) 0.902 (0.042) 0.844 (0.055)
Mills ratio -0.223 (0.066)
r '2 0.239 0.239 0.251
N obs 3 108 3 108 2 984
Table 4.7: France 1992, Comparaison Experience /  Education
Simulation: number of years 
of experience equivalent to:
M en W om en
Educ.= 12, Vocational
Educ=14
Educ>15
Educ>15 - Educ.= 12, Non Voc. 
Average return to exp in % (20 yrs)
13 years 23 years 
20 years Never 
Never Never 
12 years 2 0  years 
3.34 2.16
Table 4.8: France 1992, estim ated interaction term s between education and experience
GLS Men Women
All coef. xlOO 
Educ=5
E due= 8, Non Voc 
E duc= 8, Voc 
Educ=12, Non Voc 
Educ=12, Voc 
Educ=14 
Educ>  15
Real Exp Real Exp 
0.64 (0.41) 1.22 (0.59) 
1.12 (0.32) 0.96 (0.45) 
0.51 (0.49) 1.38 (0.50) 
0.60 (0.28) 0.39 (0.46) 
0.97 (0.48) 1.56 (0.52) 
0.32 (0.42) 0.34 (0.45) 
0.52 (0.46) -0.06 (0.56)
th a t the  average retu rn  of men is higher by 45%: it is 3.34%) for men whereas it is 2.16% for 
women. It can be seen th a t the average retu rn  to education is com pensated in 13 to 23 years, 
bu t th a t the wage gap between workers with no diplom a and workers with the highest level of 
education can never be to ta lly  covered.
For completeness, the table 4.8 reports the coefficients of an interaction term  between diplo­
mas and experience when it is added to the specification in the wage equation. These interaction 
term s are never very significant, contrary to what is usually found when real experienced is prox- 
ied by potential experience. W hen in addition a quadratic  interaction term  is added, none of 
the  interaction coefficients are significant a t the 5% level. The conclusion of tables 4.5 to 4.7 
are not altered by the interaction term s.
4 .5 .3  T im in g  o f  th e  ch a n g es in  th e  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e  la b o u r  force
The figure 4-9 summarizes an exercise made in the previous chapter. The idea is to  decompose 
the fitted hourly wage from a wage equation of all individuals in the labour force into two 
components, experience (on the x-axis) and education (on the y-axis). The points represent the 
average of the efficiency units of the labour force in each of these two dimensions for each year
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France: Skill Composition of the Labor Force 
in Efficiency Units of Experience (x-axis) and Education (y-axis) 
at constant price (1970)
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Figure 4-9: Tim ing of the changes in the composition of the labour force. Source FQ P and 
chapter 3
1970, 77, 85 and 93. The re tu rn  to  education and the retu rn  to  experience are chosen in a given 
year, 1970, bu t the result do not depend on the choice of the reference year. The wage equations 
allow for female-male wage differences in the intercept, the retu rn  to  education and experience. 
It appears from the graph th a t the first large shift in the skill composition of the labour force is 
a decline during the period 1970-77 in the experience level, for reasons investigated in chapter 
3 (namely, women and young). Over the same period, there is an increase in the efficiency 
level of education. In a second step, after 1977, the decrease in the average efficiency units of 
experience of the labour force decelerates, and there is a strong rise in supply of education. 
As predicted by the model, the rise in the education level of the labour force is following the 
decline in experience.
4 .6  C o n c lu s io n
In the paper, it is argued th a t one should explain the evolution of inequality and  unemployment 
taking in account all the labour supply changes. Demographic changes (age and gender) were 
im portan t in all OECD labour m arkets and they have to  be considered.
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The model explores the dynam ic implication of these changes (age and gender, i.e. less 
experienced workers). It allows to disentangle the effects of labour dem and and labour supply 
shocks. W hen the labour supply shocks are shocks of more inexperienced workers, their effects 
are exactly the same as the effects of labour dem and to more skilled workers: decrease in the 
wage of the unskilled, increase in unemployment, hysteresis in unemployment, and increased 
supply of educated workers.
In the last section, I present a sum m ary of empirical findings about experience th a t justify 
the  model. First, there are age and gender differences in the quantities of experience supplied, 
and gender differences in the retu rn  to  experience. Therefore, the increasing share of young 
and women in the labour force can be seen as an increase in the supply of workers supplying 
few efficiency units of experience. Second, tim ing of the  changes in the  skill composition of 
the  labour force is consistent with the model in a high unemployment economy, France: higher 
education follows the changes in the age and gender composition of the labour force.
• A ppendix: reduced form  o f th e  production  technology
Assume that Y  =  F ( K , N s , A/77) =  K a . ( N S )^. (A77)7 for instance. The marginal product of 
capital must in the long run be equal to the interest rate r  (assumed exogenous). It follows that K  — 
r /a .[ (W by . ( A f/)7]V(1~a)- Replacing in the production function, Y  =  (N 5)0/(1-« ) .(A t/)7/(1~O!) (times 
an uninteresting constant). With a further assumption of constant return to scale of production 
cx +  +  7  =  1, one can write Y  as a CR.S function of N S and /V77.
• A ppendix: dynam ics w ith  education
In the flexible case, it is possible to study the dynamics of adjustment. Assume for instance that 
supply of education adjusts with lags to demand. For instance, assume the following dynamics:
where A characterizes the speed of adjustment. Then, in replacing the relative wages in (4.17), the 
following dynamics holds :
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Dynamics of Adjustment of Education for 
different values of lambda (0.4, 0.1, 0.25)
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Figure 4-10: Dynamics of Adjustment of Education W ith different Speeds of Adjustment
=  s t - i  +  A
l - o  -  6
a/3 .a .
S t - 2
1 — Sf-2
a s i I
1 -  S t-1
1-rt Sf- 1
a 1 -  st-t - i
(4.18)
with G  =  (1 +  r i t - i ) a+5 (1 -I- n t)~ rt-<5-1.
The dynamics is easy to simulate. What happens is that, when St_i is close to 1, the demand for 
unskilled is so high that there is a sharp decline in supply of education next period. There is a dynamics 
of overshooting convergence in education is realized in cycles of decreasing size, which happens when 
the speed of adjustment is sufficiently high. Figure 4-10 shows three paths of convergence towards the 
same limit. The curves are uniformly shifted upwards when ti t  and o  increase. The effect of a rise in 
<5 is ambiguous: it decreases the demand for unskilled, so makes education less costly, but increase the 
return to work experience, so the opportunity cost of education is higher.
• A p p e n d ix  : S u rv ey  A c tifs  F in a n c iers  1992. S o u rce  IN S E E .
In the survey Actifs Financiers 1992, individuals are asked a series of questions on then- past, including 
the age of end of schooling (variables JER201  or J  E G 201 for the person of reference of the household 
and his/her partner), the age of first paid job (variables AR2()\ or A C 201), the number of periods 
of employment interruptions (AR63  or AO(y3), the reason for it (unemployment, inactivity or disease, 
in AR64  or A(.-d4), and finally, real employment experience as measured by the number of years in
employment (defined as paid activity excluding ”Petits boulots”) (variables A/£65 and AG6b) and the 
number of years in full-time employment (AR66  and y4C’66). This is quite unique in micro-surveys, 
since usually employment experience is approximated by the potential experience or Mincer’s proxy (age 
- education - 5 or 6).
Education is defined by the highest diploma obtained in general or vocational classes, and if there is 
no diploma, the level reached (variables D IE G , D IE F \ D I E S  and N I V S A N ) .  It is defined by eight 
dummy variables (No Diploma, CEP, CAP or BEP, BEPC, Bac Technique, Bac General, Deug-Licence, 
Maitrise and higher) which correspond in order to: 5 years of schooling, 8 years vocational, 8 years 
general, 12 years vocational, 12 years general, 14 years and more than 15 years. This gives a balanced 
partition of the sample.
Annual wage earnings for 1990 includes premia and wages from temporary employment and sec­
ondary activities (variable REOlbl&nd 2 for the person of reference of the household and his/her part­
ner). Individuals declare the number of months corresponding (REO lbl and 2), as well as the percentage 
with respect to a full-time job (R E O ld l and 2). There is no problem of top-coding here. Then the log 
of hourly wage is defined as L o g (R E 0 lb l/R E O lc l  * R E O ld l / (39 * 4)) where 39 is the legal weekly 
number of hours.
The sample is restricted to the 15-65 years old, not retired. About 10% of the sample whose current 
or last activity was self-employment are excluded, since the return to experience in this type of activity 
may differ from the return to paid activity.
Standard data are used as instruments for endogeneity of participation of women: the number of 
children of age 3, 6 and 18, the number of individuals in the household, the marital status, the status of 
head of household (1 if yes), the activity of individual’s mother, the existence of an activity in the past, 
the year of constitution of household. To instrument real experience in wage equations, the same kind 
of variables were used.
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C hapter 5
C om p etition  for Jobs in a  G row ing  
E conom y and th e  E m ergence o f  
D ualism
A b s tra c t :  We aim to explain the rising share of short-term employment in Europe using a matching
model with growth. We find that a slowdown in growth of labour productivity leads to the 
emergence of temporary (short-term) jobs that explains their increasing share in total employment. 
Lower growth rates also shift the “Beveridge curve“ to the right and weaken the bargaining position 
of workers. These effects generate a relation between growth and unemployment, which can be 
negative when the adverse effect of growth on wage setting dominates over its positive effect on 
labour demand. In addition, higher population growth increases the share of temporary jobs and 
unemployment. Finally, the often blamed firing costs are found to be neutral when there is no 
floor on wages.
5 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
5 .1 .1  D u a lism  an d  th e  e m er g en ce  o f  d u a lism
Dualism generally characterizes a situation where there are two sectors with different technolo­
gies, w ith possible m igration of inputs from one sector to  another. In the  labour economics
context, dualism  can m ean bo th  two types of firms or workers. M anning (1993) argues th a t it 
was initially thought as a good description of the way labour m arkets work, especially in reac­
tion to competitive modelizations. hi Doeringer and Pi ore (1971), the  prim ary labour m arket is 
thought of as non com petitive and viewed as an internal labour m arket. F inns, generally large 
ones, offer employment stability, training, career prospects and high wages. Workers are skilled, 
do not quit often. In contrast, the secondary sector is more com petitive, firms are smaller, offer 
tem porary employment at lower wages, while workers leave more often, are likely to  be (in 
the US a t th a t time) black and living in the centre of the cities. These conditions reflects an 
extrem e heterogeneity, and obviously lead to  an extrem e polarization of jobs. M anning (1993), 
in B urdett and M ortensen’s (1989) framework, develops one of the few models where dualism 
emerges endogenously and with ex-ante identical workers. Using a job-search framework, he 
shows th a t, when there is uncertain ty  on the location of the  good jobs and search frictions, 
labour segm entation is possible with little deviation from the com petitive model, .
This paper shows the possibility of emergence and of stability of dualism  of jobs in a  model 
w ith ex-ante identical workers, with one representative firm and with perfect substitu tab ility  
of the two jobs in the production process. This is a different and unconventional notion of 
dualism  in which the firm can choose to advertise for two types of jobs. The first type th a t we 
call prim ary or long-term  jobs, have long duration and high turnover costs, characteristics o f 
the less com petitive jobs of Doeringer and Fiore. The alternative jobs have shorter duration 
and low or no turnover costs, and will be called secondary or short-term  (tem porary) jobs. In 
equilibrium, since workers cannot move freely from one job to another because of search frictions, 
long-term  jobs can have for workers strictly higher present-discounted values than  short-term  
ones. We characterize this equilibrium in a job search model with exogenous growth. We study 
how and when dualism  consisting of inequality among ex-ante identical workers arises, i.e. we 
study the process of emergence of dualism.
5 .1 .2  M o re  te m p o r a r y  co n tra cts: n eed  for f le x ib ility  or o th e r  factors?
Beyond the trad ition  of dual labour m arkets in economics, we are m otivated by macroeconomic 
considerations. In the  past decade, we have observed an increasing share of tem porary work in 
to ta l employment in Europe (from 4% to 10% between 1983 and 1991) and most strongly in
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Figure 5-1: Inflows into Unemployment per year, by cause
Spain and France where these shares tripled (see Bentolila and Dolado 1994). In France, this 
phenomenon has substantially changed the inflows into unemploym ent1. We consider data from 
the National Employment Agency (ANPE). The agency collects information from its 8000 local 
branches about each new unemployed person, along with the cause of his or her registration. 
These causes are one of the following: firing because of the economic conditions of the firm, 
other firing, end of a tem porary contract, end of an interim contract2, first entry, come back to 
the labour market and other cases. The sum of all the new entrants in a year is defined as r :o 
inflows into unemployment. These flows are depicted in figure 5-1.
It appears tha t much, if not all, of the increase of the inflows into unemployment is due to 
the tem porary contracts (63% of the increase) and completion of interim work (9%). Firing for 
economic reason represents merely 14% of the increase. O ther data, from INSEE DMMO not
1 A lot. of useful information on the labour market is revealed by data on flows of workers between the different 
states, as was argued in Burda and W yplosz (1993) or Blanchard and Diamond (1990). See Abowd et al. (1996) 
for an analysis on French establishments.
2 The distinction between the two kind of contracts, interim and temporary, is only that the interim contract is 
between a firm and the interim agency. For this reason and because the two concepts are close in the anglo-saxou 
countries, we will call “temporary work“ for all the jobs with defined duration.
reported  here, show th a t the rise of the  exits from employment because of the end of tem porary 
contracts is a general feature of men, women and 25-49 years old workers of bo th  gender.
This rise in the share of tem porary contracts is in terpreted  as a need for flexibility of workers, 
and as a way for firms to get round rigid employer/employees relationship for the existing jobs. 
The lack of flexibility of the existing jobs is linked to the existence of wage rigidities, or of high 
firing costs (see for instance Saint-Faul 1993). By contrast, frequent renewals of tem porary jobs 
are a convenient way for firms to  set wages at the marginal productivity  of workers, and their 
higher proportion in firms’ employment makes down-sizing easier by simply not replacing the 
tem porary  contracts. Then, in th a t logic, countries where the share of tem porary  contracts has 
increased are those where there is a lack, and therefore a need of flexibility.
It is difficult to deny th a t new environm ent faced by firms, including more volatility or 
uncertainty in the economy, higher degree of com petition within and among countries and 
.many other factors can explain why more flexibility is needed from workers is needed. However, 
we argue here th a t there are two other changes having affected economies in the long run, th a t 
can contribute to the  rising share of tem porary contracts.
First, there is the slowdown in productivity  growth: in the first 30 years following the end 
of Second W orld War, France like other European countries experienced a large productivity  
growth of around 5% a year. During the period 1965-74, this rate  was still around 4%. However, 
between 1975 and 1979 it was 2.5% and has further fallen to  1.7% between 1980 and 1994. It 
can be argued th a t W estern economies faced a changes in the  regime of growth between the 
1950- 60’s and the end 1970’s-80’s (see Cohen 1994). W hat are the consequences of a change 
of the growth regime on the labour m arkets? As discussed in introduction of the recent C E PR  
Report (1994), lower growth has been associated to higher unemployment in Europe and higher 
inequality in the US. In M anning (1992) for instance, it is argued th a t no convincing story of 
OECD unemployment can avoid to imply the slowdown in productivity  growth3. Similarly, we 
will argue th a t a slowdown in growth has an effect on the share of tem porary contracts in the 
economy.
The second factor is the rise in labour force by the increased participation of women to  the
3 In this model, technological growth leads to wage growth, so higher “ rents“ of being employed. Thus higher 
growth induces wage moderation and so less unemployment.
labour m arket and due to  bigger cohorts of young (with a peak in the USA in 1977, see Welch 
1979), b o th  trends implying more “ young” in the sense, of new entrants on the labour market. 
Because most of these en tran ts are first unemployed, this can be proxied by more flows from 
inactivity to unemployment like in the case of higher population growth. The rise in labour 
force participation leads to  decrease the congestion process of the labour m arkets. Congestion 
is thought here in the  sense of a negative externality between firms in the  m atching technology 
associating the unemployed and the vacant positions. This decrease in congestion may have 
affected the relative position of unemployed with respect to employers and their propensity to 
accept tem porary  contracts.
5 .1 .3  A  jo b -se a rch  m o d e l w ith  gro w th
In this paper, we consider the implications of lower productivity  growth and higher population 
growth (higher share of new entran ts in the labour force) for the labour m arkets, using the 
framework of equilibrium  unemployment theory by Pissarides (1990), th a t we extend to  the 
case of two kinds of jobs. We show th a t both  the apparition and the increasing quantity  of 
short-term  jobs arise endogenously as response of firms to these two factors taken exogen. >'.s 
The two basic: intuitions are simple:
•  In Pissarides’ model, the tightness of labour m arkets is increased by the capitalization 
effect of growth: higher expected profits tomorrow induce more hiring today. Hiring, 
which is costly, is therefore an investment. In periods of high sustained growth, first the 
lost profit (the opportunity  cost) of replacing workers is high and second, if there is high 
labour tightness, it is difficult for employers to  fill the vacancies. Therefore, it is im portant 
for firms to  retain  workers by offering them  long-duration contracts. By contrast, in a low 
growth regime, firms have stronger incentives to use short duration contracts, particularly 
if these contracts have other advantages, like weak bargaining power of the  employees, low 
firing costs and low search costs. The result of the analysis of this paper is to  show that, 
above a lim it of growth rate, depending on the search costs and exogenous reallocation 
rates, there are only long-term  jobs in the economy. Below this growth rate, the two types 
of jobs coexist, up  to a point where the marginal income generated by a job (the marginal 
product of labour minus wage, which is positive because of the monopsonistic; position of
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the firm) is the  same across jobs.
•  Population growth does not affect the  limit growth ra te  above which there is no coexis­
tence of the jobs, b u t increases the share of tem porary jobs when they exist. Indeed, more 
en tran ts into unemployment from inactivity make it less tim e consuming for firms to find 
new workers. This is the thick m arket externality of the  m atching process: more unem ­
ployed are good ceteris paribus by firms because search for firms is shorter. Therefore, 
the dem and for all workers increases and more for short duration contracts: the relative 
advantage of long-term  jobs for firms is their duration, because of the profit lost during 
replacement. If replacement is easy, then the relative advantage decreases, and  firm prefer 
workers in short-term  jobs.
This is the core of the paper, bu t the model also addresses o ther theoretical issues. A 
consequence of the rising share of tem porary contracts is th a t the entries into unemployment 
are rising by more job term inations. Then, the Beveridge curve (in the model, the  diagram  of 
unem ploym ent rates and vacancy rates in steady-state), is shifted to the right: more vacancies 
are needed to m aintain the same level of employment, or equivalently, a t constant rate of 
vacancies, there are more unemployed. This is an alternative explanation to the  shift of the 
Beveridge curve observed in the OECD countries4. A nother theoretical consequence of the 
model is a new relation between growth and unemployment. Indeed, there are classically two 
effects of growth on unemployment: the first one, the capitalization effect, implies th a t higher 
growth rates are associated with higher values of jobs and thus with increased labour demand. 
The other one, the destructive creation effect, implies th a t high growth rates make the existing 
jobs more quickly unproductive, because of obsolescence of old technologies5. Then there are 
more inflows into unemployment and new jobs have lower values. We find in our model a th ird  
effect of growth: higher growth increases the  average turnover costs, which increases the wage 
pressure and partially  or even to tally  offsets the capitalization effect of growth, such th a t the 
relation between growth and unemployment can be negative.
4T liis shift of the Beveridge curve is also in Pissarides (Chapter 5) when stochastic job  m atching is introduced. 
An increase o f the dispersion of match productivities shifts the curve to the right. We have the sam e result with  
an increase in the inequality between workers, i.e. wheii the share of short-term employment increases.
5T he capitalization effect is in the m odel, but we avoid the issues of creative destruction of Schumpeterian 
growth as modelled in Aghion-H owitt (1990), Cohen-Saint-Paul (1994) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1995).
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We then  try  to  provide empirical evidence for the mechanisms of the model. It is shown 
th a t the rise of the transition  probability between employment and unemployment in France 
is fully explained by the rising share of tem porary contracts, ending more frequently than  the 
average jobs. We test in a cross-section of 15 OECD countries the basic predictions of the 
model: the  share of tem porary contracts is an increasing function of the growth of labour force, 
and a decreasing function of the technological growth. Such a relationship seems to emerge 
from the data.
5 .2  T h e  m o d e l
We s ta r t from the classical model of growth in Pissarides (1990, §2), extended to  the case.'of 
two inputs of labour.
5 .2 .1  F irm s
There is an infinite num ber of atom istic firms, whose ou tpu t is aggregated in a production 
function which associates capital K  and efficiency units of labour N ,  augm ented with technical 
progress exp(gt): Y  =  F ( K ,  N.exp(gt))  where g is the growth rate  of labour productivity  and 
N  = L ( l  — u), with L  the labour force assumed constant, and (1  — u) the employment rate. The 
efficient units of labour are specified as follows. There are two different contracts: the long-term  
ones, w ith long duration and high turnover costs, i.e. w ith low exogenous Poisson separation 
(destruction) rate  si,  and firing costs th a t are a fraction f i  of the wage wp, and the short-term  
ones, w ith lower tenure and lower turnover costs, i.e. high exogenous separation rate  s 3, bu t 
w ithout firing costs. This is the legislation th a t distinguishes the two kinds of jobs6. We have to 
assume th a t there is no renewal of the tem porary contracts7. To keep the symmetry, we defin;1 
f s — 0 such th a t fi .Wi  is the  firing cost of job i, i = I, .s8. The two types of jobs are perfect
6 We can think the long-term jobs as undefined duration contracts, and in that case, .S; =  .sshock is an exogenous 
reallocation rate due to technical changes. The short-term jobs are defined duration contracts, and end either by 
destruction with probability <sshock, or because of their normal duration, which we proxy (im perfectly) as another 
Poisson process w ith arrival rate .send contract, then =  .send contract +  s^hock-
7T his is a realistic feature in m ost European countries - except UK, Ireland and Denmark, the nine other 
countries have such a legislative system . The duration of the temporary contracts is also lim ited in eight countries 
(the sam e nine minus Holland); see Grubb and W ells (1994) and appendix 5.
8 Exactly the same results are found if we suppose that firing costs are a fixed amount, and not indexed on 
wages.
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substitu tes in the production function, Y  = F ( K , ( N i  +  N s)exp(gt)).  Thus, the coexistence of 
two types of jobs relies only on an arbitrage between endogenous hiring costs and the expected 
profit of the job, depending positively on the duration of the contract. This is in contrast with 
m ost of the models studying tem porary contracts, where the coexistence is purely the result of 
an imperfect substitu tab ility  between the jobs.
5 .2 .2  S earch  an d  m a tch in g
Firm s post vacancies in order to hire workers. This process is costly and the flow cost of 
search is 7 0 i, higher for long-term  jobs. Unemployed workers are in num ber U = u.L.  L  is 
the  labour force, assum ed constant. There is a m atching technology associating vacancies and 
the unemployed, which is slightly more complicated than  usually. In Pissarides, the  num ber of 
m atch between IJ unemployed and V  vacancies is h(U, V)  per unit of time, where h is increasing 
in each of argum ent and concave. As there are two types of job, we have to  modify the m atching 
process (see figure 5-2):
D e f in it io n  1 . The matching technology with two types of  jobs is specified as follows: the 
total number of  contacts is h(U,Vi  +  Vs), workers, ranking the jobs I and s, c.hoosc the first 
kind of  job9, such that them arc h(l.J,V{) hiring in I, and h(U , Vi -I- Vs) — h(JJ,Vi) hiring in s.
The implicit assum ption is th a t the unemployed are ex-ante identical, b u t some are lucky 
enough to  get an undefined duration contract, some other are less lucky and get a tem porary 
contract, and some other rem ain unem ployed10. The job offers are assum ed to  be accepted 
by the workers. We shall call y y  = Vs/ (U  +  Vs) the share of the short-term  vacancies. We 
denote by Oi =  Vi/ lJ , the ratio  of vacancies of type i to  the num ber of unemployed. Then, the 
probability for a firm of filling a vacancy I is the num ber of hiring in I divided by the nm nber 
of vacancies /,
9 This definition of an equilibrium (the workers prefer jobs I to jobs s) implies that the present discounted 
value of job I is always higher than of job s. This is a necessai'y condition, which as we show, is always tnie in 
equilibrium.
10 Another way to model this job dualization would be to have simply h(U, Vj) hiring in I, and h(U, V )  hiring 
in s. In that case, the results concerning the effect of a slowdown of growth on dualization are very similar to 
those obtained here. I show in a note (Wasmer 1997) that the m ost im portant result in the paper, the existence  
of a threshold technological growth rate leading to the apparition of two jobs, is shown to be true for a largei 
class of matching functions.
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Short Term Job Short Term Job 
Offer
^Destruction 
Term Job Long Term Job /  0f  ^ e  job
Figure 5-2: Matcliing teduiology witli two types of jobs
qi = In/Vi = x(9i) (5.1)
where x (V / l J )  = h(J .J ,V)/V. Thus, tr(.) is decreasing, with elasticity y v - x ' / x  =  —7]. This 
property  reflects an externality in the matcliing process: if there are more other firms looking 
for workers for a job I, it is more difficult for a given firm to find a worker for a job /. The
probability for a firm of filling a vacancy s is thus:
7 t i r  x ( Q l  +  Q s )  1 — y v  /  s\ \  f r  <-Aqs =  ha Va = ---- ------------- x {0 i )  (5.2)
y v  y v
Here qs is not equal to  the function x( Qs) wliich means additional complications in the 
resolution. It can be proved (see the appendix 1) th a t the hires in long-term  jobs and total 
hires follow constant retu rn  to scale (respectively in (f/, Vj) and in (IJ, V)), while hires in short­
term  jobs follow increasing returns to  scale in (U,VS). This property  may reflect the  fact tha t
when short-term  employment is more common, the unemployed are less likely to have any choice 
between long and short term  jobs.
Unemployed
5 .2 .3  P rofit M axim ization
The firms are small such th a t they have no m arket power and take the stock of vacancies
and of unemployment as exogenous. The firm i posts Vi3 vacancies for the contract of type j .
Hereafter we forget the subscript i. The m atching function provides the  following constraint 
on employment evolution:
d N j / d t  = qj.Vj -  ftj.Nj  (5.3)
T he program  of the representative firm is to maximize the present-discounted value (FDV) 
of profit:
/ +oo e x p ( - r t ) [ F (K ,  (Ni  +  N s)exp(gt)) +
0 (5.4;
E  ( - W j .N j  -  7 0 j .Vj -  w j .N j f j . s j )  -  d K / d t  -  6K\dt
j=l,s
with r  the disc,omit rate, 7 0 j  the search cost (depending on the type of the  job), K  the
firm ’s stock of capital depreciated a t a uniform rate  6. Prices of ou tpu t and of new capital are
norm alized to 1 .
Replacing Vj by Nj  and d N j / d t  w ith (5.3), we obtain:
/ + 0 0 e x p ( - r t ) [ F (K ,  (N t +  N s)exp(gt))±
0 (5.5)
E  ( - w j - N j  ~  j o j . ( d N j / d t  +  Sj.Nj)/cjj  -  w j . N j f j . s j ) -  d K / d t  -  SK\dt  
3=l,s
The first order condition of M a x  f  G(x, d x / d t , t)dt  where G  is a differentiable function is given 
by: Gi — 8(G s) /d t  =  0 where Gj  is the  derivative with respect to the j th argm nent of G.
D e fin it io n  2. The steady state is defined by: constant stocks dVj/St,  =  0, d N j / d t  =  0, 
d 6 j / d t  — 0 and wages, benefits and costs growing at the rate g.
Therefore, we have in steady-state:
V j / N j  -  S j / q j  (5.6)
for j  =  I, s.
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Furtherm ore we assume th a t the flow cost of search paid by firms, which is growing at rate  
g , is indexed on the m arginal productivity  of labour: 7 0 j = j j . M F }L(k) .exp(g t) , w ith 7 j a 
constant. Applying the first order conditions for K , Ni  and N s, we get, in steady-state  and 
in defining k =  K /N .e x p g ( t ) and f ( k )  = Y /  N  .exp(gt)  respectively the capital and  ou tpu t per 
efficiency unit of labour:
/ '( * ) - » •  =  0 (5-7)
exp(pt)[/(fc) -  k . f ' ( k) \  -  (1  +  -  {r +  s j  -  gYfOj/qj =  0  (5-8)
for j  =  I, s
The sum  of all hires is equal, in steady-state, to  the job destruction.. Therefore, with
Vj = Oj.u.L, we get a relation between 6 1 , 9S and U or between Vi, Vs and IJ, winch is the
equivalent of the (UV) condition in Ffissarides, defining the Beveridge Curve:
Vz.<71 +  Va.qa =  (1 -  u)L[$i.(l -  y N) +  s a.yN\ (5dJj
or
=  «•(! ~ u ) / u  (5.10)
where H is the average separation ra te  in this economy. The position of the Beveridge curve 
is therefore indexed by ?, and is therefore endogenous. Here t/yv is the fraction of tem porary 
jobs.
5 .2 .4  W ork ers’ M a x im iz a tio n
The intertem poral valuation of employment and of unemployment for workers is quite complex 
to  derive: there are two different jobs, with different wages, firing rates, turnover costs and 
hiring probability. Moreover, if offered a tem porary contract, the unemployed could find it 
optim al to  wait on an average 1 /(Oiqi) period to get a long-term  job. We m ust check ex-.- 
post th a t the present-discounted value (PDV) of being unemployed U is always smaller than 
M i n { E i , E s) with Ej  the expected PDV of being employed in a job of type j .  This defines 
a double inequality th a t needs to  be satisfied in equilibrium. We also assume no on-the-job
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search.
W hen unemployed, a worker has a utility  2; which is equal to a share A of the marginal 
p roduct of labour: 2  =  X.exp(g t ) .M F>L(k)  where M F }L(k) =  f ( k )  — k. f ' {k) .  We index 2: on 
MF*L and not on the previous wage or the average wage to avoid any further complications: if 
IJ depended on the past wage, then different hired workers would have different outside options, 
and could bargain different wages even if they were in the same kind of job. This obviously 
complicates the analysis.
The asset values of U and Ej  are:
(r -  g)U = z + 6j .qj(Ej  -  U) (5.11)
(r — g)Ej — Wj(\  +  Sj . f j )  +  Sj(lJ — Ej)  (5.12)
for j  = I, $
fj .Wj  being the layoff premium. We have therefore from (5.11) and (5.12) (see the appendix 
2  for the  proof):
1 Q j q j W j f i + S j  . f j )
z  / —i r - g  +  s j
(r -  g + Si)(Ei -  IJ) = uh{ 1 +  S i . f i )   e~f-  (5-13'1 1 V   7 _
'  2^  r —g + S j
j=l,s
R e m a rk  1  Our defijiition o f  the steady-state implies that we must have in equilibrium:
■ Ei — U >  0  (5.14)
for i =  f s  and the m atching technology implies th a t, in equilibrium:
E i > E a (5.15)
5 .2 .5  W a g e  b a rg a in in g
W hen an unemployed person is offered a job of type i, the firm and the worker are engaged in
a bargaining process over wage. The wage rate  (recall th a t it is growing a t ra te  g) maximizes
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each period:
( E i - U W J i - V t f - *  (5. 16)
with ft representing the bargaining power of the worker, J t (resp. Vt ) the  m arginal value of a 
filled (resp. empty) position, and Vi is equal to 0 when all job opportunities are exploited. The 
sufficient (conditions for an equilibrium  with two jobs coexisting are reported  in next section. A 
necessary (condition for this equilibrium is given by the following proposition.
P r o p o s itio n  1 . The wage, plus the firing premium , (the sum. being called the equivalent 
wage), is the same for  each job.
P ro o f. It is easy to  show (see the appendix 3) th a t as in Pissarides (1990), the  wage is the 
weighted average of the unemployment benefit and of the m arginal productivity  of labour plus 
the  search cost, minus the firing cost. Then, with uh the wage of job i and WiC = w i (1  +  Si . fi) 
called hereafter the equivalent wage, we have:
Wie =  Wi( 1 +  Si.fi) =  (1  -  P)-z +  p[exp(g t ) .M PL  +  ^  OjToj] (5-17)
j = l , 3
for i =  I, s
Prom this equation, we see th a t the equivalent wages WiC =  w^(l +  Si . fi) are the same in 
bo th  jobs.
■.
This means th a t wages internalize the differences between the two kinds of jobs. We can 
wonder why it would be so, when the jobs have different separation rates: a priori , the value 
of the  filled position should depend on the duration of the m atch, which is decreasing with
Si. But a t the same tim e, the  value for the worker of being employed also depends upon the
duration  of the match. As the wage is fixed in order to  share the surplus of the m atch between 
b o th  sides, by a property of homogeneity, the wage is independent of the separation rate. In 
the  way we modelled the production, the jobs I and s are perfect substitu tes and  have the 
same productivity. If we relax this assum ption, we loose the result. For instance, when we 
assum e th a t the productivity  of long-term  jobs is higher by a factor a  th an  the productivity 
of short-term  jobs, this prevents from finding a simple sym m etric solution for w ei / a  and w es.
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This is shown in appendix 3. 
We have from (5.17):
w ei =  Wi(l +  Si.fi) =  [A(l -  /3) +  ^  Oj 'yj) \.MPL(k)exp(gt)  (5.18)
j=l,S
for i =  l,$
It follows th a t Ei > E s and also th a t Ji > J s which is an equilibrium  condition (see the 
appendix 3).
5 .3  S o lu t io n
5 .3 .1  T h e  sy s te m  o f  eq u a tio n s
We are now able to elim inate the wage with (5.13) and (5.8) which leads to
(1 -  /*)(1 -  A) -  (3 ^ 2  ° j l j  =  (r  +  ** -  9)-li/Qi (5-19)
j —l,3
for i =  Z, .s
We have of course y /v =  N s/ (N i  +  N s) and y v  = Vs/(Vi  +  Vs). (5.7) determ ines the stock 
of capital per efficiency miits. (5.18) provides the equivalent wage w e% which is the same for 
bo th  jobs. W ith (5.8) we get the ratio  qi/q3 and thus w ith (5.6), yisj and y y , the fraction of
short-term  jobs and of short-term  vacancies. Then we have 0 from (5.19). Finally, (5.6) and
(5.10) determ ine Vi, Ni  and u.
5 .3 .2  E n d o g en o u s  e m er g en ce  o f  jo b  d u a lism
In this section, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for having an equilibrium  with 
two types of jobs coexisting. Consider the equation (5.8), which is the m arginal condition on 
labour. Rew riting it as:
m  exp(g t) l f ( k)  -  k . f ' (k) \  -  (1  +  ’Sj.fj).Wj]
r  +  Sj -  g r  +  sj -  g
— I0 j /q j[ f {k)  — k. f ' ( k) \  =  0 (5.20)
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for j  =  1,2. The present discounted value of the expected retu rn  to the  firm of one marginal 
job, is equal to the flow cost times the average search duration for the firm. The flow of income 
to  the firm generated by the marginal job i, called ni is the same for each job, when the two 
types of job coexist. Given different Si, tins implies th a t jobs I w ith longer duration (smaller 
$i) are preferred to  jobs s by the firms. We are going to show th a t the condition (5.20) cannot 
always be true. W hen it is not true, no interior solution exists with two types of jobs, and so 
coexistence is impossible.
P r o p o s i t io n  2. There exist a limit growth rate go — 7’+  [.«?[.7 /.(1 —7/) —-Ss.7 s]/[7 z-(l — 7/ ) ~ 7 s\ 
sueh that, i f  g > go, the marginal profit o f  the f irm for  jobs I is always higher than for  jobs 
s, whatever the fraction of  vacancies s and I the f inn  posts. In  this case, only long te.wri jobs 
exist.
P roof. Consider 77  and 7rs as functions of y v ,  the share of short-term  vacancies. We have:
^  =  ( 5 - 2 1 )
decreasing in y v , and winch tends to  (7’ +  s\ — g).'yi/x(6) when y v  tends to 0  and  tends to 0  in 
y v  tends to  1. We also have:
** =  -------- (r +   - M P L ( k )  (5.22)
x { 0 ) / y v  -  (1  -  yv ) / yv .x [6 (  1 -  y v )\
and 717 is decreasing in y v ,  w ith lim it in 0: ( 7- -\- s s — g).~fs/ ( x (6 ) ( l  — 7/) and lim it in 1: (?• +  s 3 —
g)- ls /x{6)
So, if 7 7 (0 ) >  717(0 ), then 77  >  717 for every yv'- the firm chooses to post long-term  vacancies 
only, and  therefore in steady state, only long-term  jobs exist. The existence of the equilibrium 
with only one type of job is proved in Pissarides (1990). Then, the lim it growth ra te  go is the 
g on solving 7 7 (0 ) =  717(0 ). It is straightforw ard to show th a t go has the value given in the 
proposition 2.
■
High search cost for long-term  jobs, high separation ra te  .sq, high discount rates increase go, 
and therefore the likelihood of coexistence. This property of endogenous emergence of dualism 
may appear mysterious. Actually, all is driven by the m atching technology. In some cases, it is
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so difficult (so long and so costly) for firms to get hires in short-term  jobs th a t they can never 
satisfy the first order conditions on jobs 1 and 2.
Assume now th a t g < go.
P roposition  3. With a growth rate be.low the growth rate go, both jobs coexist and the 
share of  short-term vacancies posted by the f irm is decreasing with g.
P roof. W hen there is coexistence, the equilibrium y v  is given by the relation:
=  1 =  (r +  si -  g)-fi m(6>)/m[6>(l -  y v )\ -  1 +  
n s (r +  s s -  g)~fs y v
In the Cobb-Douglas case, in the RHS of (5.23), we can elim inate 9. Then, the LHS is the 
p roduct of a decreasing function of g (the first ratio) and of decreasing function of y v  - Since 
the product is equal to  \ , y v  is decreasing in p .11
■
The intuition of F’roposition (3), the dependence of the share of short-term  vacancies in all 
job offers with the technological growth rate, is the following: high growth implies high values 
of future jobs, through the capitalization effect. Firms prefer low separation rate jobs even 
w ith higher turnover costs. The investment realized in hiring in long-term  jobs has a relatively 
higher return , because workers in short-term  jobs would have to be replaced sooner. On the 
contrary, when growth is low, discounted profits lost during the replacem ent of the successive 
workers are less im portant.
P roposition  4. The share of short-term  jobs cy/v, is an increasing function of the share of 
short-term  vacancies, yy.
Proof. From (5.6) we also have: Vi/VSN S/N i  - 0i /0s .yN l (  1 — 2/yv) -  s i / s 3.q3/qi. Therefore, we 
get a relation between the fraction of short-term  vacancies y v  and the fraction of short-term
j 1 r ( > )  _  Jj =   x { 9 )  _
1 — V n  *a  1 — y v  x(6i) s s 1 — y y  #[0(1 — yv)\
The right hand  side (RHS) of (5.24) is an increasing function of yv'. x  has an elasticity less 
th an  1 in absolute value, so the product (1  — t/v/)#(l — yv )  has a positive elasticity, thus the 
denom inator is decreasing in yv ,  so the RHS is increasing in yy .  Therefore, y^j is an increasing
In non Cobb-Douglas cases, the property is rather difficult, to show for all values of the parameters.
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LHS of (25) RHS of (25)
Figure 5-8: Correspondence between the share of secondary jobs and the share of secondary 
jobs
function of yy.  The figure 5-3 shows the correspondence between ypf and yy ,  for a Cobb-Douglas 
matcliing function.
■
The propositions 2 to 4 establish that without ambiguity, a lower growth rate increases the 
share of short-term  jobs in the economy: the profit lost during the replacement of workers is
lower, and so is the relative advantage of workers in long-term jobs.
5 .3 .3  A g g reg a te  E ffects
We now turn  to the aggregate effects of technological growth. We are interested in the effects 
of growth on wages, on the to tal number of vacancies, on unemployment and employment. For 
that, it is convenient to represent the equilibrium in the plane (w, 9), where 9 is the sum of 9i 
and 9S. We define two curves (LD) and (WS) (like Labour Demand and Wage Setting).
From (5.18) we have:
cxp(—gt).Wie/ M  P L  = t x p ( —gt).weJ M  P L
— (1 — f t ) \  +  /?(1 +  9i.~g +  9 s.js) (5.25)
=  (1 -  /?)A + {I +  9.[~n +  (1 -  y v ) ^  -  7/)!}
This is a positive relationship between wages and the supply of vacancies, represented by
1 8 1
LI)
Figure 5-4: Wage Setting and Labour Market Tightness
(WS) in figure 5-4. This can be interpreted as a wage setting curve: higher values of S, the 
workers’ share in the surplus generated by a match, and higher recruitment cost for firms, 
increase the rent to the workers, and shift this curve up. Given 7 5 — 71 <  0 , the effect of growth 
is not neutral with respect to the wage setting curve, contrary to the case with only one kind 
of job in Pissarides. Because y y  is decreased by higher growth, the slope of the curve increases 
by (7 s — 7 i)dy/dg: remember tha t the average turnover costs (equal to 7 /.(l — yv)  +  I s - w )  are 
here endogenous. I11 a period of low growth, without the capitalization effect, the bargaining 
power of workers is lowered, because of smaller average turnover costs.
From (5.19) and (5.18), we get, on eliminating (Oi.'yi +  ^S.7 S),
exp(—gt).weJ M P L  =  1 -  (r  +  s t -  g)A/x[0(l  -  yv)\  (5.26)
which is a negative relation between w  and 6, represented on figure 5-4 by (LD), or labour 
demand, since it is coming from a first order condition in employment. A rise in g has tv/o 
effects. First, there is the capitalization effect, equivalent to a decrease in the interest rate, which 
shifts the curve up. Secondly, there is a decrease in yv ,  the share of short-term  vacancies, or an 
increase in (1 — yv) ,  so at constant 6, a decrease in y u  so the curve shifts down. The smaller 
the elasticity of the matching function, the smaller the latter effect. For a reasonable set of 
param eters, the capitalization effect is more im portant (see the simulations in section 5).
Proposition  5. Higher growth shifts up the labour demand, curves, but also the wage setting
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curve. Workers get higher wages (expressed as a fraction o f  the marginal product of labour). 
The effect on the tightness of labour market is ambiguous.
P ro o f . Assume th a t on balance, the  labour dem and shifts up with higher growth, (liven that 
the wage setting  curve also necessary shifts up, the result is an increase in the wage rate to the 
m arginal product of labour w e/ M P L .  By contrast, there is an ambiguous effect on the tightness 
of labour m arket. We can nevertheless get some results: if the bargaining power of workers ft 
is low enough, then 6 is likely to  increase with growth, since the shift in the wage setting  curve 
is small. On the contrary, high values of ft are likely to  reinforce the effect of the  wage setting 
curve and will decrease with growth.
■
Higher growth means higher average search cost, such th a t the wage pressure of the workers 
is stronger. We call this the wage setting  effect of growth.
P r o p o s i t io n  6. The transition rate from unemployment to long-term jobs Oi.qi is without 
ambiguity increasing in g. This is not the case for  the transition rate from  unemployment  
to short- term  jobs 9s .qs . The sum of the two, which is the exit rate from unemployment  A 
higher when growth is higher only when the capitalization effect dominates the ivage setting  
effect described above.
P ro o f . In the appendix 1, we show th a t, as 6i is increasing in g , 9[.qi is increasing in g due 
to  the  properties of the m atching function. This is not the case for the hires into the s-jobs. 
In effect, we have 9s .qs different from 9s .q{9s). This is the result of the difficulty to  hire in the 
s-jobs when there are sufficiently 1-jobs. We can however get a result for the sum  of the two 
hiring rates, p =  because, by definition,
p =  9 .x (9 )= p  =  (9i +  9s).x{9i +  9S)
If ft is low, then 9 is increasing w ith growth because the wage setting effect is not strong 
enough to  offset the  shift of labour demand. On the contrary, high values of ft imply th a t 9 is 
a decreasing function of g.
uv
vs
Figure 5-5: The Beveridge Curve and the (u,v) equilibrium
5 .3 .4  T h e  sh ift o f  th e  B ever id ge  C urve
In the (u, V)  plane, three effects are at work. When g increases, the capitalization effect and 
the wage setting effect shift the (VS) curve in opposite directions. When the capitalization 
effect dominates, the (VS) curve shifts up. The Beveridge curve also shifts to the left when 
growth is higher, because the average turnover is lower. See the figure 5-5.
The first and second effects are dem onstrated by propositions 5 and 6. The th ird  part comes 
from equation (5.10): if g increases, decreases, therefore s =  .sj.(l — y ^ )  4- $s-yN increases. 
So, u = 'sj{s y ) 9j .q-j) increases because of an increase of s and a decrease of 6j .qj . In 
other words, a slowdown in growth, by modifying the composition of employment, increases 
the separation rate and therefore shifts the Beveridge curve to the right. Therefore, the rise in 
unemployment, caused by a lower productivity growth is amplified through this effect.
5 .4  L a b o u r  fo rce  g r o w th
If the rise in the recourse to tem porary contracts is a general feature in Europe, it is much 
more prevalent in France and Spain. W hat is the reason for this? We could think of the role of 
firing costs, which are known to be especially strong in Spain (see Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). 
However, in section 2, we have shown that wages internalize the effect of firing costs: the effect 
of higher firing premiums is to reduce wages by the same amount times the separation rate.
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Tlie param eter f i , the share of wage which is paid for a layoff, has 110 aggregate effect, only an 
intertem poral redistributive effect: a higher prem ium  tomorrow implies a lower wage today.
T here is however a potential explanation for the French and Spanish characteristic; in de­
m ographic developments. In fact, we are going to show th a t the  effect of population growth 
is to  increase the stock of unemployment. Because of the increasing re tu rn  to scale in the hir­
ing technology into short-term  jobs, as dem onstrated in appendix 1, higher population growth 
increases the efficiency for firms of the hiring in short-term  jobs. As a result, employers can 
make use of this supplem entary labour force to replace long-term  jobs by short-term  jobs, other 
things being equal.
The analysis is straightforward: call n  the growth ra te  of population or equivalently hereafter 
labour force growth. How does labour force growth affect the previous equations? The answer 
is: not much. Labour force growth has the same effect as a slowdown in technological growth 
on the distribution of jobs. Assume th a t L, the labour force, is growing a t rate  n, and th a t all 
the new entrants, in num ber 7i.L, begin by being unemployed. Thus,
S
dU/d t  = n .L  -  Y <ti-v 3 +  (1 -  u)L. s  (5.27)
We define the new steady-state  as du /d t  =  0, dU/dt  = n i l . Condition (5.10) is now:
Y  =  P  +  • ( 1 “  u)/u (5-28)
The stock of employed workers is also growing at ra te  n. Therefore, equation (5.6), which is 
given by d N j / d t  — n . N j  becomes:
Vj / N j  =  f e  +  n ) / cU 0 2 9 )
The first order conditions (with respect to K ,  Ni and N s) are unchanged introducing a growing 
population.
Now re-consider the 5 first propositions. Proposition 1, implying an equality between the 
equivalent wages, still holds. Propositions 2 and 3 are the same: the  lim it growth ra te  above 
which there are only long-term  jobs is independent of the population growth. The link between
the equilibrium  share of short-term  vacancies when there is coexistence is also independent 
of population growth. There are however differences with the case of constant population (in 
propositions 4 and 5) which can be summ arized with proposition 7.
P r o p o s i t io n  7. The threshold value of  growth below which there is coexistence is not  
changed by "population growth. In contrast, the relation between the share o f  short-term vacancies 
and the share of  short-term jobs is changed by population growth: at same share of  short-term 
vacancies, there are. more short-term jobs.
P ro o f . Proposition 4 is changed in the following way: (5.24) is implied by (5.6), which is not 
invariant to population growth. Thus, (5.24) is now (5.30):
VN = si + n . 1 x(9)  _  st +  n  1 x($)  ^  3Q)
1 — Pn  s 8 + n  1 - y v  x(8i) s s +  n  1 -  y v  a:[0(l -  yv) \
Since, w ithout ambiguity,(.s/ +  n )/( .ss +  n) >  s i / s 3 if si < s 3, it means th a t in (5.24) the I T IS 
curve is unchanged and the RHS curve is shifted up. This means tha t, for the same ratio  of 
short-term  vacancies posted by the firms, there is now a higher share of short-term  jobs. The 
reason here is clear: higher growth of population increases the stock of unemployed. Labour 
m arket tightness decreases and the derivative of qi — qs w ith respect to 9 , a t constant yy ,  is 
negative. We have sign {d(qi — qs) /d 9}  =sign (x-(0) — :r(0(l — 't/i/))} <  0 
■
As corollary of the proposition, when g is lower than  go, there are more short-term  jobs in 
the period of high population growth. The wage-setting schedule is unchanged, as well as the 
dem and curve. Finally, in the  (u ,v)  plane, the (VS) curve is unchanged, and the (UV) curve 
is clearly shifted up and left, because of the increased in the inflows into unemployment. In 
conclusion of this extension, higher growth of population is associated with more unemployment, 
more job offers, the same ratio  v /u ,  and more short-term  jobs.
5 .5  S im u la t io n s
Some simulations provide additional understanding of the model, especially to evaluate the 
relative im portance of the d istributive and the aggregate effects of growth. The param eters are 
chosen to  produce equilibrium  unemployment between 8 and 12 percent of labour force:
1 8 6
T ab le 5 .1 . P aram eters  V alues
Param eters Symbol Value
Interest Rate r 0.075
Separation rate  I si 0.1 Duration 10 years
Separation rate  s s 3 0.3 D uration 3 years
Scale param eter in h(U, V) A 0.3
Elasticity in U in h(U, V) V 0.5
Search (lost I l i 0.25
Search Cost s Is 0.05
Replacem ent Ratio A 0.5
Share of Workers in Bargaining P 0.1
Limit Growth Rate with Coexistence 90 0.042
The param eters ?* , .<?/, s 3 and are set to  commonly adm itted  values. ?/ is chosen as an average 
of Pissarides, Blanchard-Diam ond and Burda-W yplosz estim ates. The search cost is a quarter 
of the m arginal product of labour for the long-term  jobs, and 1/20 for the short-term  jobs. The 
o ther param eters are such th a t unemployment and hiring rates are roughly a t the  European 
levels. W ith  these values, the lim it growth rate  below which dualism  arises is 4.16% a year. We 
get the  following results (table 5.2):
Table 5.2: Benchm ark Sim ulation
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Productiv ity  growth g 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
II 4.67 5.04 5.47 5.93 6.49
Cc II 3.63 2.97 2.19 1.27 0.201
6 — 6i +  03 8.30 8.01 7.66 7.22 6.69
to II <c: 's 0.437 0.370 0.286 0.176 0.029
Qi 0.139 0.134 0.128 0.123 0.118
Qs 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.058
9i-Qi +  Qs-Qs 0.864 0.849 0.830 0.806 0.776
0.120 0.116 0.111 0.107 0.101
u 0.122 0.120 0.118 0.117 0.115
N t 0.790 0.809 0.831 0.854 0.880
N s 0.088 0.070 0.051 0.029 0.004
N s/ N  = y N 0.100 0.080 0.058 0.033 0.005
Lower productivity  growth, from 4% to  0%, increases the  share of short-term  job offers 
from 2.9% to 43.7% and of short-term  jobs, from 0.4% to 8.8%. Unemployment increases from 
11.5% to  12.2%: here the capitalization effect dom inates the wage setting  effect, because the 
param eter ft is low. From this simulation, it appears th a t the aggregate effects of growth are 
quite weak. However, the distributional effects are very im portant, since the share of short­
term  jobs is increased by 25% for each percentage point of growth lost. The model reproduces 
the stylized fact th a t downturns are period of rising inequalities. Here, inequality arises from 
differences in the duration of jobs, not from wages.
hi table 5.3, we see th a t, w ith higher values of ft, the capitalization effect of growth can be 
to ta lly  offset by the wage setting  effect. It means th a t lower growth reduces wage pressure so 
much th a t unemployment does not increase. Unemployment even decreases from 8.69 to  8.61%) 
of the  labour force when growth rate  falls from 4% to 0%. The share of short-term  job offers 
and of short-term  jobs is very similar to  the previous simulations.
Table 5.3. Variation: f t =  0.6, A = 1 .0
Productiv ity  growth g 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
II 5: .‘“"H 0.913 0.953 0.996 1.042 1.092
es =  v s/ v 0.709 0.561 0.398 0.222 0.032
9)+II 1.623 1.513 1.394 1.264 1.125
Co II 0.438 0.370 0.286 0.176 0.029
91 1.050 1.020 1.000 0.979 0.957
Qs 0.450 0.453 0.459 0.466 0.475
9i-9l +  9s.qa 1.270 1.230 1.180 1.120 1.060
~s 0.120 0.116 0.112 0.106 0.101
u 0.0861 0.0861 0.0863 0.0865 0.0869
N t 0.822 0.841 0.861 0.883 0.908
N s 0.091 0.073 0.052 0.030 0.005
N s/ N  =  y N 0.100 0.080 0.057 0.033 0.005
We now return  to the benchm ark simulation, and see how the replacem ent ratio, the cost 
structure , population growth and job duration affect the equilibria.
• Benclnnark
9 0.01 0.04
9S/ 0 =  y v 0.37 0.03
N s/ N  = y N 0.08 0.005
u 0.120 0.115
90 0.042
• Effect of the replacem ent ratio: A =  0.7
9 0.01 0.04
9S/ 9 =  y v 0.37 0.03
N s / N  =  yN 0.08 0.005
u 0.170 0.160
90 0.042
• Effect of the hiring cost structure: 7 / — 0.30,7 3 =  0.05
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9 0.01 0.04
6S/ 6 — y v 0.66 0.50
N s/ N  =  y N 0.19 0.12
u 0.125 0.120
90 0.075
•  Effect of population growth: n  =  0.04
9 0.01 0.04
Qs/Q — y v 0.37 0.03
N s/ N  =  y N 0.097 0.006
u 0.158 0.154
90 0.042
• Effect of the separation rates: $i =  0.1, s 3 =  0.3‘2
9 0.01 0.04
9s/ 0  =  y v 0.37 0.03
N s / N  =  y N 0.04 0.00
u 0.123 0.120
90 0.028
The distribution of jobs is very sensitive to changes in the hiring costs or in the separation 
rates. Aggregate variables, unemployment, vacancy rates and labour m arket tightness are by 
contrast very sensitive to  the aggregate param eters like the replacem ent ratio.
Finally we could wonder if the introduction of short duration contracts sufficiently lowers 
the  bargaining power of insiders to improve the efficiency of the labour m arket and to increase 
employment. We come back on the benchm ark simulation, th a t we compare with the case w ith 
only long-term  jobs allowed in the economy.
• W ith  two types of jobs
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0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
0 — Oi +  6S 8.30 8.01 7.66 7.22 6.69
Oi-qi +  0s.qs 0.864 0.849 0.830 0.806 0.776
$ 0.120 0.116 0.111 0.107 0.101
u 0.122 0.120 0.118 0.117 0.115
• W ith  long-term  jobs only
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
e 4.98 5.32 5.68 6.08 6.51
e.q{6) 0.670 0.692 0.715 0.740 0.766
~s 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
u 0.123 0.126 0.123 0.119 0.116
The difference between an economy with dualism, and one where dualism  is not allowed, is 
though generally weak yet stronger in periods of low growth. A fraction of workers suffer from 
the low growth, paying the cost in term s of shorter contracts.
5 .6  E m p ir ic a l  E v id e n c e
5 .6 .1  T h e  r ise  in  tu rn o v er  b e tw e e n  E m p lo y m en t an d  U n e m p lo y m e n t in  F rance
In a paper by Cohen and Lefranc (1994), the authors discuss the effect of changes in the 
productiv ity  growth on the French labour m arket by showing th a t the separation ra te  (the 
exit ra te  from employment) of the male 25-49 years old workers is strongly and negatively 
correlated to the growth of labour productivity. The transitions between three different states, 
Em ploym ent, Unemployment and Not in Labour force (E, U, N hereafter) are obtained from 
labour force survey Enquete Emploi: people of the sample are asked, which sta te  they are in, 
and  which sta te  they were in a year before. Dividing each of the six flows by the population of 
the original state, we obtain a transition  ra te  from sta te  i to s ta te  j .  We can therefore define 
a m atrix , where the element of the i th column and of the j th row is the probability for an 
individual to  transit from i to j  between t  and t  +  dt. After a m athem atical transform ation 
(see appendix 4 for details), we get the m atrix of the m onthly transitions. The separation rates
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Monthly transition rates of men : exit from employment
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Figure 5-6: France: transition employment-unemployment and employment-inactivity for men
(figures 5-6 and 5-7), disaggregated by sex (denoted by s — e, or exit  — e), exhibit the clear 
pattern  discussed in Cohen and Lefranc: the increase in the male exit rate from employment 
and the constancy of its female counterpart. Remarkably, the inflows into miemployment are 
increasing in both cases. This is also true for the 25-49 years old which by definition excludes 
most of the new young entrants and the retiring people.
The model of sections 2 to 5 provides a theoretical interpretation of Cohen and Lefranc’s 
correlation: as already discussed in introduction about figure 5-1, all this rise in the separation 
rate can be attribu ted  to the rising fraction of tem porary contracts in total employment, which 
in turn  is linked to lower growth.
5.6 .2  T est o f  th e  m od el
The model predicts that the increased use of tem porary contracts is caused by a decrease of the 
productivity growth, by higher population growth and by high hiring cost differential between 
jobs. These predictions can be tested on the first two param eters in a cross-section of countries. 
We denote by T M  F\ the share of tem porary contracts to all the jobs in 1983, T M P 2 the share
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Monthly transition rates of women : exit from employment
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Figure 5-7: France: transition employment-unemployment and employment-inaetivity for
women
of tem porary contracts in 1991. Relevant da ta  are available for 15 OECD countries. We denote 
by n  and nl  the growth rates of population and of labour force respectively.. If we denote by 
g(s, t) the average growth rate of GDP per head between .s and £, we may define the slowdown 
of growth by dg = g(76, 94) — #(60, 75), to get a proxy of the slowdown in productivity growth. 
We use this difference in the regression analysis, since the actual share of tem porary contracts is 
likely to be on a transition path  rather than in a steady-state equilibrium. Therefore, the speed 
of adjustm ent to the steady-state value is likely to be both  highly correlated to the changes in 
growth conditions and a good proxy for the long-run value of tem porary contracts.
hi all the specifications reported in table 4, the countries with more tem porary contracts 
are the countries where the slowdown in growth was im portant and the population growth 
large, as one expected from the model:
Table 5.4. R egression analysis,OLSQ
T M f \  =  2.32(0.51) +  14.61(1.16).n -  2.64(1.58).rf#
R 2 =  0.29, 15obs
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S hare  of Temporary C ontracts (controlled by population growth in the first regression) 
a s  a  fcmction of the slowdown in growth
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Figure 5-8: Regression Analysis in a Cross-Section of 15 OECD countries
(TMF>2 -  T M F \)  = -1.46(0.36) +  2.01(0.18).7i -  1.42(0.96).dp 
R 2 =  0.08, 15 obs
T M F \  =  3.78(1.09) +  12.6(1.32).n -  1.23(0.96).dp 
R2 =  0.22, 15 obs
T M P 2 =  3.86(0.83) +  4.28(0.62).?d -  3.03(1.7H).dg 
R 2 =  0.24, 15 obs 
(t-Stat in parentheses)
See also the figure 5-8 and the regression lines linking the share of tem porary contracts in 
1991 to the slowdown of growth (controlled by the population growth, that is removing from 
T M F \  the effect of population). We suggest that the effects described in the model are likely 
to be at work in the reality: a low growth is associated with lower value of long-term jobs for 
firms and a high population growth makes the recruitment of workers in short-term  jobs easier. 
O ther tests, including cross-industry data, are possible and left for future work.
5 .7  C o n c lu s io n
This work shows tha t in an equilibrium unemployment model 4 la Pissarides with exogenous 
growth, the firms have much more easily recourse to tem porary contracts when growth is low. 
In this la tte r case, firms prefer high turnover workers with low turnover costs, to workers with
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longer tenures b u t with higher turnover costs. W hen growth is low, then  population has also a 
positive im pact on the share of tem porary jobs. In addition, when the share of short duration 
jobs increases, so does the inflow into unemployment, which shifts the Beveridge curve to  the 
right and reinforces the  rise in unemployment.
Finally, for some values of the param eters, in particu lar if the share of the  workers in 
the surplus of a m atch is high (wages are set by a Nasli-Bargaining), the relation between 
technological growth and unemployment can be negative: high growth implies higher wage 
pressure due to more long-term  jobs, which can negatively affect employment beyond the rise 
in labour dem and due to  higher growth.
This analysis is consistent with the French inflows into unemployment changes over the  last 
25 years and with the OECD cross-coimtry differences in the extent of recourse to  tem porary 
contracts.
• A ppend ix  1. R eturns to  scale o f th e  m atching technology and properties o f  
th e  ex it rates from  unem ploym ent.
It is easy to see that hi = h(JJ, Vi) is constant return to scale in (U, V{) by definition. The same is 
true for h(U, V ), constant return to sc ale in (17, V). Now with h(U, Vi +  Va) — h(U , Id), we argue that 
this quantity is increasing return to scale in (17, Vs) at constant V/. Proof. For that, it Is sufficient to 
show that the quantity H ( z ) =  c/>vi+zVa) h{zV,vi) _  Vi/z)  +  h(U, V i/z  +  Vg) is increasing in
z, the scale factor. This is true since d H ( z ) / d z  =  V//T2 [/is(17, V i /z ) — h s(U, V i/z  +  V7)], with h s the 
derivative of h with respect to the second argument. By concavity of / i( . , .) in each of its arguments, the 
quantity is strictly larger than 0  for >  0 . H
We also derive some properties of the exit rates from unemployment: the transition rate from 
unemployment to jobs I is equal to Oi.qi =  6ix{6{). Given that x  has an elasticity of —7} smaller than 1 
in absolute value, the exit rate is increasing in 6i. The same is true for the exit rate from unemployment, 
Oi.qi +  6s .qs =  6 .x {6 ), which is increasing in 6. Unfortunately, this property does not hold for the 
transition from unemployment to jobs s.
• A ppendix  2. D eterm ination  o f (5.13)
We have (5.11)
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(5-11)
« = E -
j = l , s
Oj.qj
r ~  9 +
and we have:
(1 • i! E E r - T + ^  ~ ^
3 = 1 ,8  j  — I , s  3  " 3
and so:
We also have (5.12)
(r  -  g ) E j  =  W j{ \  +  S j . f i )  +  S j (U  -  E j )  (5-12)
(5.11) and (5.12) yields:
( r ~ 9  + S j)(E j -  U) = wCj -  z -  ^  e3 -(l j - ( E 3 ~  U )
3=1,3
Dividing by r  — g +  fij and adding both lines for j  = I and s:
E K(Ej -  v) = Y .  r - a T Z ^  ~ Z)- E T ^ T T T  E (5-32)
j = l , S  j — l , 3  3  j - l , S  3  j = l , S
We call now:
E -  v) = —  E ~*) - TT7- (s-33)
3 = 1 , 3  S  j = l , a  V I
Now we can replace in (5.31), and we have demonstrated (5.13):
(?’ — g-\-Si)(Ei — U) — u>i(\+Si.fi) — { z-\-  ^>2 ~ ~   ^ ^“7  ~ }/{* +  ^  i^jQj \ / { r ~  9 +  E  f Ir—r  ?’ — g +  Sj *—r
j  —  l , S  ' J  j — l y S
(5-13)
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• A p p e n d ix  3. D ete rm in a tio n  o f  w ages
Wages are bargained such as to share the marginal surplus of the firm and the surplus of the workers. 
The marginal surplus of the firms follows the following asset value:
(r  -  g) Ji =  exp(g t) .M P L (k )  — w ei +  *;(!/; -  J») (5.36)
with V{ the marginal value of a vacancy, given by:
(r  -  g)Vi =  - 7 0 i +  qi{Ji ~  V ) (5.37)
and Vi is equal to 0  if all the vacancy opportunities are exhausted.
Assume different bargaining power fij for each job. The bargaining yields to:
f t  1 f t
Ej - V  J i -  Vi
We have:
f t   f t  • O' -  9 +  * j)(l +  £)
Ei U « ,« ( ! + « )
3 = 1
and from Vj =  0:
so:
f t  ft'C1 +  £)[exp(g t) .M P L(k)  -  w ej\
r —g  +  S j W e 3 3=1,s
Therefore, dividing by Jj  and taking the inverse:
(5.38)
(5.39)
exp (g t) .M P L (k )  -  wei
Ji = JOi qi =     (5.40)
r - g  + Si
(5.41)
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AC 1 +  4)lexp{g t) .M P L (k )  -  w cj\ =  (1 -  f1j)(wej(l  +  £) -  2  -  ^ 2  — ^ F  „ wcj) (5-42)
3 =1, , 7 ~  9  + s>
and after simplification:
2  +  E  r r f f c ' r -7
w Cj  =  i i j [ e x p ( g t ) . Mf ' L ( k )  +  (1 -  f y )  ’ f t + c----------  (r,-4:!)
This last result is very important since it proves that, if we add the assumption of the same bargaining 
power for each job fti =  fts = ft, then the equivalent wage, w ei  =  Wi( 1 +  Si.fi) is the same for both 
contracts. Then the solution is easy: from 5.43 and with w e =  uiei = w ei it follows that:
w e =  /3[exp (g t) .M  P L (k )  — w e] +  (1 — ft)z
Using the fact that
E @j •Qj _ _____  Qjlj________r ~  9 +  Sj exp(gt) .M  F* L(k) — w ej  — lyS j —ljS
it conies finally:
w ei = Wi( 1 +  Si.fi) =  [A(l -  ft) 4- ft[MF,L{k).cxp{gt)  +  Ojqj] (5.44)
3=l,s
Note that Ei >  E s because si <  s s-
We can also derive the same equations when the production function is not symmetric in the two 
types of jobs, for instance
Y  =  F (K ,e x p (g t) (a ,N i  + N s))
where a  >  1 quantifies the difference in productivity of long-term jobs workers. In that case, this can 
be found in the first order condition of the firm maximization, in the firm’ s marginal asset value of a 
match, but not in the workers valuation.. In that case, 5.43 would become:
2 +
wcj = a.()j [exp(gt).M P L (k )  +  (1 -  f t j )  —  j -  ---------  (5.45)
1 +  s
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Unfortunately, the symmetric solution in wages cannot be defined.
•  A p p e n d ix  4. In fra-year tra n sitio n s
Let Q(dt  =  12) be this matrix associated, during the period t  and t  +  12. In our case,
^ 1   'U *■* ^
Q(dt) — Id  + P (d t  =  12) =
1 — eu — en ue ne
eu 1 — ue — u n  n u
en u n  1 — ne — nu /
for a vector of states
X ( t )  = (t)u
\ N  J
representing the number of persons in each state at t. Therefore, X ( t  -f 12) =  Q(dt =  V2).X(t,) and 
the net flows in level are given by F}{dt =  12) .X (t) .  A criticism can be easily made: when the rates in 
the matrix P  are far from 0 , like the ue  rate which is about 50%, the probability of multiple infra-period 
transitions cannot be neglected, and the flows in level are underestimated. It is therefore better to 
estimate from the matrix Q(dt =  12), the matrix Q(dt)  for smaller dt (in the limit, when dt tends to 
0, the matrix P {d t) /d t  gives the Markovian transition matrix). For our purpose, which is to get rid of 
the multiple transitions, the monthly matrix is sufficient. It is clear that Q(dt) * Q(dt') = Q(dt  +  dt'), 
and assuming:
1 . the monthly matrix to be constant over the year, and 2 . no state dependence of the individuals,
we can, by taking the unique 1 2th root of Q{dt =  12) whose all coefficient are strictly between 0  
and 1 , estimate the monthly rates and therefore the monthly flows, obtained by multiplying the rates 
by the real stocks.
•  A p p e n d ix  5. T em p orary  work: th e  m ain  fea tu res
In France there has been a spectacular rise in the demand for temporary contracts. Between 1983 
and 1991, the share of temporary workers in total employment increased from 3.3 to 10.2%, while in 
UK, it stayed around 5.5%, in Germany it stayed around 10%, and in Belgium it stayed around 12%. 
A similar rise has been observed in Spain. Overall, in Europe, this share increased from 4% to 10% 
(according to Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).
The legislation on the renewal is nevertheless restrictive: the maximum duration is two years, and 
they are renewable twice only. See OECI) Employment Outlook, and Grubb and Wells (1993) for more 
details.
Men are concerned as much as women: in 1991, 47.4% of all temporary jobs are for men. The 
concentration is of course a decreasing function of age: 44.5% of the temporary workers are between 
15 and 24 years old, while these 15-24 years old workers represent a share of only 15.8% of all salary 
earners. Nevertheless, the 25-54 years old represents 53.4% of these contracts (for a fraction of 78.3% of 
total salary earners).
Evidence from other countries suggests that a majority of the temporary workers could not find 
a permanent job: 90% in Spain, 60% in Italy. However, the corresponding figure is not available for 
France. In the UK in contrast, their number is only 30%. From the employer side, the main reasons for 
he recourse to these contracts are: seasonal factors, replacement of absent workers, occasional jobs with 
specific skills, screening, etc.... But in the surveys where these answers come from, there is no distinction 
between temporary and interim contracts. Other reasons are provided when the distinction is made (see 
Me Gregor and Sproull, 1991, quoted in the OEGD survey): reduced wages, fewer employment rights, 
flexibility in staffing levels. These latter facts justify the way we modelled the short-term jobs, with low 
hiring costs, low firing costs and of course low durations.
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C hapter 6
E quilibrium  U rban U n em p loym en t
A b s t r a c t :  We introduce a spatial dimension in a search equilibrium unemployment model. By
assuming that workers’ search efficiency decreases with the distance to the employment-center, two 
urban equilibrium configurations emerge: either the unemployed reside close to the employment- 
center or far away from it, depending on the values of the commuting costs and of the surplus 
associated with search, which depends on the labour market equilibrium. The labour market 
equilibrium itself depends crucially on these urban equilibria. We show that the unemployment 
level is lower in the first urban equilibrium.
6 .1  I n tr o d u c t io n
Most synthesis of unemployment (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and  Jackm an, 1991) introduce the 
spatial dimension a t a fairly aggregate level and generally at the regional level. It is usually 
shown th a t unemployment is unevenly distribu ted  between regions and th a t this phenomenon 
persists in the long rim (Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Gordon, 1987, part 1 , Holzer, 1989, Mc­
Cormick and Sheppard, 1992, Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, ch.2). Even though it is com­
monly observed th a t unemployment is unevenly d istribu ted  within cities, the  explanation of 
urban  unemployment and in particu lar of in tra-urban unem ploym ent differences is still in its 
infancy. In the US m etropolitan areas, unemployment rates tend  to  be larger in the city-center 
th an  in the suburbs (see table 6 . 1a). In Europe the p a tte rn  is less clear. If we take a large city 
like Paris, we see th a t the contrary is true while (G reater) London (see Hasluck, 1987, p. 11,
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figure 1.3(b)) and (extended) Brussels (see Thom as and Zenou, 1997, figure 3) resemble the US 
m etropolitan  areas. How can we explain such differences ? The natu ral explanation th a t comes 
to  m ind is the historical reasons, reflected by the type and location of amenities w ithin a city 
(Brueckner, Tliisse and Zenou, 1997).
A nother explanation of urban  unemployment is the fact th a t access to employment w ithin a 
city is strongly affected by residential location. Since workers do not reside in the same location 
in the city, they do not have the same access to  employment. This is the idea of the spatial 
mismatch  hypothesis introduced by Kain (1968) and reviewed more than  twenty years later 
by Holzer (1991): residing in segregated areas distant from and poorly connected to m ajor 
centers of employment growth, African Americans face strong geographic barriers to finding 
and keeping well-paid jobs. In this context, African Americans are forced to  stay in the ghetto 
in the city-center and  are therefore far away from jobs, located at the city outskirts, because 
of the  discrim ination in the housing m arket in the suburbs. In France, the same problem 
exists. In Table 6 .1 .b, we have reported  unemployment of the 500 prioritary  districts in France. 
According to Castellan, M arpsat and Goldenberg (1992), these districts have a geograpliical 
specificity in the sense th a t they are closer to the periphery than  the center (0.9 km versus 
2.3 km  in average), in general physically separated from the centers by ring roads, rivers or 
railroads, and poorly connected to the center since there is a railroad in 70% of the  districts, 
bu t a sta tion  in only 40% of the cases.
[.In ser t  Tabic  6 .1 a and  6.15]
In this paper, we want to emphasize the fact th a t space is an obstacle in the access o f  job 
opportunities. In o ther words, workers living further away from jobs have poorer labour m arket 
inform ation th an  those living closer. This is particularly  true for younger a n d /o r  less-skilled 
workers who rely heavily on informal search m ethods for obtaining employment (Holzer, 1987).1 
The reliance on these informal m ethods of job search suggests th a t inform ation on available job 
opportunities may decay rapidly w ith distance from the home (Ehlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1990) 
and th a t the black disadvantage is entirely a ttribu tab le  to  residential segregation (Ihlanfeldt
1 In Holzer (1988), it  is shown that among the 16-23 years old workers who reported job acceptance, 66% used 
informal search channels (30% direct application w ithout referral and 36% friends/relatives), for only 11% using 
state agencies or 10% newspapers.
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1997).2 A nother empirical study (Zax and Kain ,1996) has illustrated  this fact. By studying 
a ’natu ra l experim ent’ (the case of a large firm in the service industry  which relocated from 
the center of Detroit to the suburb Dearborn in 1974), they show th a t the suburbanization of 
employment tends to  reduce black opportunities and increase, black unemployment. Among the 
workers whose com m uting tim e was increased, blacks were over-represented, and not all workers 
could follow the firm. This had two consequences: first, segregation forced some blacks to  quit 
their jobs. Second, the share of black workers in job applications drastically decreased (53% 
to 25% in 5 years before and after the relocation), and the share of black workers in hirings 
also fell down from 39% to 27%. Zax and Kain concluding rem arks are: "... with employment 
in the D etroit region shifting from locations at which black workers have higher probabilities 
of employment to locations a t which they have lower probabilities, black workers m ust search 
more locations in order to prevent their aggregate probability of employment from declining. If 
search is costly, some decline is unavoidable. Therefore, the ’’spatial m ism atch ” m ust certainly 
cause some, as yet unestim ated, increase in black unemployment in the Detroit m etropolitan 
area.”
The empirical relevance of urban  unemployment and of the relation between space and 
job opportunity  is quite clear. However, the theoretical explanation of the cause of urban 
unem ploym ent and of the location of the unemployed is still very recent and there is so far no 
complete theory (Zenou, 1997). Z6 nou and Smith (1995) were the first to  explicitly introduce 
the location of the unemployed workers with an endogenous level of urban unem ploym ent (due 
to  efficiency wage reasons). This paper is in the same vein only more oriented towards the 
micro-m acro interactions, following Benabou (1993) who investigates the com bination of loral 
com plem entarities in hum an capital accumulation and global com plem entarities in production. 
Here, we build a model of search in a monocentric city in which local factors (rental price, 
distance to employment-centers) and global factors (labour m arket tightness, wages) influence 
the location choices of the  workers (the urban  equilibrium) and  the labour m arket equilibrium. 
A central assum ption here is th a t the probability of getting a job is inversely related to the 
distance to  the employment-center. This is one way to emphasize the fact that the geographical
2 O f course differences in access of information on job opportunities can also be explained by the the social 
network and the neighborhood where workers live (Benabou, 1993, O ’Regan and Quigley, 1993, Topa, 1997, 
W ilson 1987, 1996). In this paper we focus on the geographical distance as a barrier to access to employment.
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distance to the employment-center and thus access to employment is a key factor to explain 
urban unemployment. The first (and main) reason for this, consistently with the empirical 
observations made by Holzer (1987), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990), Dilanfeldt (1997), Zax and 
Kain (1996)... developed above, is th a t inform ation about available jobs circulates through 
informal networks and the further away workers live the poorer is this information. The second 
reason is th a t among the numerous forces th a t aggregate people in cities, the labour market 
forces are especially relevant: people come to  cities to  get an access to employment. This 
second reason is especially appropriate when the local labour m arket considered has the size of 
an agglom eration, i.e. incorporating the city-center, the suburbs and the periphery in a broad 
sense.
W ithin this framework, we have different urban  equilibria since the unemployed want to 
be as close as possible to  the OBD in order to  increase their probability of getting  a job and 
the employed want the same location because they bear higher com m uting costs. As a resuh, 
the equilibrium  configuration will depend on the shape of the search intensity function since 
the  slope of the bid rent of the unemployed depends only on this function and on the linear 
tran spo rt cost. If this function is linear with distance (as a first simplifying assum ption), then 
there will be only two possible configurations: either the  unemployed are close to the OBD or 
they are further away from the OBD. If we further introduce search effort, then we prove tha t 
search efficiency is decreasing and convex with the distance to  the OBD. This convexity can 
lead to  a th ird  urban equilibrium  in which the unemployed will locate a t the vicinity of the 
OBD and a t the outskirts of the city whereas the employed will reside in between them.
We then  derive the labour m arket equilibrium  in which urban  unemployment is due to 
frictions in the  labour market: even if firms pay the reservation wage of workers, there will 
still be a level of durable unemployment in the city because there is a stochastic rationing that 
cannot be elim inated by price adjustm ent. We explore different wage setting mechanisms tha t 
give sim ilar results. The im portan t point in our analysis is th a t the labour m arket equilibrium 
depends crucially on the urban  equilibrium configurations, and the urban equilibrium  itself 
depends on aggregate variables (wages and labour m arket tightness) because these variables 
affect location choices. If for example, unemployed workers reside far away from the city- 
center, aggregate m atching is not efficient and firms are reluctant to make job offers. On the
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other hand, when the  unemployed reside close to the city-center, firms post more vacancies and 
aggregate unemployment is lower. In our model, in the lo'iu equilibrium (in which the matching 
is not efficient)  workers can not move towards jobs because o f  the high land price. This is part 
of the story we want to  explain and the other p a rt is certainly due to  racial discrim ination and 
bad environm ent.
It is im portan t to observe th a t search models have rarely been introduced in a spatial 
framework. Exceptions include Jayet (1990a,b), Simpson (1992), Coulson, Laing and Wang 
(1997). However, these authors focus on different issues and in particu lar they do not model 
explicitly the in tra-urban  equilibrium  in which the location of the unemployed and the employed 
workers is determ ined endogenously and influences the labour m arket equilibrium.
The rem ainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its 
notations. In section 3, we derive the different equilibrium  urban  configurations. The labour 
m arket equilibrium  with exogenous wages is then studied in section 4 whereas the case with 
endogenous wage bargain is analysed in section 5. Finally, section 6  concludes.
6 .2  T h e  m o d e l  a n d  g e n e r a l n o ta t io n s
The model is a m atching model of search a la Pissarides (1990). Firms and workers are all 
(ex ante) identical. A firm is a unit of production th a t can either be filled by a worker whose 
production is y  units of ou tpu t or unfilled and thus unproductive. The la tte r  case may happen 
because the allocation of resources is tim e consuming and involves frictions in the labour market. 
The former case concerns the two sides of the labour m arket. In order to  find a worker, a firm 
posts a vacancy th a t can be filled according to a random  Poisson process. wSimilarly, workers 
who are looking for a job will find one according to  a random  Poisson process. In this context, 
the num ber of unemployed workers IJ and the num ber of vacancies V  are bo th  determ ined at 
a given period of time. Moreover, there are a num ber of contacts between the two sides of 
the m arket during a small tim e interval dt th a t we assumed to be determ ined by the following 
matching function:
x (s lJ ,V )d t  (6 .1 )
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where $ is the  average efficiency of search of the unemployed workers (a worker i has an efficiency 
of search equal to Si). We assumed th a t #(.) is increasing bo th  in its argum ents, concave and 
homogeneous of degree 1 (or equivalently has constant re tu rn  to scale). Observe th a t here the 
num ber of job contacts as described by (6 .1 ) is equivalent to  the  num ber of job m atches, i.e., all 
job contacts lead to  job matches. We could have differentiated the two concepts (job contact 
versus job m atch) as in Pissarides (1990, ch.5) by m ultiplying V )d t  by a probability tha t 
a job contact is transform ed into a job m atch bu t this will complicate the analysis without 
altering our main results. Therefore, (6 . 1 ) is the well behaved m atching function th a t gives the 
num ber of jobs form ed at any moment of tim e as a function of the num ber of ’’efficient un its” of 
searching workers and  the num ber of firms looking for workers. In this context, the probability 
for a vacancy to be filled during a small tim e interval dt  is:
x(sU, V )d t  (g 2)
By constant re tu rn  to scale, (6.2) can be rew ritten as:
q(6)dt = x ( ^ , l ) d t  (6.3)
where 9 = V /U s  is a measure of labour market tightness in efficiency units. By using the 
properties of a:(.), it is easily checked th a t q'(0) <  0 : the greater the labour m arket tightness, 
the lower the probability of filling a vacancy for a firm. Observe th a t we assume th a t firms 
have no im pact on their own search efficiency and considers s, IJ and V  as given. Similarly, for 
a worker i w ith efficiency Si, the probability of having a contact with a vacancy during a small 
tim e interval dt is:
X -^— ’ ^  dt = 6q(6)si{d)dt = p(d)dt  (6-4)
IJ s
where d is the distance from the workplace. Contrarily to  the standard  model of job m atching 
as proposed by Pissarides (1990) in which there is no spatial dimension, we make here the 
im portan t assum ption th a t .<?* depends on the location of the unemployed workers in the city: 
the closer to  the workplace the location, the greater the  efficiency and the more likely is to 
have a contact (s* =  $i(d) where d is the location of the worker with .s((rZ) <  0). As already
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discussed in the introduction, we focus here on low-skill workers who rely strongly on informal 
search m ethods to get a job. We therefore assume here th a t search costs are higher and informal 
inform ation networks are less effective for those residing further away from jobs’ location (this 
is empirically verified, a t least for the unskilled workers; see e.g., Holzer, 1987, 1991).4
Therefore, the. endogenous choice o f  workers’ locations will be strongly influenced by the 
search process and by the labour market conditions. Once the m atch is realized the wage is 
determ ined (first exogenously and then through a Nash bargaining). At each period, there is 
also a probability Sdt th a t the m atch is destroyed. All these transition  probabilities describe 
a Poisson process. In order to determ ine the equilibrium, we will proceed as follows. We 
determ ine first the u rban  equilibrium configurations. Then, depending on the location of the 
unemployed and thus on the aggregate search efficiency s, we determ ine the labour market 
equilibria.
6 .3  E q u ilib r iu m  u r b a n  c o n f ig u r a t io n s
We use here the s tandard  framework in urban  economics of the m onocentric city (see Fujita, 
1989). All firms are assum ed to  be located at the central business d istrict (OBD hereafter) 
whereas workers decide endogenously their optim al residence between the OBD and the city 
fringe. The assum ption th a t firms cannot chose their location can be seen as a short run 
assum ption. In the  long run, the equilibrium  may not hold if the cost for a firm to leave the 
o ther firms is smaller than  the gain associated to  the other location, hereafter the fact tha t 
the firm will be closer from the unemployed. However, by an argum ent of symmetry, it will be 
shown la ter th a t even in relaxing the assum ption th a t firms are located in the  OBD, in most of 
the cases, the  choice of this location is itself the result of an equilibrium.
The city is linear, closed and landlords are absent .4 There is a continuum  of workers th a t are 
d istribu ted  uniformly along the linear city and consume all the same am ount of land (normalized 
to 1 ). The density of residential land parcels is taken to  be unity so th a t there are exactly d
3 See Appendix 1 where this assumption is derived endogeneously. In this case, search efficiency depends on 
the optim al level of workers’ effort. This effort is associated to the distance to the workplace by a cost-benefits 
trade-off and gives the sam e negative dependance between search efficiency and distance.
4 All these assum ptions are very standard in urban economics and relaxing them will not alter the main 
conclusions but just yield  to more com plicate results.
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units of housing within a distance d of the CBD.
Employed workers go to the CBD to work and to shop while unemployed workers go to the 
CBD to be interviewed and to  shop. Let us denote by a sd, a ed and a ud the transporta tion  
cost a t a distance d from the CBD for respectively shopping, working and unemployed specific 
activities (interviews, registration), w ith a s >  0, a e. >  0, a u >  0. In this context, the trans­
p orta tion  cost for the  employed workers is equal to  (a s + a e) d  and for the unemployed worker it 
is equal to ( a s +  a u)d. All workers bear land rent costs a t the m arket price R(d)  and receive a 
wage w  when employed and an unemployment benefit b if unemployed. We denote by Iu and Ie 
the expected lifetime net income of the unemployed and the employed respectively. We assmne 
th a t location changes are costless. W ith  the Poisson probabilities defined above, infinite lived 
workers have the following intertem poral utility  fimctions:
r l u(d) = b — (as 4- a u)d — R(d) +  p(d) [.Maxd>Ie(d') — Iu{d)] (0.5)
r l e(d) = iu — ( a s +  c*e)d — R(d) +  6 [M ax#  Iu(d') — /f(d)] (6.0)
where r  is the exogenous discount rate. Let us comment (6.5). W hen a worker is unemployed 
today, he resides in d and his net income is b — (a s +  a u)d — R (d ) . Then he can get a job 
w ith a probability p(d) and then will optim ally relocate in d! and obtain an increase in his 
income of I e{d') — Iu{d). We assume here th a t relocation costs are zero and th a t when a worker 
changes his employment sta tus he autom atically change his residence. The in terpreta tion  of
(6 .6 ) is similar. In equilibrium, all unemployed workers enjoy the same level of u tility  as well
as employed workers: r l u =  r l u and r l e =  r l e , bo th  determ ined by the urban  equilibrium. 
Therefore, bid rents, i.e., the maximmn rent th a t workers are ready to  pay in order to  reach 
the equilibrium  utility, are respectively equal to :5
^u(rf, Iu, Ie) = b — ( a s +  a u)d +  p(d)Ie -  (r + p(d))Iu (6.7)
JAs it can be seen from (6.7) aud (6.8), bid rent is the inverse of tlie indirect utility function. Moreover, bid 
rent is a useful concept do determ ine the optim al location o f workers. Indeed, since all workers of the sam e group 
enjoy the sam e level of utility in equilibrium, the optimal location of each worker is that location at which his 
bid rent curve is tangent to the market rent curve from below (see Fujita, 1989, p .24).
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.(d, / u, / e) =  w -  (as +  Cic)d +  SIU -  (r +  S)Ie (6.8)
The determ ination  of urban  equilibrium  involves the shapes of the bid rents. They are 
respectively equal to:
where p'(d) =  0q(6)s'(d) <  0. These slopes (in absolute values) can be in terpreted  as the
one hand, for the unemployed this marginal cost is the smn of the marginal com m uting cost,
equal to  ( a s +  a e) since the probability of losing a job 6 is to tally  exogenous and do not depend 
on the location of workers. To find the equilibrium  location of all workers in the city, we must 
com pare these slopes.
Assume th a t the  intersections of the slopes of the two bid rents is of zero measure. This 
implies th a t we exclude mixed configurations where bo th  employed and unemployed are located 
a t the same place and  th a t we consider only separated configurations where only one type of 
workers locate within the same segment. Let us denote by d f  the city fringe, and by hu(d) and 
he(d), the  density functions of the unemployed and the employed households at each location
<9'fhi(d, Iui Ie 
dd — — (o:s +  fl'u) +  P {d){Ie ~  Iu) <  o
(6.9)
(6 . 10)
m arginal cost th a t the worker is ready to pay in order to  be m arginally closer to the CBD. On
( a s +  en-u), and the marginal probability of finding a job times the (intertem poral) surplus of 
being employed. On the o ther hand, the employed bear only a t the m argin com m uting cost
d6.
D e f in i t io n  1  The urban equilibrium is such that:
R(d) =  M a x  {^u (d , Iu , Ie), ^e{d, Iu, h ) ,  R-a } at each d £ [0 , df]
R(d) =  'Lu(d, Iu, Ie) i f  hu{d) > 0, he(d) =  0 at each d £ [0, df]
R(d) =  e(d , 7U, /<,) i f  h e(d) > 0, hu(d) =  0 at each d £  [0, df]
6Giveu the assum ption that, workers are distributed uniform ally in the city, the density functions have their 
values in {0 ,1}.
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R ( d f ) =  R a
W ith  tills definition of equilibrium, we can have a large variety of equilibria. However, in 
this paper, for analytical simplicity, we focus only on linear bid rent slopes, i.e., p"(d) =  0  in 
which only two u rban  equilibria are possible: the first one (labelled Equilibrium  1) where the 
unemployed reside a t the vicinity of the CBD and the second one (labelled Equilibrium  2) where 
the unemployed locate at the outskirts of the city. For th a t we assume th a t s{d) = sq — ad with 
so >  0 and a > 0. Obviously, the urban equilibrium results as a trade off between the difference 
in com m uting costs, (o:r — o^), and the m arginal probability of getting a job since here both  the 
employed and the unemployed want to  be as close as possible to the CBD (employed workers 
want to  save com m uting costs and unemployed workers want to  increase their probability to 
get a job). Thus, Equilibrium  l 7 occurs if and only if:
(Qe-ocu)  <  0 i< 7( 0 iM /p i  -  / u j  ( 6 - 11)
Equation (6 .1 1 ) m eans th a t the differential space costs between the employed and the unem ­
ployed is smaller th an  the gradient in space of the expected retu rn  for an unemployed of being
more efficient in search (the m arginal probability of exit from unemployment times the surplus). 
Thus if (6.11) holds, the  employed bid away the unemployed towards the periphery of the city. 
In the o ther equilibrium, we have the opposite result:
( a f -  a u) > O2q(02)a(IC2 -  IU2) (6.12)
It is im portan t to notice th a t all w hat improves workers’ position (6q{6) and ( IP — Iu)) cen 
help to  switch from equilibrium  2 to equilibrium  1 . A nother rem ark is th a t when the employed 
have lower costs th an  the unemployed, the only possible equilibrium  is the first one since the 
unemployed have all the  incentives to  go closer to the CBD.
Let us define the two urban  equilibria by rem embering th a t the city is closed, linear and 
landlords are absent. We normalize the labour force L  to 1, i.e. L =  U +  N  — 1, where 
N  is the  nm nber of employed workers. Therefore, the unemployment rate  u  is equal to the
7We index by 1 all variables that w ill determine at the labor market equilibrium 1. We do the sam e thing for
Equilibrium 2.
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unemployment level U.
D e fin it io n  2 The urban equilibrium 1 (IU], / f l , d]b, rfj) is such that:
4 = u i (6.13)
4 =  1 (6.14)
i ) — 'I1 , /(’.)) (6.15)
^ ( 4 , 7 ^ , 1 7 )  =  R a  (6.16)
This equilibrim n is illustrated  in Figure 1. By using (6.7), (6 .8 ), (6.13) and replacing them  
in (6.15) and 6.16), we obtain:
T ~  T ~  -  Wl ~  b ~  foe ~  a u )Ul (K 1 7^
EI 1 r +  tf +  pfai) j
where w i,u i ,  will be determ ined at the labour m arket equilibrimn. The values of 7f] and  /„.
can be calculated using (6.16) and (6.17). The average efficiency intensity is equal to:
TT =  .so — ad\ =  .so — a—  (6.18)
We can now define the second urban equilibrium.
The urban  equilibrium  2 ( /U2, Ie2,d \ ,  d'j) is such that:
4 = 1 - u 2 (6.19)
d)  =  1 (6 .2 0 )
^ e { d b )  I u .2 , I e2) =  t y u ( d ‘b , I u .2 )  I e,2 )  (^-21)
Vu{d2f , IU2, Ie2) =  R a (6 .2 2 )
This equihbrim n8 is illustrated  in Figure 2. By using (6.7), (6 .8 ), (6.19) and replacing them
8 In the first equilibrium, unemployed may have exploding debt, since they receive b and pay at most R(0). A 
sufficient condition for avoiding the problem is that R(0)  >  b.
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in (6 .2 1 ) and (6 .2 2 ), we obtain:
—  _  W2 - b -  ( a e -  q u ) ( 1  -  ix2)
02 U2~  r  + 6 + p ( l - u 2)
where w 2 , 1x2 , 6 2  will be determ ined at the labour m arket equilibrium. Similarly, I e .2 and IU2 can 
be calculated by using (6.22). The average efficiency intensity is equal to:
  'U <2
~S2 =  «o -  =  '$o -  a ( l  -  Ty) (6-24)
P roposition  1: Whatever the labour market equilibrium, the average search efficiency in 
the urban equilibrium 1 is greater than the one in the urban equilibrium 2, i.e., ~s\ >  sT 
Proof. H\ >  J 2 —u i / 2  >  —(1 — 1x2/ 2 ) •<=> 1x1 4 - 1X2 <  2 which is always true. ■
Before analysing the labour m arket equilibrimn, it can be explained why in this model, the 
location of the firms in the CBD is not a strong assum ption. The model is perfectly symm etric 
in distance: workers wifi be located either to  the right and to  the left of the CBD. Then, if 
a firm wanted to locate closer to the unemployed to face a smaller s, it would have to chose 
one side, and therefore to  be further away from the unemployed of the other side. W ith our 
assm nption of linearity of s(d), the firm will in fact be indifferent between being located in the 
CBD or in the middle of the unemployed. Thus, as long as we do not model the rent paid by 
the firm, the  location of the  firms in the CBD can be seen as the  result of an equilibrimn. 
Before determ ining the labour equilibrium  we can give a general definition of it.
D efin ition  3 A steady-state labour market equilibrium is a triple {w, 6 , u) such that, given the 
matching technology defined by (6 . 1), all agents (workers and firms) maximize their respec­
tive objective function, i.e. this triple is determined by a steady-state condition, a free-entry 
condition fo r  firms and a wage setting determination.
This labour m arket equilibrium  will be studied in two cases. First, when wages are exoge­
nous, second when they are the outcome of a bargaining over the surplus.
6 .4  T h e  la b o u r  m a r k e t  e q u il ib r iu m  w it h  e x o g e n o u s  w a g e
In this section, we assmne th a t the  wage in the economy is exogenous and equal to w\ =  w 2 =  ~w.
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6.4 .1  F ree-entry con d ition  and  labour dem and
We denote by I j  and I y  the  intertem poral profit of a job and of a vacancy respectively. If 7  is 
the search cost for the firm per un it of time, and y  is the product of the m atch, then  I j  and I y  
are w ritten  as (Poisson process):
r l j  = y — w + 6(IV -  I j )  (6.25)
r l y  =  —7  +  q (0 )( lj  -  I y )  (6.26)
As in Pissarides (1990), we assume th a t firms post vacancies up to a point where
I y  =  0 (6.27)
which is a free entry condition. Thus, we have:
' - ^ = 7 7 !  ( 6 - 2 8 )
In o ther words, the value of a job is equal to the expected search cost, i.e. the cost per un it of 
tim e tim es the average duration  of search for the firm. Notice th a t this value is increasing in 1 
the average search efficiency determ ined by the urban equilibrim n since 9 =  V/{uIs)  and q' <  0.
Prom the free entry condition (6.28), we have a decreasing relation between labour m arket 
tightness and wages, which is:
w = y - ( r  + 6 ) - ^  (6.29)
Notice th a t this labour dem and curve is independent on the type of urban  equilibrium. 
It is because, independently of workers’ location, firms post vacancies up to I y  =  0. This is 
illustrated  in Figure 3. The L d curve (6.29) is independent of d& and is downward sloping in 
the plane (9 ,w ). Since the  wage is independent of the urban  equilibrium, we have a unique 
9* = 6-\ =  92- This means th a t, depending on the values of 9*, only one urban  equilibrium  will 
prevail.
T heorem  1: There is a unique urban equilibrium. I f  9*q(9*) >  m (resp. < rn ) ,  Equilibrium
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1 (resp. Equilibrimn 2) prevails, where
_ =  ( a e - QM)(r +  i )  >  0  ( 6  30)
a[w - b )  -  ( a e -  a u)so
P ro o f . By using (6.29) and Lemma 3 , 9 we have: w(9 =  0) -- y. Since by Leimna 3, the labour 
dem and (6.29) is downward sloping and since y > ui,  there exists a unique 9* and thus a unique 
urban  equilibrium.
Moreover, by replacing (6.17) in (6 .1 1 ), (6.23) in (6.12), the result follows. ■
Observe th a t the RHS of (6.30) is composed only by exogenous param eters and therefore 
does not depend on the labour m arket equilibrimn. The intuition of this theorem  is straight­
forward. W hen the probability to obtain a job is very high, the unemployed will locate close to 
the employment center whereas in the other case, they will reside a t the outskirts of the city;
As sta ted  above, equation (6.29) determ ine a unique 9* wliich gives a unique relation between 
v and u. (6.29) rewrites:
q(9) -  f zr— 7  =  0 (6.31)\ w - y )
By to tally  differentiating (6.31), it is easily checked by using Leimna 2 that:
dv 1)9/ du
du 3 6 /dv
> 0 (6.32)
This upward sloping curve in the u  — v space is called the V S  curve. There is a unique 9 
bu t since si ^~ s2, there are two V S  curves labelled V S \  and V S 2 . Moreover, equation (6.31) 
has only one unknown, 9 , thus we can rew rite it in the u — v space as:
whose slopes are
v k =  0*UkSk k =  1,2 (6.33)
= 9*(s0 -  a.u-\) (6.34)
aui oui
=  9*(s 2 +  u 2. ^ )  =  9*(so -  a .( l  -  u 2)) (6.35)
9 All Lemmas are stated and dem onstrated in Appendix 2.
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6 .4 .2  S tea d y -sta te  labour m arket equilibrium
We can now close the model by the following steady-state condition on the flows:
0q{0)sku k =  ( 1  -  u k)8 k =  1 , 2 (6.36)
which is equivalent to:
<5
k =  1 , 2 (6.37)Uh 6 + 6q(8)sk
This equation can be rew ritten as:
<5(1 -  Uk) - v kq(0k) =  0 (6.38)
This equation can be m apped in figure 4 in the plane (uk, v k): it is the  so-called Bev-
plane (uk , v k) and the one corresponding to  Equilibrim n 2 is above the one corresponding to 
Equilibrim n 1.
T h e o r e m  2: When the wage is exogenously deterxnined, there exits a unique and stable- 
labour market equilibrimn characterized by:
Existence, and uniqueness: In the plane (u ,v) ,  for each urban  equilibrimn, we have an 
upward sloping curve (6.31), the V S  curve, th a t cuts the  axes and a downward sloping curve 
(6.38), the Beveridge curve (UV), th a t does not cut the  axes. We have therefore a unique 
labour equilibrimn.
Stability: We use the same argum ent as in Pissarides (1990).
Next, from Lemma 5, the Beveridge curve 2 (the one corresponding to the urban  equilibrium
eridge curve UVk . By using Lemmas 4 and 5, the Beveridge curve (6.38) is decreasing in the
0* = 0i =  02
P ro o f .
2) is always above the Beveridge curve 1. By using (6.34) and (6.35), we have therefore that: 
u*} > u*. ■
The following comments are in order. There is obviously a ’’bad” and a ’’good” urban 
equilibrium. Indeed, in urban equilibrium 1 when all unemployed are close to  the employment 
center, fo r  the same level labour tightness the level o f  unemployment is lower and average search 
efficiency is higher compared to urban equilibrium 2. This means th a t in the la tte r  equilibrium, 
in average, workers tend  to  stay unemployed for a longer period th an  in equilibrium 1 . An 
intuitive in terpretation  is th a t ’’segregated” cities i.e., cities where unemployed workers are 
far away from the employment-center, are less efficient than  ’’in tegrated” cities. This leads to 
interesting government policy predictions. Indeed, the (local) government should try  to impose 
equilibrim n 1. How this is possible ? By looking a t Theorem  1, the following policies are 
possible. The government should, other things being equal, increase the wage received by worker's 
(i.e. subsidize it, in partial equilibrium) and decrease the level o f  unemployment benefits. This 
will lead to a more integrated city because the unemployed will be induced to reside a t the 
vicinity of the  employment center. A nother interesting policy is th a t the government should 
decrease the differential a e — a u, for instance in subsidizing all the commuting costs. It is 
commonly observed in the American cities than  the m ain problem  of access to  employment is 
the com m uting cost. A lot of ’’segregated” cities like e.g. Los Angeles, OA, Detroit, MI, or 
St. Louis, MO, have a very bad  transporta tion  system and thus the access to  employment is 
very difficult. O ur model shows th a t subsiding the com m uting cost by creating for example 
an efficient transporta tion  system  will change the shape of the  city and will cut the level of 
unemployment. The (local) government can also help job seekers. They can help them  by 
reducing their fixed search cost .so or by increasing their variable search cost a, bo th  policies 
inducing them  to  be closer to the employment-center. We can summ arize these results by the 
following proposition.
P r o p o s i t io n  2: By reducing the level o f  unemployment benefit and/or by subsiding the 
wages or the commuting cost, the government can cut the level o f  urban unemployment and a 
segregated city (Eq 2) can be transformed into an more integrated one (Eq 1).
P ro o f . All these actions tends to  reduce m  in Theorem  1, therefore increasing the likelihood 
th a t 9*q(6*) >  m. ■
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The effect of the exogenous wage on the equilibrimn is also interesting to analyse..
P r o p o s i t io n  3: When the exogenous wage increases from the reservation wage of workers 
( I e =  Iu), i.e., b 4 - ( a f. — aiu) .( l — ^ 2 ) to y, then we have urban equilibrium °2, then 1, then 2 
again.
P ro o f .  See Lemmas 8  and 9 ■
The intuition of Proposition 3 is the following. W hen wages are too low, unemployed workers 
have no incentives to  go closer to the CBD to  search because the surplus of being employed is 
low. By contrast, when wages are extremely high (close to y) then firms have no incentive to 
post vacancies and aggregate labour m arket tightness is low.
P r o p o s i t io n  4 ( th e  o p t im a l  level o f  w age): There, are two local minima in unemploy­
m ent with respect to the exogenous wage, one associated with the reservation wage o f  workers, 
the second with the first intersection o f  the two cui'ves in figure 3.
P ro o f . In equilibrimn 2, on the Beveridge curve, u  is always decreasing in 9. This is also true 
in equilibrium  1 in most of the cases. See leimna 10. Therefore, u  is minimized in the second 
equilibrium  for the maximum  value of 9*, i.e., for the lowest possible wage, and in the first 
equilibrim n, for the highest 6* com patible with this equilibrium, i.e., in the first intersection of 
the two curves of figure 3. I
We have here an interesting case where unemployment does not decrease m onotonically 
w ith wages. Since there are incentive mechanisms in the model affecting the location choices, 
themselves implying search efficiency, there could be a level of wage larger than  the reservation 
wage, th a t minimizes unemployment.
R e m a rk  1 : By optim al, we mean minimizing unemployment. It is well know n1L) in search 
models th a t there can be a strictly  positive level of unemployment maximizing welfare. This is 
not our focus here.
R e m a rk  2: Aggregate conditions also play a role in the determ ination of equilibrium: the 
o u tpu t y  of the m atch affects the  profitability of the m atch, therefore the level of job openings 
and thus 9 in (6.29). Bad aggregate conditions increase the tendency to  reject the unemployed 
a t the periphery.
R e m a rk  3: In the model, there is a perfect access to credit m arket, if for instance in
10 See Fissarides (1990), chapter 8 and subsequent references.
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equilibrim n 1 , the unemployed pay high rents in order to  maximize their present-discounted 
value of utility. This perfect access to credit could be modified, in assuming for instance th a t the 
unem ployed face credit constraints. This would obviously complicate the model. This points out 
another type of policy action, which is to  subsidize the access to credit of the unemployed, such 
th a t they can locate in the city a t their optim al distance. Otherwise, we would have involuntary 
locations winch would add up to  involuntary unemployment due to search frictions.
6 .5  W a g e  b a r g a in in g
Let us consider an endogenous wage setting. We assume th a t at each period, the  to ta l in­
tertem poral surplus is shared through a Nash-Bar gaining' process between firms and  workers. 
The to ta l surplus is the sum of the surplus of the workers, I e — IU) and the surplus of the firms 
th a t we define now.
From the free en try  condition (6.28), we still have a decreasing relation between labour 
m arket tightness and  wages (6.29). By contrast, the wage setting  curve W S  (6.42) or (6.43) is 
upw ard sloping and depends crucially on the type of urban  equilibrium  (see Figure 5).
At each period, the  wage is determ ined by :
where k: denotes the  urban  equilibrium.
Observe th a t IUk , the th rea t point for the worker in the u rban  equilibrium  k, does not
yJk = A r g m a x ( I e_k -  Iuk) P ( h k -  h k)' 13 k =  1,2 (6.39)
depend on the current location of the worker, which will relocate if there is a transition. First 
order condition yields:
(6.40)
Since the wage is negotiated a t each period, IUk does not depend on w^,. By using (6 .6 ) and 
(6.28), we can rew rite (6.40) as:
(6.41)
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This defines a positive relationship between wages and labour m arket tightness, th a t is 
sometimes interpreted as a wage setting function or a labour supply function. According to 
the  type of urban  equilibrimn th a t we get, this wage setting equation will differ. In urban  
equilibrium  1 , we obtain:
wi =  (1 -  ft) [6 +  ( a B -  a u)ui\ + ft [y + s(u i)0 i7 ] (6.42)
The wage setting curve described by (6.42) is a positively slope curve in the plan (w, 6). 
Let us in terpret (6.42). The first p a rt of the RHS of (6.42), ( 1  — ft) [b -f (a e — Ou)'Ui] , is what 
firms m ust com pensate in term s of transporta tion  costs to  induce workers just employed to 
stay in the  city plus the miemployment benefit. If we look closer, one can see th a t the firm 
m ust exactly com pensate the transporta tion  cost difference (between the employed and the 
unemployed) of the unemployed worker who is the further away from the CBD, i.e. located 
a t d\ =  u \ .  This is what we call the ’’com pensation effect” . Zenou and Sm ith (1995) have 
obtained a sim ilar condition in the case of efficiency wages. Therefore, when u\  increases, this 
m arginal unemployed worker is further away from the CBD and firms must increases their 
wage to  com pensate the transporta tion  cost difference. The second p a rt of the RHS of (6.42), 
[fty +  s (u i) 0 i 7 ] has an opposite effect. W hen u\  rises the average unemployed (i.e. the one 
located in d =  u 2/2)  is further away from the city-center and then Ins outside option decreases. 
This is w hat we call the ’’outside option effect” . The first effect is a pure spatial cost since 
( a fi — a u)'U] represents the space cost differential between a worker and a unemployed worker 
paying the same bid rent whereas the second effect is a mixed labour-spatial cost one. Notice 
th a t these effects are two externalities in the  model, caused by the spatial dimension. Tins 
is an addition to the th in  m arket externality of the m atching teclmology, already present in 
Pissarides. In urban equilibrium  2, we obtain:
w2 =  (1 -  ft) [6 +  (rte -  a u)(l -  u 2)] +  ft [y +  s ( l  -  u 2 )027) (6.43)
The equation is exactly similar to  (6.42) if one replaces u\  by 1 — u 2. However, the two 
externalities described before have exactly the opposite effect on the wage setting: the first
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one (space cost differential) cuts the bargain wage when U2 increases whereas the second one 
(mixed labour-spatial cost effect) rises the bargain wage when U2 increases: this is because 
now, an increase in U2 moves the first employed to the left, while in equilibrimn 1 , it moved it 
to  the right. Observe also th a t while the two wages are upw ard sloping in the  plane (wk , 9k), 
VffiS'i is steeper than  W $ 2  bu t the intercept of W S \  is lower (see Leimna 6 ). Tins is illustrated 
in Figure 5: for small values of #, W2 > w 1 whereas for large values of 9 , W2 < w\.  In other 
words, if the  labour m arket is not very tense (there are few vacancies com pared to efficient units 
of unemployed workers), the  probability to  get a job is low and thus the com pensation effect 
dom inates the  outside option effect. In the other case when the labour m arket is very tense, 
we obtain  the opposite result.
6 .5 .1  S te a d y -s ta te  la b o u r  m arket eq u ilib r iu m
The two equations (6.29) and (6.42) (resp. (6.43) in the  second equilibrimn) determ ine wages 
and  labour tightness param etrized by u k. As in the previous section, the model is closed by a 
steady-sta te  condition on the flows:
u k = r r ' a ' 6(a » A; = 1 , 2  (6.44)
0  +  9kq{9k)sk
This equation is p lo tted  in figure 4 in the plane (I/, V): it is the  so-called Beveridge curve 
U V .  The distance to  the origin of the curve is strongly depending on ~s. The curve of the 
equilibrim n 9 is given by the intersection in figure 3.
Therefore, we have three equations (6.42) (or (6.43) for equilibrimn 2), (6.29) and (6.36) 
and three unknowns wk, 9k and u k (k =  1,2). We can obtain  the equilibrim n values (denoted 
by the superscript star) as a function of exogenous variables: w l(.)  , 9l() and u k(.).
T h e o r e m  3: h i each urban equilibrium, there exists a unique labour market equilibrium. 
P ro o f . Since for each urban  equilibrium the Beveridge curve is decreasing and convex and does 
not cut the axes and since the curve 9k(uk) is increasing and concave for the urban  equilibria, 
it m ust be th a t the labour equilibrium  exists and is unique. ■
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6 .5 .2  E x isten ce  and un iqueness o f  urban equilibrium
Condition (6 . 1 1 ) has to  be satisfied in urban equilibrium 1 and the inverse inequality (6 .1 2 ) has
to be satisfied in urban equilibrium 2 .
P r o p o s i t io n  5: At the labour market equilibrium with endogenous wage, urban equilibrium 
1 'prevails i f f  9\ > I and urban equilibrium 2 prevails i f f  9\ <  I, where
P ro o f .  If we replace Ie — Iu in (6.11) and (6.12) respectively with (6.41), the result follows. ■
P r o p o s i t io n  6 :
U  @1 <  $2 , then i f  an urban equilibrium exists, it is unique. We have three cases:
•  i f  fi* < « 2  <  *. urban equilibrium 2 exists and is unique;
•  i f  I < 9\ <  $2 , urban equilibrium 1 exists and is unique;
•  i f  9\ <1 < 92 , there is no urban equilibrium.
I f  @2 <  9*, an urban equilibrium always exists but is not necessarily unique. We have also 
three cases:
•  i f  # 2  <  f  urban equilibrium 2 exists and is unique;
•  i f  I < 91 < 0 {, urban equilibrium 1 exists and is unique;
•  i f  0 % < I < 0 \, both urban equilibria exist.
This proposition describes all the possible situations th a t can arise when the wage is en­
dogenously determined.
R e m a rk  4: The critical value I defined by (6.45) is exactly equal to  9 (see (6.56) in Leimna 
6 ) winch is the unique, value of 6  when the fine W S \  defined by (6.42) intersects the line W 8 2  
defined by (6.43).
T h e o r e m  4: There exists a unique urban equilibrimn and only the two following cases are- 
possible. I f  9\ < 9\ < 7, urban equilibrimn 2 exists and is unique. I f  I < 9* < 92 , urban 
equilibrium 1 exists and is unique.
(6.45)
Proof. 9k is determ ined by the intersection of the labour dem and curve and the wage setting 
line (see Figure 5). Two situations are possible. E ither the  labour dem and curve cuts the wage 
setting  before the intersection point (w, 9) (which defined in Leimna 6 ) or after it. In the first 
case, we have: 9% < 9\ < I = 9, and then according to  Proposition 4, there is only one unique 
u rban  equilibrium  which is equilibrimn 2. In the second case, we have: I = 9 <  9\ < 9% and 
according to Proposition 4 only equilibrium  1 exists. ■
Observe th a t m ultiple urban  equilibria can never happen here because the condition for 
m ultiple equilibria is 9*2 <  I < 9\ and it can never be satisfied since the intersection of the 
labour dem and with the wage setting  line never satisfies this condition. This is due to the fact 
th a t 1 = 9. Observe also th a t we exclude the case when the labour dem and curve intersects 
the two wage setting curves a t exactly (w ,9 ). This corresponds to the  urban  equilibrium  where 
the slopes of the bid rents for the unemployed and the employed are equal and th is can never 
happen  because of our assum ption on bid rents.
6 .6  C o n c lu s io n
We have developed a model th a t integrates land and labour m arkets. Search efficiency is assumed 
and then  proved to  be negatively depending on distance. In this case, the  urban configuration 
of workers has a strong im pact on average search efficiency and therefore on incentives for firms 
to  create jobs. The rent plays a m ajor role here: according to  the different incentives for the 
workers to  be closer from the CBD (transport costs and search efficiency), a category of workers 
can reject the other to  the  periphery. In the case where unemployed are far from the city center, 
the  outcom e is likely to  be very bad  since search efficiency will be in average very low. The key 
issues underlined in the present paper are:
•  first, u rban  equilibrimn m atters on the labour m arket and have an im pact b o th  on equi­
librim n unemployment and on search effort.
•  second, higher wages due for instance to greater bargaining power increase the surplus of 
the  workers and as a consequence, their incentive to  be closer from the CBD and more 
efficient in their job search. This generates a more efficient labour m arket.
222
•  third, w ith respect to  Benabou’s im portant contributions (1993, 1996), the  welfare aspects 
of location-segregation of workers don’t rely on a trade-off between local com plem entari­
ties in hum an capital accum ulation and global com plem entarities in the production, bu t 
instead on the interactions between local factors (rent, distance to employment centers) 
and global factors (labour m arket tightness, wages).
•  last, aggregate changes (for instance variations in y  the production of a m atch) tend to 
be amplified by the endogenous choices of locations of workers: bad  aggregate conditions 
are associated with rising suburbanization of the unemployed. Since suburbanization has 
adverse effects on search, location choices play a role of amplificator of the aggregate 
conditions.
A ppend ix  1: E ndogeneous choice o f search effort
In the previous sections, we have made the assumption that search efficiency is a decreasing function 
of distance between workers and firms. In search theory, efficiency is primarily seen as a function of 
effort of workers, rather than from the location of workers. We can modify the model in this direction 
to get slightly more complicated results, but easy to understand given that the intuitions of the model 
are exactly the same.
The search process of the workers is modelled as follows. The search efficiency s  depends on the 
worker’s effort, which is denoted by e. We assume decreasing returns to scale in the effort, i. e., s' (e)  >  0 
and s ' \ e )  <  0. As before each interview is made in the CBD and therefore involves transport costs. 
Thus we assume that the search commuting cost is an increasing and convex (or linear) function of 
the effort level e devoted to job search, i.e., a !u( e) >  0 and 0!^(e) >  0. There is therefore a trade-off 
between the search costs which are here associated to direct costs and the gains associated with a higher 
probability to exit from unemployment. The value of unemployment can now be written as:
r l u{d) =  b -  (a s + a u(e))d -  R(d)  +  p(c)  [.Maxd>Ie{ d ') -  Iu{d)] (6.46)
where p(e)  =  6q(9)s (c ) .  The the value of employment is still
v l e{d) = w - ( a s + a e) d  -  R(d)  +  <5 [ M a x d,Iu{d!) -  I e(d)] (6.47)
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The unemployed worker located at a distance x  from the CBD chooses e* that maximizes his 
intertemporal utility (6.46). First order condition yields:
p'(e‘)(Ie -Iu) = ^ l(t', )d (6.48)
The interpretation is straightforward. The LHS of (6.48) is the marginal probability generated by 
one more interview times the surplus of a worker when he leaves unemployment whereas the RHS of
(6.48) is the marginal commuting cost of searching for a job. Of course both are equated when e =  e*.
By totally differentiating (6.48), we obtain:
fo* = _________________________  0
dd 9q($)s"(c*){le -  /„) -  n"(e*)<i
and thus
3s 3s  de 
dd d e d d  ^
The bid rent of the employed and its slope are still the same and given by:
tye(d, Ie , I u ) = W  — (aa +  OCe)d +  S(IU -  I e)  -  Ie
d ^ e{dJe ,Tu)
d d
The bid rent of the unemployed is now:
— — ((^s +  Gif) <  0
d d
d 2$ o ( d ,  / e, Iu) /  d a u de*
tyu{d, I e, Iu) =  b -  [g s  +  G!u(e*(rf))J x  +  a ( c * ( d ) ) ( I e -  Iu) -  Iu (6.50)
and by the Envelope theorem, the slope of the unemployed bid rent is:
d t y u ( d } Ie,, Iu)
=  - [ a ,  +  a„(e*(d))j < °  (6-51)
>  0 (6.52)
d d 2 \  de* d d
It follows that the unemployed bid rent is decreasing and convex with the distance to the CBD. Thus 
different configurations can emerge. The two as before and third one when the unemployed locate both 
at the vicinity of the CBD and at the outskirts of the city whereas the employed reside in between the
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unemployed.
The average search intensity is now given by an integral defined over the location of unemployed:
$ =  I s ( e * ( x ) ) d x  (6.53)
Unemployed,
where x  replaces distance in the integral for convenience.
A p p e n d ix  2
Lemma 1: For both the exogenous and endogenous wage, we have the following properties of the 
function q{9) and 9q{9)\
q'{9) < 0 ; q"{9) >  0
dq(9) 9 
— 1 <rfk ~  ~S9~q{9)  <
Proof. The results stem directly from the properties of the matching function ^(.). B
Lemma 2: For the two urban equilibria, the following relations always hold along the (VS) curve 
(6.33):
^ > 0  ; f ^ < 0  * = 1 , 2
ovk OUk
Proof. Since 9k =  Vkf(skUk),  we have:
^  =  - 4 r - > 0  VA: =  1, 2
ovk Uk#k
9 9 k v k ( _  (Jsk
Sk +  Uk
Next,
M k = _ _  
d u k (u ks k) 2 V "
Let us start with urban equilibrium 2 where #2 — •<?0 — ft(l — U2 / 2 ) and (SS2 /&U2 — 11/ 2 >  0. This 
implies that:
0
OU2
Consider now urban equilibrium 1 where Si =  .so — ft'Ui/2 and (Js\ /du\  =  —a/2  <  0. We have 
therefore:
d 9\  v \
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This can easily be rewritten as:
3 6 \ /  1 a
3u\  \u~i 2 ?i
But
1 a  /  N A—  >  —-  <=> .so — au i =  .s(ai) >  0
u\  2 ,si
which is always true. Therefore,
<9fli
chii
< 0
Lemma 3: For both the exogenous and endogenous wage, in the plane (9 ,w ), the labour demand 
curve (6.29) is downward sloping and convex. It cuts the axes at w { 6  =  0) =  y  and 0(w =  0) =  $ >  0 
where 0  is defined by the following equation: q(6 ) =  (r  +  6 )7 jy .
P roof. By differentiating (6.29), we obtain:
3w
~de =  ( r + 5 ) r ^ < 0
_  =  - 2 . ( r  +  5 )7 q"{8)q(0) -  2 q'(8)2
By assuming that 7]qi >  27jq, we have:
<9 w
> 0
whprp n , _  dq(6) ewnere 7]q> — de ql^ a n d 7 ) q — df) q e^y
Then by using (6.29), we easily obtain:
w{9 =  0 ) = y  and 0{w =  0) =  9 =  >  q
ft ci'j
Lemma 4: For both the exogenous and endogenous wage, in the plane (Vk,Uk), k — 1,2, the 
Beveridge curve (6.36) is decreasing. It cuts the axes at Uk(vk =  0) =  +00  and v^U k  =  0) =  +CX3.
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Proof. By totally differentiating (6.38):
+  v kq,(6k)(86k/ d u k) =  +  (1  -  u)/W-&Sk/duk\duk
Then, since q'(0k){d9k/duk)  '> 0 from Lemma 2, in equilibrium 1, we always have dv \!  du\ <C. 0. In 
equilibrium 2, 1 +  (1 — u) /~$~.(Js /  3 u k can be rewritten as 1/5*7 : [.*>(1/2)] >  0. Then, in all cases,
Vf c = l , 2
duk
Next, by using (6.36), we have:
v k(uk =  0 ) =  +cx) and u k(vk =  0 ) =  Too
Lemma 5: For both the exogenous and endogenous wage, in the plane (9, w ), the Beveridge curve in 
urban equilibrium 2 is always above the Beveridge curve in urban equilibrium 1.
Proof. Since the two Beveridge curves have the same slopes everywhere and do not cut the axes, we must 
show that if v\  =  V2 =  v then u\  < U2 ■ By using (6.36) and by observing that <5(1 —u k) =  Tj u^ii, v), 
we have:
x(J^uk,v)  +  6.uk = 6 (6.54)
By the implicit functions theorem, there exists locally a function u = F(sk^ v). Given the monotonicity 
of the arguments in (6.54), the function exists everywhere, and it is easy to check that F-[ <  0. Therefore, 
since ,<>i >  s 2 from Proposition 1, we get the result.
■
Lemma 6 : For the endogenous wage only, in the plane (0k)w k), k =  1,2, the two lines (6.42) and 
(6.43) are upward sloping. The line (6.42) is steeper than (6.43) but the intercept of (6.42) is lower than 
the one of (6.43). The intersection point between these two lines is equal to:
b +  —'( a e; — a u).so 
a
+ Py  (6.55)
1 —6 ( ae — a u)
— r ~ —  — 6.56)
P . . a 7 . . . . .
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P roof. Along (6.42) we have d w \ / d 6 \  = p(so — (lui)'y. Along (6.43) we have dw2/0$2  =  P($Q — 
a ( l  — U2 ))7 - Then we have 3w \ /d 6 \  >  dw\/d02  u-[ +  U2 <  1. This is always true for reasonable
values of lii and U2-
m  (0 i =  o) =  (1  -  p) [b +  ( a e -  otu)ui] +  py
< W2 ( 0 2 =  0 ) =  ( 1  — p) [b +  (q:c -  a u)( 1 -  u 2)) +  py  ^  u\  4- u\  <  1 .
To find the intersection point, one has to solve (6.42)=(6.43). I
Lemma 7: For the endogenous wage only and whatever the urban equilibrium, we have the following
relation:
—  < 0  , Vf c = l , 2  (6.57)
duk
Proof. Observe from (6.42) or (6.43) that:
=  (1 -  P)(ote -  a u) -  pci'yd-i (6.58)
OClbk
along the wage setting curves. From (6.45) dwk/Odik  is positive in Equilibrium 1, and negative in
Equilibrium 2. Therefore, since di i =  U\ and df,2 =  1 — U2 , we have in all cases dwk/ddbk  >  0, then
by intersection with (6.31), (6.57) is true in all urban equilibria. H
Lemma 8 : In the exogenous wage case, there are either 0 or 2 intersections of the curve 9l(w) where
6l is determined by 9lq(9l) = rri and the L d curve (6.29).
Proof. m  is monotonically decreasing in w  from +cxd in b-\-(ac — a u).So/a to 0 in + 0 0 . Therefore, the 
limit value of 9 which determines the urban equilibrium is also decreasing from + 0 0  to 0 over the same 
interval of ui. Then, we have to compare this value of 9 to the labour demand curve (6.31), decreasing 
from a positive value in 0 to 0 in Tv =  y. See also figure 3. Except in the case where there would be a 
single tangency point, both curves never intersect or intersect twice. M
Lemma 9: Denote by w a and w 5 the wages of the two intersections. If TZ7 <  w a or w > w 5 then we
are in urban equilibrium 2. If wa < w < W b  then we are in equilibrium 1.
Proof. In the first case, 9* <  9\  then from Theorem 1, we are in the second equilibrium. In the second 
case, 9* >  9l, then from Theorem 1, we are in the first equilibrium. I
Lemma 10: On the Beveridge curve, the lowest wage is reached at the highest 9*.
P roof. On the Beveridge curve, we have:-^p = <5 =  0q{6). Denote by F {u ) =  Zop(-^p = ). Then F'  < 0 
in the two urban equilibria. In the second equilibrium, F'  =  j — <  0 as long as U2 <  0.5.
In the first equilibrium, F'  =   ^ <  0 ^  (1 — 2ui).(,‘?o — o,u\ ^  ^ which is true
if u \ \_^2uiXl *s ran£e [0,1], and if u \ <  0.5 H
Table 6.1a: Unemployment rates in large U.S. MSAs
Unemp. center Unemp. suburbs
New York, NY, MSA 8 .2 4.5
Los Angeles, OA PMSA 8.9 7.2
Chicago, IL PMSA 6.7 4.4
Houston, TX PMSA 7.0 4.5
Philadelphia, PA PMSA 7.6 5.2
San Diego, OA MSA 6.5 6.3
Dallas, TX PMSA 5.9 3.9
Phoenix, AZ MSA 3.8 3.3
Detroit, MI PMSA 1 0 .0 4.0
San Antonio, TX MSA 5.0 3.2
PMSA: Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area; MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area ;
Unemp. center: Unemployment rate in the city center in 1995 ; Unemp. suburbs: Unemployment 
rate in the suburbs in 1995
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Table 6.1 Id : IJnem ployment rates in Prioritary Districts, France
PD Agglomerations with a t least 1 PD France
Unemp. rate 19.7 11.5 1 0 . 8
U.R: Men 20-24 24.1 16.8 14.8
U.R: Women 20-24 34.0 24.0 25.3
Share of long term  unemp. 30.7 27.8 28.2
PD: Prioritary Districts; Source: French Census 1990; Long term Unemployed: more than 2 years.
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Figure 6-1: Urban Equilibrium 1 (UE)
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Figure 6-2: Urban Equilibrium 2 (EU)
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